Test: Builds

Bug: 64121714
Bug: 31973802
Change-Id: Id37be8726a8bb297e35bca494964fdbcc48c6a73
(cherry picked from commit 4be28894)

Create a new label for /data/system/dropbox, and neverallow direct
access to anything other than init and system_server.

While all apps may write to the dropbox service, only apps with
android.permission.READ_LOGS, a signature|privileged|development
permission, may read them. Grant access to priv_app, system_app,
and platform_app, and neverallow access to all untrusted_apps.

Bug: 31681871
Test: atest CtsStatsdHostTestCases
Test: atest DropBoxTest
Test: atest ErrorsTests
Change-Id: Ice302b74b13c4d66e07b069c1cdac55954d9f5df

We're adding support for OEMs to ship exFAT, which behaves identical
to vfat.  Some rules have been manually enumerating labels related
to these "public" volumes, so unify them all behind "sdcard_type".

Test: atest
Bug: 67822822
Change-Id: I09157fd1fc666ec5d98082c6e2cefce7c8d3ae56

This is a partial cherry pick of commit 6231b4d9
'Enforce per-app data protections for targetSdk 28+'.

Untrusted_app_27 remains unreachable, but it's existence
prevents future merge conflicts.

Bug: 63897054
Test: build/boot aosp_walleye-userdebug
Change-Id: I64b013874fe87b55f47e817a1279e76ecf86b7c0
Merged-In: I64b013874fe87b55f47e817a1279e76ecf86b7c0
(cherry picked from commit 6231b4d9)

Access to these files was removed in Oreo. Enforce that access is not
granted by partners via neverallow rule.

Also disallow most untrusted app access to net.dns.* properties.

Bug: 77225170
Test: system/sepolicy/tools/build_policies.sh
Change-Id: I85b634af509203393dd2d9311ab5d30c65f157c1

Bug: 71527305
Test: compile and boot
Change-Id: I91097bd62d99b8dd9eb6f53060badbaf0f4b8b4a
(cherry picked from commit 1aedf4b5)

Test: App startup on boot
Change-Id: I7740aafc088aadf676328e3f1bb8db5175d97102

Bug: 63928580
Test: Manually tested.

Change-Id: If6bb10cb7c009883d853e46dcdeb92cd33877d53

This is an experimental feature only on userdebug and eng build.

Test: play MP4 file. install & uninstall media update apk.
Bug: 67908547
Change-Id: I513cdbfda962f00079e886b7a42f9928e81f6474

The NeuralNetworks runtime is a library that communicates with
NeuralNetworks HIDL services and is linked by applications. To enable
the NN runtime to use these services, applications must have explicit
sepolicy permissions to find the NN services and communicate across
binder.

This CL relaxes neverallow rules for hal_neuralnetworks_*.

Because it is affecting pre-existing neverallow rules, this CL requires
a CTS rebuild.

Bug: 70340780
Test: mm
Test: ran neuralnetworks vts and cts binaries
Change-Id: I84f73ac77486681f91d1f8687268c0fa22a7ba0b
(cherry picked from commit 598870bebc4bb34542df81799b46f3cdcfb6723b)

Do not let apps read uid_concurrent_active_time and
uid_concurrent_policy_time.

b/68399339

Test: Check that they can't be read from the shell
    without root permissions and system_server was able
    to read them

Change-Id: I6f09ef608607cb9f4084ba403a1e7254b8c49a06

Test: build aosp_sailfish
Change-Id: Iaefe1df66885d3e78feb600c3d9845bd9fe671a2

Renamed this type:
proc_asound_cards -> proc_asound

Labeled /proc/asound/devices as proc_asound.

We now use proc_asound type to label files under /proc/asound which we
want to expose to system components.

Bug: 66988327
Test: Pixel 2 boots, can play sound with or without headphones, and
selinux denials to proc_asound are not seen.

Change-Id: I453d9bfdd70eb80931ec9e80f17c8fd0629db3d0

Bug: 37916906
Test: Builds 'n' boots.
Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668
Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb

This CL was accidentally reverted a second time by commit:
cb5129f9.  Submit it for the third,
and final, time.

(cherry-pick of 5637587d
which was in AOSP and internal master but not stage-aosp-master)

Bug: 62102757
Test: Builds and boots.
Change-Id: I0394907e808c737422e644aec452baa3e777cf6f

Bug: 37916906
Test: Builds 'n' boots.
Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668
Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb

Bug: 62658302
Test: Boot device and observe no new denials

Change-Id: If9a21610897b14a419f276289818127412c29c55
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Vendor HAL extentsions are currently allowed to discover hardware
services that are labelled with 'untrusted_app_visible_hwservice'.
However, the policy doesn't allow these apps to talk to these services.
This CL makes sure that is now possible via the
'untrusted_app_visible_halserver' attribute for vendor domains that host
such a service.

Bug: 64382381
Test: Boot device and observe no new denials.

Change-Id: I1ffc1a62bdf7506a311f5a19acdab8c7caec902b
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

This reverts commit ceed7204.

New HALs services that are added in the policy while the CL was reverted
will are not made visible to applications by default. They are:
  hal_neuralnetworks_hwservice
  hal_wifi_offload_hwservice
  system_net_netd_hwservice
  thermalcallback_hwservice

Bug: 64578796
Test: Boot device

Change-Id: I84d65baddc757a5b0a38584430eff79a383aa8e0
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Remove restriction to restrict only domains in AOSP to use the
untrusted_app_all attribute

BUG=63167163
Test: Sanity check

Change-Id: I9e1b8605fad108f45f988d8198a9a1cadb8dfa5e

This CL was accidentally reverted a second time by commit:
cb5129f9.  Submit it for the third,
and final, time.

Bug: 62102757
Test: Builds and boots.

Change fb889f23 "Force expand all hal_* attributes" annotated all
hal_* attributes to be expanded to their associated types. However
some of these attributes are used in CTS for neverallow checking.
Mark these attributes to be preserved.

In addition, remove the hacky workaround introduced in oc-dev
for b/62658302 where extraneous neverallow rules were introduced
to prevent unused or negated attributes from being auto-expanded
from policy.

Bug: 62658302
Bug: 63135903
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
    android.cts.security.SELinuxNeverallowRulesTest

    armeabi-v7a CtsSecurityHostTestCases completed in 4s.
    501 passed, 0 failed, 0 not executed
Merged-In: I989def70a16f66e7a18bef1191510793fbe9cb8c
Change-Id: I989def70a16f66e7a18bef1191510793fbe9cb8c

This reverts commit 3e307a4d.

Test: Builds - neverallow change only.
Bug: 62806062
Change-Id: Id3aa1b425cf48fc8586890c9850a74594584922d

Same-process HALs are forbidden except for very specific HALs that have
been provided and whitelisted by AOSP.  As a result, a vendor extension
HAL may have a need to be accessed by untrusted_app.  This is still
discouraged, and the existing AOSP hwservices are still forbidden, but
remove the blanket prohibition.  Also indicate that this is temporary,
and that partners should expect to get exceptions to the rule into AOSP
in the future.

Bug: 62806062
Test: neverallow-only change builds.  Verify new attribute is in policy.
Change-Id: I6d3e659147d509a3503c2c9e0b6bb9016cc75832

bug: 22804304

Change-Id: I7162905d698943d127aa52804396e4765498d028

This reverts commit c147b592.

The new domain changed neverallows, breaking CTS compatability.
Revert the domain now, with the intention to re-add for the next
release.

Bug: 62102757
Test: domain is set to priv_app
Change-Id: I907ff7c513cd642a306e3eaed3937352ced90005

This reverts commit c00c07c1.

Change-Id: I0c4f5e8cece9c48672a5210adb7e8427e4fd427a

This reverts commit c147b592.

The new domain changed neverallows, breaking CTS compatability.
Revert the domain now, with the intention to re-add for the next
release.

Bug: 62102757
Test: domain is set to priv_app
Change-Id: I907ff7c513cd642a306e3eaed3937352ced90005

Test: pass
Bug: 62073522
Change-Id: I3d53d0d5ec701c87fb3d45080799f424f7ba3792

This was accidentally omitted from all_untrusted_app

While I'm here, split across mutiple lines and alphabetize.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I7fe1d1d0a4ef2ed3ab010931ee2ba15637c2be51

The fuse_device neverallow rules are too aggressive and are inhibiting
certain vendor customizations. Relax the /dev/fuse neverallow rules so
that they better reflect the security invariants we want to uphold.

Bug: 37496487
Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ie73b0ba7c76446afc2a7a23ebed1275c977d932d

This adds neverallow rules which enforce the prohibition on
communication between framework and vendor components over VendorBinder.
This prohibition is similar in spirit to the one for Binder
communications.

Most changes consist of adding neverallow rules, which do not affect
runtime behavior. The only change which does affect runtime behavior
is the change which takes away the right of servicemanager domain to
transfer Binder tokens to hwservicemanager and vndservicemanager. This
grant was there by accident (because it was overly broad) and is not
expected to be needed: servicemanager, hwservicemanager, and
vndservicemanager are not supposed to be communicating with each
other.

P. S. The new neverallow rules in app_neverallows.te are covered by
the new rules in domain.te. The rules were nevertheless added to
app_neverallows.te for consistency with other *Binder rules there.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 37663632
Change-Id: I7c2ae23924bf0f2fed3f1e3a8d4d603129286329

This adds a neverallow rules which checks that SELinux app domains
which host arbitrary code are not allowed to access hwservicemanager
operations other than "find" operation for which there already are
strict neverallow rules in the policy.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy -- neverallow-only change
Bug: 34454312
Change-Id: I3b80c6ae2c254495704e0409e0c5c88f6ce3a6a7

App domains which host arbitrary code must not have access to
arbitrary HwBinder services. Such access unnecessarily increases the
attack surface. The reason is twofold:
1. HwBinder servers do not perform client authentication because HIDL
   currently does not expose caller UID information and, even if it
   did, many HwBinder services either operate at a layer below that of
   apps (e.g., HALs) or must not rely on app identity for
   authorization. Thus, to be safe, the default assumption is that
   a HwBinder service treats all its clients as equally authorized to
   perform operations offered by the service.
2. HAL servers (a subset of HwBinder services) contain code with
   higher incidence rate of security issues than system/core
   components and have access to lower layes of the stack (all the way
   down to hardware) thus increasing opportunities for bypassing the
   Android security model.

HwBinder services offered by core components (as opposed to vendor
components) are considered safer because of point #2 above.

Always same-process aka always-passthrough HwBinder services are
considered safe for access by these apps. This is because these HALs
by definition do not offer any additional access beyond what its
client already as, because these services run in the process of the
client.

This commit thus introduces these two categories of HwBinder services
in neverallow rules.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy -- this does not change on-device policy
Bug: 34454312
Change-Id: I4f5f4dd10b3fc3bb9d262dda532d4a23dcdf061d

Bug: 37541374
Test: Build and boot sailfish

Change-Id: I8afe9463070cca45b3f1029cc168a3bf00ed7cdc
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

MediaProvider requires permissions that diverge from those
of a typical priv_app. This create a new domain and removes
Mtp related permissions from priv_app.

Bug: 33574909
Test: Connect with MTP, download apps and files, select ringtones
Test: DownloadProvider instrument tests, CtsProviderTestCases

Change-Id: I950dc11f21048c34af639cb3ab81873d2a6730a9

MediaProvider requires permissions that diverge from those
of a typical priv_app. This create a new domain and removes
Mtp related permissions from priv_app.

Bug: 33574909
Test: Connect with MTP, download apps and files, select ringtones
Test: DownloadProvider instrument tests, CtsProviderTestCases

Change-Id: I950dc11f21048c34af639cb3ab81873d2a6730a9

Prevent app domains (processes spawned by zygote) from acquiring
locks on files in /system. In particular, /system/etc/xtables.lock
must never be lockable by applications, as it will block future
iptables commands from running.

Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: Ifd8dc7b117cf4a622b30fd4fffbcab1b76c4421b

Untrusted apps should only access /data/preloads/media and demo directory.

Bug: 36197686
Test: Verified retail mode.
      Checked non-privileged APK cannot access /data/preloads
Change-Id: I8e9c21ff6aba799aa31bf06893cdf60dafc04446

We simplified the way we track whether or not a dex file is used by
other apps. DexManager in the framework keeps track of the data and we
no longer need file markers on disk.

Test: device boots, foreign dex markers are not created anymore

Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I464ed6b09439cf0342020ee07596f9aa8ae53b62