Values of the following properties are set by SoC vendors on some
devices including Pixels.
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- persist.vendor.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- ro.bt.bdaddr_path
- wlan.driver.status

So they should be whitelisted for compatibility.

Bug: 77633703
Test: succeeded building and tested with Pixels
Change-Id: Ib2b81bcc1fd70ddd571dc7fb2b923b576d62b7d5
Merged-In: Ib2b81bcc1fd70ddd571dc7fb2b923b576d62b7d5
(cherry picked from commit 224921d1)

Values of the following properties are set by SoC vendors on some
devices including Pixels.
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- persist.vendor.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- ro.bt.bdaddr_path
- wlan.driver.status

So they should be whitelisted for compatibility.

Bug: 77633703
Test: succeeded building and tested with Pixels
Change-Id: Ib2b81bcc1fd70ddd571dc7fb2b923b576d62b7d5

Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.

To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.

Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
    navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
    Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest

Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457

Because applications should be able to set the receive
timeout on UDP encapsulation sockets, we need to allow
setsockopt(). getsockopt() is an obvious allowance as
well.

Bug: 68689438
Test: compilation
Merged-In: I2eaf72bcce5695f1aee7a95ec03111eca577651c
Change-Id: I2eaf72bcce5695f1aee7a95ec03111eca577651c

Because applications should be able to set the receive
timeout on UDP encapsulation sockets, we need to allow
setsockopt(). getsockopt() is an obvious allowance as
well.

Bug: 68689438
Test: compilation
Change-Id: I2eaf72bcce5695f1aee7a95ec03111eca577651c

CTS tests need to be able to call, from hostside:
adb shell cmd stats dump-report (and others)
On a user build, this will fail because of an selinux policy violation
from shell. This cl fixes this by granting shell permission.

Similarly, Settings needs to communicate with statsd, so
system_app-statsd binder calls are given permission.

Bug: 72961153
Bug: 73255014
Test: run cts-dev -m CtsStatsdHostTestCases -t android.cts.statsd.atom.HostAtomTests
Test: manual confirmation
Change-Id: I6589ab4ef5c91a4a7f78eb97b63d9bb43e3d8f02

Bug: 65643247
Test: manual
Test: browse internet
Test: take a picture
Change-Id: I9faff44b7a025c7422404d777113e40842ea26dd

This is needed to allow system apps to know whether security
logging is enabled, so that they can in this case log additional
audit events.

Test: logged a security event from locally modified KeyChain app.
Bug: 70886042
Change-Id: I9e18d59d72f40510f81d1840e4ac76a654cf6cbd

This gives the privilege to system apps, platform apps,
ephemeral apps, and privileged apps to receive a
UDP socket from the system server. This is being added
for supporting UDP Encapsulation sockets for IPsec, which
must be provided by the system.

This is an analogous change to a previous change that
permitted these sockets for untrusted_apps:
0f75a62e

Bug: 70389346
Test: IpSecManagerTest, System app verified with SL4A
Change-Id: Iec07e97012e0eab92a95fae9818f80f183325c31

This CL lists all the exported platform properties in
private/exported_property_contexts.

Additionally accessing core_property_type from vendor components is
restricted.
Instead public_readable_property_type is used to allow vendor components
to read exported platform properties, and accessibility from
vendor_init is also specified explicitly.

Note that whitelisting would be applied only if
PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY is set on.

Bug: 38146102
Test: tested on walleye with PRODUCT_COMPATIBLE_PROPERTY=true
Change-Id: I304ba428cc4ca82668fec2ddeb17c971e7ec065e

Dontaudit denials for services that system_app may not use due
to neverallow assertions.

Bug: 67779088
Test: build
Change-Id: I822a7909c86bee5c2fdeec6e13af1a9791883f72

Bug: 37916906
Test: Builds 'n' boots.
Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668
Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb

Used to display kernel version in settings app.

avc: denied { read } for name="version" dev="proc"
scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_version:s0
tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 66985744
Test: kernel version now displayed in settings app.
Change-Id: I53f92f63362b900347fd393a40d70ccf5d220d30

Bug: 37916906
Test: Builds 'n' boots.
Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668
Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb

This change is the bare minimum needed to publish a new vold
Binder service and move the simple "reset" call over to go through
the new interface.

The new rules here are mirrored on the existing installd rules, but
with a handful of neverallow rules relaxed due to funky interactions
with hal_client_domain().

Test: builds, boots
Bug: 13758960
Change-Id: Ia9522ea7a68698cb0edce7879abfbf22b9d67c76

long live domain.te!

Remove all references.

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Merged-In: I99953ecc7d275fdbe8e56d8f47a27d1f9e1cc09a
Change-Id: I99953ecc7d275fdbe8e56d8f47a27d1f9e1cc09a

long live domain.te!

Remove all references.

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Change-Id: I99953ecc7d275fdbe8e56d8f47a27d1f9e1cc09a
(cherry picked from commit b8d14dc9a6b1593c4ad5210f3079bcac3a9aea33)

Remove "granted" logspam. Grante the observed permissions to the
individual processes that need them and remove the permission from
domain_deprecated.

avc: granted { read open } for comm="ndroid.settings"
path="/proc/version" dev="proc" ino=4026532081
scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { getattr } for comm=4173796E635461736B202332
path="/proc/pagetypeinfo" dev="proc" ino=4026532129
scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read open } for comm="uncrypt" path="/proc/cmdline"
dev="proc" ino=4026532072 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read open } for comm="update_engine"
path="/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id" dev="proc" ino=15852829
scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read open } for comm="tiveportallogin"
path="/proc/vmstat" dev="proc" ino=4026532130
scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0
tclass=file

This change is specifically not granting the following since it
should not be allowed:
avc: granted { read open } for comm="crash_dump64"
path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532416
scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for comm="crash_dump64" name="filesystems"
dev="proc" ino=4026532416 scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="crash_dump64"
path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532416
scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 64032843
Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Change-Id: Ib309e97b6229bdf013468dca34f606c0e8da96d0

Grant audited permissions collected in logs.

tcontext=platform_app
avc: granted { getattr } for comm=496E666C6174657254687265616420
path="/" dev="dm-0" ino=2 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir

tcontext=system_app
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="android:ui" path="/" dev="dm-0"
scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="android:ui" path="/" dev="dm-0"
scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir

tcontext=update_engine
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="update_engine" path="/" dev="dm-0"
ino=2 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0
tclass=dir
avc: granted { getattr } for comm="update_engine" path="/fstab.foo"
dev="dm-0" ino=25 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for comm="update_engine" path="/fstab.foo"
dev="dm-0" ino=25 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Change-Id: I6135eea1d10b903a4a7e69da468097f495484665

The fuse_device neverallow rules are too aggressive and are inhibiting
certain vendor customizations. Relax the /dev/fuse neverallow rules so
that they better reflect the security invariants we want to uphold.

Bug: 37496487
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ie73b0ba7c76446afc2a7a23ebed1275c977d932d

Test: works on internal marlin
Bug: 34274385
Change-Id: Idd35e5cdccb595b4e5994eb1d78fdeece0aec0a6

Test: works on internal marlin
Bug: 34274385
Change-Id: Idd35e5cdccb595b4e5994eb1d78fdeece0aec0a6

VR HWC is being split out of VR Window Manager. It creates a HW binder
interface used by SurfaceFlinger which implements the HWComposer HAL and
a regular binder interface which will be used by a system app to receive
the SurfaceFlinger output.

Bug: b/36051907
Test: Ran in permissive mode and ensured no permission errors show in
logcat.

Change-Id: If1360bc8fa339a80100124c4e89e69c64b29d2ae

On PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE devices, non-vendor domains (except vendor
apps) are not permitted to use Binder. This commit thus:
* groups non-vendor domains using the new "coredomain" attribute,
* adds neverallow rules restricting Binder use to coredomain and
  appdomain only, and
* temporarily exempts the domains which are currently violating this
  rule from this restriction. These domains are grouped using the new
  "binder_in_vendor_violators" attribute. The attribute is needed
  because the types corresponding to violators are not exposed to the
  public policy where the neverallow rules are.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: In Chrome, navigate to ip6.me, play a YouTube video
Test: YouTube: play a video
Test: Netflix: play a movie
Test: Google Camera: take a photo, take an HDR+ photo, record video with
      sound, record slow motion video with sound. Confirm videos play
      back fine and with sound.
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I0cd1a80b60bcbde358ce0f7a47b90f4435a45c95

This set of rules is neeeded to allow vr_windows_manager to run
successfully on the system.

Bug: 32541196
Test: `m -j32` succeeds. Sailfish device boots.
Change-Id: I0aec94d80f655a6f47691cf2622dd158ce9e475f

Test: adb shell incident
Bug: 31122534
Change-Id: I4ac9c9ab86867f09b63550707673149fe60f1906

Create an event_log_tags_file label and use it for
/dev/event-log-tags.  Only trusted system log readers are allowed
direct read access to this file, no write access.  Untrusted domain
requests lack direct access, and are thus checked for credentials via
the "plan b" long path socket to the event log tag service.

Test: gTest logd-unit-tests, liblog-unit-tests and logcat-unit-tests
Bug: 31456426
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: Ib9b71ca225d4436d764c9bc340ff7b1c9c252a9e

- Added set_prop to shell so that you can set it from shell.
- Added set_prop to sytem_app so that it can be updated in settings.

Bug: 34256441
Test: can update prop from Settings and shell. nfc and lights work with
ag/1833821 with persist.hal.binderization set to on and off. There are
no additional selinux denials.
Change-Id: I883ca489093c1d56b2efa725c58e6e3f3b81c3aa

This leaves only the existence of system_app domain as public API.
All other rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and
are thus now private.

Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for
      disappearance of all allow rules from system_app_current
      attribute (as expected).
Bug: 31364497

Change-Id: Ifc7d350ed9749a32b0c38a78ac5f41c819dbdb96

app_domain was split up in commit: 2e00e637 to
enable compilation by hiding type_transition rules from public policy.  These
rules need to be hidden from public policy because they describe how objects are
labeled, of which non-platform should be unaware.  Instead of cutting apart the
app_domain macro, which non-platform policy may rely on for implementing new app
types, move all app_domain calls to private policy.

(cherry-pick of commit: 76035ea0)

Bug: 33428593
Test: bullhead and sailfish both boot. sediff shows no policy change.
Change-Id: I4beead8ccc9b6e13c6348da98bb575756f539665

app_domain was split up in commit: 2e00e637 to
enable compilation by hiding type_transition rules from public policy.  These
rules need to be hidden from public policy because they describe how objects are
labeled, of which non-platform should be unaware.  Instead of cutting apart the
app_domain macro, which non-platform policy may rely on for implementing new app
types, move all app_domain calls to private policy.

Bug: 33428593
Test: bullhead and sailfish both boot. sediff shows no policy change.
Change-Id: I4beead8ccc9b6e13c6348da98bb575756f539665

In order to support platform changes without simultaneous updates from
non-platform components, the platform and non-platform policies must be
split.  In order to provide a guarantee that policy written for
non-platform objects continues to provide the same access, all types
exposed to non-platform policy are versioned by converting them and the
policy using them into attributes.

This change performs that split, the subsequent versioning and also
generates a mapping file to glue the different policy components
together.

Test: Device boots and runs.
Bug: 31369363
Change-Id: Ibfd3eb077bd9b8e2ff3b2e6a0ca87e44d78b1317