ASAN builds may require additional permissions to launch processes
with ASAN wrappers. In this case, system_server needs permission to
execute /system/bin/sh.

Create with_asan() macro which can be used exclusively on debug
builds. Note this means that ASAN builds with these additional
permission will not pass the security portion of CTS - like any
other debug build.

Addresses:
avc: denied { execute } for name="sh" dev="dm-0" ino=571
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_exec:s0
tclass=file

Test: lunch aosp_marlin-userdebug;
      cd system/sepolicy; mm SANITIZE_TARGET=address;
      Verify permissions granted using with_asan() are granted.
Test: lunch aosp_marlin-userdebug;
      cd system/sepolicy; mm;
      Verify permissions granted using with_asan() are not granted.
Test: lunch aosp_marlin-user;
      cd system/sepolicy; mm SANITIZE_TARGET=address;
      Verify permissions granted using with_asan() are not granted.
Bug: 36138508
Change-Id: I6e39ada4bacd71687a593023f16b45bc16cd7ef8

Now that the android wifi framework has fully switched over to HIDL,
remove the sepolicy permissions for accessing wpa_supplicant using
socket control interface.

While there, also removed the redundant |hwbinder_use|.

Bug: 35707797
Test: Device boots up and able to connect to wifi networks.
Test: Wifi integration tests passed.
Change-Id: I55e24b852558d1a905b189116879179d62bdc76c

Prevent app domains (processes spawned by zygote) from acquiring
locks on files in /system. In particular, /system/etc/xtables.lock
must never be lockable by applications, as it will block future
iptables commands from running.

Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Ifd8dc7b117cf4a622b30fd4fffbcab1b76c4421b

This is a follow-up to 93391686
which added both
hal_client_domain(cameraserver, hal_graphics_allocator) and
binder_call(cameraserver, hal_graphics_allocator). The latter
binder_call rule is no longer needed because it is automatically
granted by virtue of cameraserver being marked as a client of
Graphics Allocator HAL --
see 49274721.

Test: Take a photo (both HDR and conventional) using Google Camera
Test: Record video using Google Camera
Test: Record slow motion video using Google Camera
Test: No denials to do with cameraserver and hal_graphics_allocator*
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: If93fe310fa62923b5107a7e78d158f6e4b4d0b3a

Test: Boots, runs
Bug: 32713782
Change-Id: Ia58db3c4c0159482f08e72ef638f3e1736095918

HALs are intended to be limited responsibility and thus limited
permission. In order to enforce this, place limitations on:
1. What processes may transition into a HAL - currently only init
2. What methods may be used to transition into a HAL - no using
   seclabel
3. When HALs exec - only allow exec with a domain transition.

Bug: 36376258
Test: Build aosp_marlin, aosp_bullhead, aosp_dragon. Neverallow rules
      are compile time assertions, so building is a sufficient test.

Change-Id: If4df19ced730324cf1079f7a86ceba7c71374131

All previous users of this macro have been switched to
hal_server_domain macro.

Test: no hal_impl_domain in system/sepolicy/ and device/**/sepolicy
Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I4a71b3fd5046c0d215b056f1cae25fe6bda0fb45

Apps should be able to access the configstore HAL since framework
libraries which are loaded into app process can call configstore.

Letting apps have direct access to this HAL is OK because: 

(1) the API of this HAL does not make clients provide any sensitive 
information to the HAL, which makes it impossible for the HAL to 
disclose sensitive information of its clients when the HAL is 
compromised, 

(2) we will require that this HAL is binderized (i.e., does not run 
inside the process of its clients), 

(3) we will require that this HAL runs in a tight seccomp sandbox 
(this HAL doesn't need much access, if at all) and,

(4) we'll restrict the HALs powers via neverallows.

Test: apps can use configstore hal.

Change-Id: I04836b7318fbc6ef78deff770a22c68ce7745fa9

Test: Google camera app snapshot/record/
      slow motion recording
Bug: 36383997
Change-Id: I565fb441aec529464474e0dd0e01dbfe0b167c82

This switches Allocator HAL policy to the design which enables us to
identify all SELinux domains which host HALs and all domains which are
clients of HALs.

Allocator HAL is special in the sense that it's assumed to be always
binderized. As a result, rules in Camera HAL target hal_allocator_server
rather than hal_allocator (which would be the server and any client, if
the Allocator HAL runs in passthrough mode).

Test: Device boots up, no new denials
Test: YouTube video plays back
Test: Take photo using Google Camera app, recover a video, record a slow
      motion video
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: Ifbbca554ec221712361ee6cda94c82f254d84936

Every client of Graphics Allocator HAL needs permission to (Hw)Binder
IPC into the HAL.

Test: Device boots, no denials to do with hal_graphics_allocator
      (also, removing the binder_call(hal_graphics_allocator_client,
      hal_graphics_allocator_server) leads to denials)
Test: GUI works, YouTube works
Bug: 34170079

Change-Id: I5c64d966862a125994dab903c2eda5815e336a94

This adjusts the grants for recovery to make it explicit that recovery
can use the Boot Control HAL only in passthrough mode.

Test: Device boots up, no new denials
Test: Reboot into recovery, sideload OTA update succeeds
Test: Apply OTA update via update_engine:
      1. make dist
      2. Ensure device has network connectivity
      3. ota_call.py -s <serial here> out/dist/sailfish-ota-*.zip
Bug: 34170079

Change-Id: I0888816eca4d77939a55a7816e6cae9176713ee5

This patch fixes Gatekeeper HAL rules.

Bug: 34260418
Test: Device boots with gatekeeper_hal using hwbinder and
      gatekeeperd does not fall back to software.
Change-Id: I6aaacb08faaa7a90506ab569425dc525334c8171

This switches Boot Control HAL policy to the design which enables us
to conditionally remove unnecessary rules from domains which are
clients of Boot Control HAL.

Domains which are clients of Boot Control HAL, such as update_server,
are granted rules targeting hal_bootctl only when the Boot Control HAL
runs in passthrough mode (i.e., inside the client's process). When the
HAL runs in binderized mode (i.e., in another process/domain, with
clients talking to the HAL over HwBinder IPC), rules targeting
hal_bootctl are not granted to client domains.

Domains which offer a binderized implementation of Boot Control HAL,
such as hal_bootctl_default domain, are always granted rules targeting
hal_bootctl.

P. S. This commit removes direct access to Boot Control HAL from
system_server because system_server is not a client of this HAL. This
commit also removes bootctrl_block_device type which is no longer
used. Finally, boot_control_hal attribute is removed because it is now
covered by the hal_bootctl attribute.

Test: Device boots up, no new denials
Test: Reboot into recovery, sideload OTA update succeeds
Test: Apply OTA update via update_engine:
      1. make dist
      2. Ensure device has network connectivity
      3. ota_call.py -s <serial here> out/dist/sailfish-ota-*.zip
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I9c410c092069e431a3852b66c04c4d2a9f1a25cf

The fix for b/35100237 surfaced this error. This SELinux policy
fragment was included only on Marlin, but needs to be included in core
policy.

Bug: 35100237
Test: With https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/354292/
Test: Set up PPTP VPN using http://www.vpnbook.com/ on Marlin.
Test: Connect:
03-17 15:41:22.602  3809  3809 I mtpd    : Starting pppd (pppox = 9)
03-17 15:41:22.628  3811  3811 I pppd    : Using PPPoX (socket = 9)
03-17 15:41:22.637  3811  3811 I pppd    : pppd 2.4.7 started by vpn, uid 1016
03-17 15:41:22.639  3811  3811 I pppd    : Using interface ppp0
03-17 15:41:22.639  3811  3811 I pppd    : Connect: ppp0 <-->
03-17 15:41:22.770  3811  3811 I pppd    : CHAP authentication succeeded
03-17 15:41:22.909  3811  3811 I pppd    : MPPE 128-bit stateless compression enabled
03-17 15:41:23.065  3811  3811 I pppd    : local  IP address 172.16.36.113
03-17 15:41:23.065  3811  3811 I pppd    : remote IP address 172.16.36.1
03-17 15:41:23.065  3811  3811 I pppd    : primary   DNS address 8.8.8.8
03-17 15:41:23.065  3811  3811 I pppd    : secondary DNS address 91.239.100.100

Change-Id: I192b4dfc9613d1000f804b9c4ca2727d502a1927

Certain libraries may actually be links. Allow OTA dexopt to read
those links.

Bug: 25612095
Test: m
Change-Id: Iafdb899a750bd8d1ab56e5f6dbc09d836d5440ed

Allow getattr on links for otapreopt_slot. It reads links (to the
boot image oat files) when collecting the size of the artifacts
for logging purposes.

Bug: 30832951
Test: m
Change-Id: If97f7a77fc9bf334a4ce8a613c212ec2cfc4c581

This switches most remaining HALs to the _client/_server approach.
To unblock efforts blocked on majority of HALs having to use this
model, this change does not remove unnecessary rules from clients of
these HALs. That work will be performed in follow-up commits. This
commit only adds allow rules and thus does not break existing
functionality.

The HALs not yet on the _client/_server model after this commit are:
* Allocator HAL, because it's non-trivial to declare all apps except
  isolated apps as clients of this HAL, which they are.
* Boot HAL, because it's still on the non-attributized model and I'm
  waiting for update_engine folks to answer a couple of questions
  which will let me refactor the policy of this HAL.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: Device boots, no new denials
Test: Device boots in recovery mode, no new denials
Bug: 34170079
Change-Id: I03e6bcec2fa02f14bdf17d11f7367b62c68a14b9

Test: take a screenshot
Test: run CTS ImageReaderTest
Bug: 36194109

(cherry picked from commit 49ed0cd6)

Change-Id: I331bce37b35e30084ba9f7ecd063a344a79c5232

The secondary dex files are application dex files which gets reported
back to the framework when using BaseDexClassLoader.

Also, give dex2oat lock permissions as it needs to lock the profile
during compilation.

Example of SElinux denial:
03-15 12:38:46.967  7529  7529 I profman : type=1400 audit(0.0:225):
avc: denied { read } for
path="/data/data/com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox/files/velour/verified_jars/JDM5LaUbYP1JPOLzJ81GLzg_1.jar.prof"
dev="sda35" ino=877915 scontext=u:r:profman:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c512,c768 tclass=file permissive=1

Test: adb shell cmd package bg-dexopt-job works for sercondary dex files
Bug: 26719109
Change-Id: Ie1890d8e36c062450bd6c54f4399fc0730767dbf

This change defines new policy for modprobe (/sbin/modprobe) that should
be used in both recovery and android mode.

Denials:
[   16.986440] c0    437 audit: type=1400 audit(6138546.943:5): avc:
denied  { read } for  pid=437 comm="modprobe" name="modules" dev="proc"
ino=4026532405 scontext=u:object_r:modprobe:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
[   16.986521] c0    437 audit: type=1400 audit(6138546.943:6): avc:
denied  { open } for  pid=437 comm="modprobe" path="/proc/modules"
dev="proc" ino=4026532405 scontext=u:object_r:modprobe:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
[   16.986544] c0    437 audit: type=1400 audit(6138546.943:7): avc:
denied  { getattr } for  pid=437 comm="modprobe" path="/proc/modules"
dev="proc" ino=4026532405 scontext=u:object_r:modprobe:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Bug: 35633646
Test: Build and tested it works in sailfish recovery. The modprobe is
invoked in init.rc (at the end of 'on init') with following command line

    exec u:r:modprobe:s0 -- /sbin/modprobe -a nilfs2 ftl

Change-Id: Ie70be6f918bea6059f806e2eb38cd48229facafa

bufferhubd should be able to use sync fence fd from mediacodec; and
mediacodec should be able to use a gralloc buffer fd from the bufferhubd.

Bug: 32213311
Test: Ran exoplayer_demo and verify mediacodec can plumb buffer through
bufferhub.

Change-Id: Id175827c56c33890ecce33865b0b1167d872fc56

Test: no log spam for graphics allocator
Test: dmesg | audit2allow does not show denial for
hal_graphics_allocator_default
Test: system is responsive after boot (because
      android.hardware.graphics.allocator@2.0::IAllocator getService()
      will not be blocked)

Bug: 36220026
Change-Id: I3e103f88988fe4a94888e92ee8c5b1f27845ad9e