This reverts commit 9899568f.

Reason for revert: Reports of high numbers of SELinux denials
showing up on the SELinux dashboard.

Bug: 110043362
Change-Id: Id8fc260c47ffd269ac2f15ff7dab668c959e3ab0

What changed:
- Removed cgroup access from untrusted and priv apps.
- Settings app writes to /dev/stune/foreground/tasks, so system_app domain
retains access to cgroup.
- libcutils exports API to /dev/{cpuset, stune}/*. This API seems to be used
abundantly in native code. So added a blanket allow rule for (coredomain - apps)
to access cgroups.
- For now, only audit cgroup access from vendor domains. Ultimately, we want to
either constrain vendor access to individual domains or, even better, remove
vendor access and have platform manage cgroups exclusively.

Bug: 110043362
Test: adb shell setprop ro.config.per_app_memcg true, device correctly populates
/dev/memcg on a per app basis on a device that supports that.
Test: aosp_sailfish, wahoo boot without cgroup denials
Change-Id: I9e441b26792f1edb1663c660bcff422ec7a6332b

Bug: 117440207
Bug: 111890351
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ie218dec3e4f0f5dbade6d1c4d28b259909664056

This daemon is very locked down. Only system_server can access it.

Bug: 72170747
Change-Id: I7b72b9191cb192be96001d84d067c28292c9688f

We plan on migrating MetricsLogger to write to statsd socket. So we need to
allow zygote, which writes to logd using MetricsLogger, to also be able
to statsd. We also re-locate some sepolicies to write to statsd socket
in their respective policy definitions.

Bug: 110537511
Test: no failure/violations observed
Change-Id: I21fd352a25ed946516f9a45ac3b5e9bf97b059bc

Bug: 117178352
Test: no denials to /system/asan.options on asan walleye
Change-Id: I6042693afb926a22a3e2be79bd2a7ba062806143

A default set of options are available, but can override in a fstab
overlay entry with upperdir=, lowerdir= to the same mount point,
workdir=.  The default is a valid /mnt/scratch/overlay/
or /cache/overlay/ directory, with .../<mount_point>/upper and
.../<mount_point>/work, associated with each system partition
<mount_point>.

Test: manual
Bug: 109821005
Change-Id: I5662c01fad17d105665be065f6dcd7c3fdc40d95

Bug: 111215474
Test: boots
Change-Id: Ib8cabeb64a8b4ec9f592d870bd0af611a2720cc7

apexd is a new daemon for managing APEX packages installed
on the device. It hosts a single binder service, "apexservice".

Bug: 112455435
Test: builds, binder service can be registered,
      apexes can be accessed, verified and mounted
Change-Id: I634ad100f10b2edcd9a9c0df0d33896fa5d4ed97

Isolated apps provide a very strict security guarantee, including the
inability to create networking sockets like TCP / UDP sockets. Add an
SELinux neverallow assertion to test for this and prevent regressions.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I2618abb17375707eb1048e89faa46f57d33e1df4

New maintenance scheme for mapping files:
Say, V is the current SELinux platform version, then at any point in time we
only maintain (V->V-1) mapping. (V->V-n) map is constructed from top (V->V-n+1)
and bottom (V-n+1->V-n) without changes to previously maintained mapping files.

Caveats:
- 26.0.cil doesn't technically represent 27.0->26.0 map, but rather
current->26.0. We'll fully migrate to the scheme with future releases.

Bug: 67510052
Test: adding new public type only requires changing the latest compat map
Change-Id: Iab5564e887ef2c8004cb493505dd56c6220c61f8

Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I6a8ff2200c82b6ecdc1404bc7cf186f439950a30

Map proc_qtaguid_ctrl to qtaguid_proc, not qtaguid_device.
Map proc_slabinfo to proc in the correct place.

Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I37c9dfe40bd20924215856b5d4ff7d9b3cbd0417

Remove these files from proc_net_type. Domains that need access must
have permission explicitly granted. Neverallow app access except the
shell domain.

Bug: 114475727
Test: atest CtsLibcoreOjTestCases
Test: netstat, lsof
Test: adb bugreport
Change-Id: I2304e3e98c0d637af78a361569466aa2fbe79fa0

Bug: 116732452
Test: No sepolicy violations observed with this change
(cherry picked from commit I1958182dd8ecc496625da2a2a834f71f5d43e7bb)

Change-Id: Ib386767d8acfacf9fedafd9a79dd555ce233f41c

Bug: 111890351
Test: manual
Change-Id: I37d632c9877c6d6f929937d8e25098763807630c

This change is for testing potential app-compat issues when removing
access to file in /proc/net. See: b/114475727#comment11.

Bug: 114475727
Test: build/boot taimen.
Test: atest CtsLibcoreOjTestCases
Test: FileSystemPermissionTest
Test: ListeningPortsTest b/114772424
Change-Id: I1db1c2b41308e47c9ec9db57ea8597a650c8906d
(cherry picked from commit 6784f80b)

In the next Android release, there will be devices that have no
xt_qtaguid module at all and framework and netd will decide which code
path it takes for trafficStats depending on the device setup. So all
apps and services should not depend on this device specific
implementation anymore and use public API for the data they need.

Bug: 114475331
Bug: 79938294
Test: QtaguidPermissionTest

Change-Id: I0d37b2df23782eefa2e8977c6cdbf9210db3e0d2

Bug: 111098596
Test: atrace/systrace

(cherry picked from commit 9ed5cf6e)

Change-Id: I97772ff21754d03a0aea0d53b39e8da5312a17c0

system_file_type is a new attribute used to identify files which exist
on the /system partition. It's useful for allow rules in init, which are
based off of a blacklist of writable files. Additionally, it's useful
for constructing neverallow rules to prevent regressions.

Additionally, add commented out tests which enforce that all files on
the /system partition have the system_file_type attribute. These tests
will be uncommented in a future change after all the device-specific
policies are cleaned up.

Test: Device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Id9bae6625f042594c8eba74ca712abb09702c1e5

/system/usr/share/zoneinfo is currently labeled zoneinfo_data_file,
a label shared with /data/misc/zoneinfo. However, each of these
directory locations has different security characteristics. In
particular, the files in /system/usr/share/zoneinfo must never be
writable, whereas /data/misc/zoneinfo may be written to by system_server.
Reusing the same label hides these different security characteristics.

Create a separate label for /system/usr/share/zoneinfo.

Test: Device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: I8cf16ff038b06b38f77388e546d9b7a6865f7879

Fixes:
avc: denied { read } for comm="init" name="linker_asan64" dev="sda22" ino=1833
scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_linker_exec:s0 tclass=lnk_file
permissive=0

Bug: 116486312
Test: adb unroot && adb shell ls -l /system/bin/linker_asan
Change-Id: I754daaf3576e83d516cc9189b8be04dcc41bbc5c

Create a new service type buffer_hub_binder_service for
BufferHubBinderService and allow bufferhubd to publish the service.

Add the service to 26.0, 27.0 and 28.0 compat ignore files since the
service is not available in past versions.

Fixes: 116022258
Test: build passed

Change-Id: I5a21f00329ed474433d96c8d1ce32377f20cada3

This adds /proc/uid_io/stats to the files that system server is able to
read.

Test: Manual test on master produces no selinux violations.
Change-Id: I2c7afec149f893b000094739d91531dec559de6f

Allow vold to run exFAT filesystem check.

Test: build, mount exFAT volume
Bug: 80202067
Change-Id: I68f3438de89246e806cebe483f37e31c68aaa3d7

Assert that only apps and installd may open private app files.

Remove "open" permission for mediaserver/vold and remove their
neverallow exemption.

Test: verify no related audit messages in the logs.
Test: build
Fixes: 80300620
Fixes: 80418809
Bug: 80190017
Change-Id: If0c1862a273af1fedd8898f334c9b0aa6b9be728

Bug: 111461540
Bug: 112570477

Test: builds
Change-Id: Icc68720ebe931c2d917703b2d34aa0f4eec3f549
Merged-In: Icc68720ebe931c2d917703b2d34aa0f4eec3f549

...to reflect that the HAL operates on storage devices,
not filesystem.

Bug: 111655771
Test: compiles
Change-Id: Ibb0572cb1878359e5944aa6711331f0c7993ba6e
Merged-In: Ibb0572cb1878359e5944aa6711331f0c7993ba6e

This change limits global access to /system files down to:
/system/bin/linker*
/system/lib[64]/*
/system/etc/ld.config*
/system/etc/seccomp_policy/*
/system/etc/security/cacerts/*
/system/usr/share/zoneinfo/*

Bug: 111243627
Test: boot device, browse internet without denials to system_* types.
Test: VtsHalDrmV1_{1, 0}TargetTest without denials
Change-Id: I69894b29733979c2bc944ac80229e84de5d519f4

kernel commit 2a4c22426955d4fc04069811997b7390c0fb858e (fs: switch order
of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH checks) swapped the order of
dac_override and dac_read_search checks.  Domains that have dac_override
will now generate spurious denials for dac_read_search unless they also
have that permission.  Since dac_override is a strict superset of
dac_read_search, grant dac_read_search to all domains that already have
dac_override to get rid of the denials.

Bug: 114280985
Bug: crbug.com/877588
Test: Booted on a device running 4.14.
Change-Id: I5c1c136b775cceeb7f170e139e8d4279e73267a4

This allows the trace producer daemon to snapshot counters at
high frequency in the trace. As usual for Perfetto, this data is
NOT made available to arbitrary apps but only to an extremely
limited subset of processes governed by selinux rules (currently
shell and statsd).

Bug: 115956288
Change-Id: I7e1bfda4b568b9bac9012b198ecbb998da4f773d

Test: Build.
Change-Id: I5c02916dfa3b2e8d5ba2bc586d05a69bd1f1254f
Merged-In: I150bc74b13a77f00a7e8b31a6c2edf9654bdbe59

Add additional compile time constraints on the ability to ptrace various
sensitive domains.

llkd: remove some domains which llkd should never ptrace, even on
debuggable builds, such as kernel threads and init.

crash_dump neverallows: Remove the ptrace neverallow checks because
it duplicates other neverallow assertions spread throughout the policy.

Test: policy compiles and device boots
Change-Id: Ia4240d1ce7143b983bb048e046bb4729d0af5a6e

Bug: 9496886
Bug: 109758967
Test: atest HostsideVpnTests
Change-Id: I1716d9c740b374b861e691b31ab271c681cf6bff

Test: manual test

BUG: b/112432890
Change-Id: If703cd25a2c0864ffd49bfdc83821fae291974b5

Test: comments only. Policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ic51533d37fff6c553950a122f33a48e3c119c67c

Currently, both untrusted apps and priv-apps use the SELinux file label
"app_data_file" for files in their /data/data directory. This is
problematic, as we really want different rules for such files. For
example, we may want to allow untrusted apps to load executable code
from priv-app directories, but disallow untrusted apps from loading
executable code from their own home directories.

Commit 23c9d91b introduced a new type
called privapp_data_file and added rules necessary to preserve
compatibility. However, that change did not relabel any existing files,
so effectively the change was a no-op.

This change performs the switch, relabeling priv-app's /data/data files
from app_data_file to privapp_data_file. Due to the compatibility rules
added in 23c9d91b, there should be no
noticeable effect from this change.

This change was originally submitted as
4df57822. However, it was reverted in
cdc6649a due to a different labeling
bug. That bug has been fixed, and we can reapply this change.

Test: Factory reset and boot - no problems on fresh install.
Test: Upgrade to new version and test. No compatibility problems on
      filesystem upgrade.
Bug: 112357170

Kernel commit 8a2af06415ef0fc922162503dd18da0d9be7771f (ashmem: switch
to ->read_iter) switched ashmem from using __vfs_read to vfs_iter_read
to read the backing shmem file.  Prior to this, reading from an ashmem
fd that was passed between processes didn't hit any permission checks;
now SELinux checks that the receiver can read from the creator's file
context.

Some apps receive buffers through ashmem from system_server, e.g., the
settings app reads battery stats from system_server through ashmem when
an app details page is opened.  Restore this ability by giving apps read
access to system_server_tmpfs.  system_server is still responsible for
creating and passing across the ashmem buffers, so this doesn't give
apps the ability to read anything system_server isn't willing to give
them.

Bug: 112987536
Bug: 111381531
Test: atest android.appsecurity.cts.PermissionsHostTest on kernel 4.14
Change-Id: Ice5e25f55bc409e91ad7e8c7ea8b28ae213191a3

Historically most uses of atrace happen via the shell domain.

There are two exceptions:
- boot tracing
- traced_probes

We need to get feature parity, so atrace has the same behavior
when is invoked either via shell or from its own domain (e.g.
via traced_probes that has an auto_trans rule into atrace on exec).
Atrace works by setting system properties to enable tracing from userspace
then poking all the binder services to read the system properties (see [1]) so
enabling the system_server category requires the ability to call binder
methods on the system_server.

For more use cases see b/113127224

[1]: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/9ead54bed65d486fe435793cbe98ed8b4786f7be/cmds/atrace/atrace.cpp#545

Bug: 113127224
Test: Add an atrace category to the Perfetto config and confirm the data
shows up.

Change-Id: Id077eff960ffb1cdd7b0ce84b21ac9ef70444a4a

https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/af63f4193f9fbbbac50fc766417d74735afd87ef
allows a security policy writer to determine whether transitions under
nosuid / NO_NEW_PRIVS should be allowed or not.

Define these permissions, so that they're usable to policy writers.

This change is modeled after refpolicy
https://github.com/TresysTechnology/refpolicy/commit/1637a8b407c85f67f0b2ca5c6d852cef3c999087

Test: policy compiles and device boots
Test Note: Because this requires a newer kernel, full testing on such
   kernels could not be done.
Change-Id: I9866724b3b97adfc0cdef5aaba6de0ebbfbda72f