This adds the premissions required for
android.hardware.keymaster@2.0-service to access the keymaster TA
as well as for keystore and vold to lookup and use
android.hardware.keymaster@2.0-service.

IT DOES NOT remove the privileges from keystore and vold to access
the keymaster TA directly.

Test: Run keystore CTS tests
Bug: 32020919

(cherry picked from commit 5090d6f3)

Change-Id: Ib02682da26e2dbcabd81bc23169f9bd0e832eb19

Bug: 31015010

cherry-pick from b6e4d4bd

Test: checked for selinux denial msgs in the dmesg logs.
Change-Id: I8285ea05162ea0d75459e873e5c2bad2dbc7e5ba

bug:32815560
Change-Id: I494141b47fcd2e7e0cc02aa58d8df9a222060b3f

reflect the change from "mediaanalytics" to "mediametrics"

Also incorporates a broader access to the service -- e.g. anyone.
This reflects that a number of metrics submissions come from application
space and not only from our controlled, trusted media related processes.
The metrics service (in another commit) checks on the source of any
incoming metrics data and limits what is allowed from unprivileged
clients.

Bug: 34615027
Test: clean build, service running and accessible
Change-Id: I657c343ea1faed536c3ee1940f1e7a178e813a42

This CLs adds SElinux policies necessary to compile secondary dex files.

When an app loads secondary dex files via the base class loader the
files will get reported to PM. During maintance mode PM will compile the
secondary dex files which were used via the standard installd model
(fork, exec, change uid and lower capabilities).

What is needed:
dexoptanalyzer - needs to read the dex file and the boot image in order
to decide if we need to actually comppile.
dex2oat - needs to be able to create *.oat files next to the secondary
dex files.

Test: devices boots
      compilation of secondary dex files works without selinux denials
      cmd package compile --secondary-dex -f -m speed
com.google.android.gms

Bug: 32871170
Change-Id: I038955b5bc9a72d49f6c24c1cb76276e0f53dc45

Test:   Device boots
        Can take photos
        Run "adb shell atrace -c -b 16000 -t 5 gfx" without root and check produces
        output
        Run "python systrace.py view gfx freq sched am wm dalvik
        binder_driver" from external/chromium-trace after adb root and
        check populated
Bug: 31856701
Change-Id: Ic319f8a0a3e395efa7ee8ba33a868ac55cb44fe4

Test: No change to SELinux policy
Change-Id: I45d6d6ab0538b9d4768b922cfdc2c972272d0b18

/sys/class/leds is the standard location for linux files dealing with
leds, however the exact contents of this directory is non-standard
(hence the need for a hal).

Bug: 32022100
Test: compiles and works for the subset of common files
Change-Id: I7571d7267d5ed531c4cf95599d5f2acc22287ef4

Revise policy, to allow init and system_server to configure,
clear, and read kernel trace events. This will enable us to
debug certain WiFi failures.

Note that system_server is restricted to only accessing
a wifi-specific trace instance. (Hence, system_server is
not allowed to interfere with atrace.) Moreover, even for
the wifi trace instance, system_server is granted limited
permissions. (system_server can not, e.g., change which
events are traced.)

Note also that init and system_server are only granted these
powers on userdebug or eng builds.

The init.te and system_server.te changes resolve the
following denials:

// Denials when wifi-events.rc configures tracing
{ write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ add_name } for pid=1 comm="init" name="wifi" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ create } for pid=1 comm="init" name="wifi" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="buffer_size_kb" dev="debugfs" ino=18061 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

// Denials when system_server sets up fail-safe
// (auto-terminate tracing if system_server dies)
{ search } for pid=882 comm="system_server" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ read } for pid=882 comm="system_server" name="free_buffer" dev="debugfs" ino=18063 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=882 comm="system_server" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/free_buffer" dev="debugfs" ino=18063 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=882 comm="system_server" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/free_buffer" dev="debugfs" ino=18063 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

// Denials when system_server toggles tracing on or off
// (WifiStateMachine is a thread in system_server)
{ search } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ write } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" name="tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ write } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" name="tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=989 comm="WifiStateMachin" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/tracing_on" dev="debugfs" ino=18067 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

// Denials when system_server reads the event trace
// (This happens in response to a dumpsys request)
{ search } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" name="instances" dev="debugfs" ino=755 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_tracing_instances:s0 tclass=dir permissive=1
{ read } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" name="trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ open } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ getattr } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" path="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/wifi/trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
{ write } for pid=3537 comm="Binder:882_B" name="trace" dev="debugfs" ino=18059 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:debugfs_wifi_tracing:s0 tclass=file permissive=1

Bug: 27254565
Test: manual
Manual test:
- Build this CL along with CL:322337
- Verify that system boots, and that we can connect to GoogleGuest.
  (Testing of actual trace functionality with require some more
  patches in frameworks/opt/net/wifi.)
$ adb root && adb shell dmesg | egrep 'avc: denied.+debugfs'

Change-Id: Ib6eb4116549277f85bd510d25fb30200f1752f4d

Replace the global debuggerd with a per-process debugging helper that
gets exec'ed by the process that crashed.

Bug: http://b/30705528
Test: crasher/crasher64, `debuggerd <pid>`, `kill -ABRT <pid>`
Change-Id: Iad1b7478f7a4e2690720db4b066417d8b66834ed

- Allow cameraservice to talk to hwbinder, hwservicemanager
- Allow hal_camera to talk to the same interfaces as cameraservice

Test: Compiles, confirmed that cameraservice can call hwservicemanager
Bug: 32991422
Change-Id: Ied0a3f5f7149e29c468a13887510c78d555dcb2a

This reverts commit 262edc38.

Fixes: 34370523
Change-Id: I077d064d4031d40bc48cb39eba310e6c16b9627d

Bug: 33746484
Test: Successfully boot with original service and property contexts.
      Successfully boot with split serivce and property contexts.

Change-Id: I7881af8922834dc69b37dae3b06d921e05206564
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Bug: 33746484
Test: Successfully boot with original service and property contexts.
      Successfully boot with split serivce and property contexts.

Change-Id: Ide67d37d85273c60b9e387e72fbeb87be6da306a
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Move from fingerprintd to new fingerprint_hal and update SeLinux policy.

Test: Boot with no errors related to fingerprint sepolicy
Bug: 33199080
Change-Id: Idfde0cb0530e75e705033042f64f3040f6df22d6

The following are the avc denials that are addressed:

avc: denied { call } for pid=889 comm="system_server"
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0
tclass=binder permissive=0

avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0
tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=binder permissive=0

avc: denied { read } for name="hw" dev="mmcblk0p43" ino=1837
scontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0
tclass=dir permissive=0

avc: denied { open } for path="/system/lib64/hw" dev="mmcblk0p43"
ino=1837 scontext=u:r:hal_gnss_default:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

Bug:31974439

Test: Checked that there no more related avc denial messages related to
the GNSS HAL in dmesg.

Change-Id: I5b43dc088017a5568dd8e442726d2bf52e95b1d5

It seems likely that there is no reason to keep around a number of
devices that are configured to be included into the pixel kernels. Init
and ueventd should be the only processes with r/w access to these
devices, so auditallow rules have been added to ensure that they aren't
actually used.

/dev/keychord was given its own type since it's one of the few character
devices that's actually legitimately used and would cause log spam in
the auditallow otherwise.

Bug: 33347297
Test: The phone boots without any apparent log spam.

Change-Id: I3dd9557df8a9218b8c802e33ff549d15849216fb

Test: run a gtest in /data/nativetest/ with no permission denial
Change-Id: Id644ed7dbea59becaf84b6073c9144711ad07c10

Bug: http://b/34228376
Test: m
Change-Id: I1321ada1521bb3e3fd08105f1a41d519ee486683

Bug: 31972505
Test: VTS test passes, Bluetooth starts/stops
Change-Id: Ic068c9fca7c50e63c5b6e3d86a2ee6cc53207e08

Bug: 33746381
Test: Device boots with no extra denials.
Change-Id: I2f0da92367851142e0d7df4afec8861ceaed9d3e

Allowing storaged for reading from pseudo filesystems and debugfs.

Bug: 32221677

Change-Id: I837cead9a68f0b399703b64d724cb9c4b205c335

Simulate platform and non-platform split by compiling two different
file_contexts files and loading them together on-device.  Leave the existing
file_contexts.bin in place until we're ready to build images based on the new
files.

Bug: 31363362
Test: Builds and boots without additional denials.
Change-Id: I7248f876e2230cee3b3cbf386422063da1e3dde0

Bring back file_contexts.bin.

Change-Id: Ifec2c363579151080fdec48e8bc46bbbc8c97674
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Change-Id: I79a305407c3a362d7be11f4c026f31f1e9666f1c
Signed-off-by: Alexey Polyudov <apolyudov@google.com>

Adding sepoilcy for sensors.

Test: Sensors work.
Change-Id: Ibbf0c1a22654a17b1573e3761ea9ccd816150255

Adding sepolicty for contexthub service.

Test: GTS tests pass.
Change-Id: I2576b8028d12a31151d7b7869679b853eb16c75e

Bug: 32123421
Test: full build/test of allocator hal using hidl_test
Change-Id: I253b4599b6fe6e7f4a2f5f55b34cdeed9e5d769b

Bug: http://b/32905206



Test: Boot sailfish and no new selinux failures observed in logs

Change-Id: Id9a46180074a61f8cf8d176a7b2ebc995a13b9f9
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

- Also allow dumpstate to talk to hal_dumpstate.

Bug: 31982882
Test: compiles
Change-Id: Ib9cf0027ee7e71fa40b9ccc29fc8dccea6977e5c

Test: tested with default health HAL on angler running as service.
Bug: b/32754732

Change-Id: Ie0b70d43cb23cd0878e1b7b99b9bebdbd70d17c7
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit ef62fd91)

healthd is being split into 'charger' and 'healthd' processes, that
will never run together. 'charger' is to be run only in charge-only
and recovery, while healthd runs with Android.

While they both share much of battery monitoring code, they both now
have reduced scope. E.g. 'charger', doesn't need to use binder anymore
and healthd doesn't need to do charging ui animation. So, amend the
SEPolicy for healthd to reduce it's scope and add a new one for charger.

Test: Tested all modes {recovery, charger-only, android} with new policy

Change-Id: If7f81875c605f7f07da4d23a313f308b9dde9ce8
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit c73d0022)

Bug: 32123421
Bug: 32905206

Test: compiles, nfc works
Change-Id: Ibf72ef70255573e4df0863ea640354b3c37eb47d

Test: logging confirms service runs on boot
Change-Id: If86fa7daf4a626b3e04fa0d2677d4cb590eb71ce
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>

Simulate platform and non-platform split by sending the split files to the
device to be compiled by init.

Bug: 31363362
Test: Policy builds on-device and boots.  sediff shows no difference.
Change-Id: I9627d1c66ca37786d97a049666278a4992ad7579

After a series of recent commits, installd has fully migrated over
to Binder, and all socket-based communication has been removed.

Test: builds, boots, apps install fine, pre-OTA dexopt works
Bug: 13758960, 30944031
Change-Id: Ia67b6260de58240d057c99b1bbd782b44376dfb5

Only init and ueventd have any access to /dev/port, and neither should
have any use for it. As it stands, leaving port in just represents
additional attack surface with no useful functionality, so it should be
removed if possible, not only from Pixel devices, but from all Android
devices.

Test: The phone boots successfully

Bug:33301618
Change-Id: Iedc51590f1ffda02444587d647889ead9bdece3f

media framework analytics are gathered in a separate service.
define a context for this new service, allow various
media-related services and libraries to access this new service.

Bug: 30267133
Test: ran media CTS, watched for selinux denials.
Change-Id: I5aa5aaa5aa9e82465b8024f87ed32d6ba4db35ca

/data/bugreports is moving to /bugreports

Bug: 27262109
Bug: 27204904
Bug: 32799236
Test: new symlink is in /bugreports and is labeled correctly
Change-Id: Ib6a492fba8388bf43debad28cfc851679f8c6151

urandom_device and random_device have the exact same security
properties. Collapse them into one type.

Test: device boots and /dev/urandom is labeled correctly.
Change-Id: I12da30749291bc5e37d99bc9422bb86cb58cec41

HAL policy defines how the platform and a given HAL interact, but not how the
HAL is implemented.  This policy should be represented as an attribute that all
processes implementing the HAL can include.

Bug: 32123421
Test: Builds.
Change-Id: I17e5612c0835773c28e14f09e2ce7bdc3f210c15