init, dumpstate and shell

Test: check avc for init is now gone
Bug: 7232205
Bug: 109821005
Change-Id: I299a0ba29bcc97a97047f12a5c48f6056f5e6de5

In particular, add assertions limiting which processes may
directly open files owned by apps. Reduce this to just apps, init,
and installd. App data is protected by a combination of selinux
permissions and Unix permissions, so limiting the open permission to
just apps (which are not allowed to have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) ensures that only installd and init have
complete access an app's private directory.

In addition to apps/init/installd, other processes currently granted
open are mediaserver, uncrypt, and vold. Uncrypt's access appears to
be deprecated (b/80299612). Uncrypt now uses /data/ota_package
instead. b/80418809 and b/80300620 track removal for vold and
mediaserver.

Test: build/boot aosp_taimen-userdebug. Verify no "granted" audit
messages in the logs.
Bug: 80190017
Bug: 80300620
Bug: 80418809
Fixes: 80299612
Change-Id: I153bc7b62294b36ccd596254a5976dd887fed046

Test: compile
Bug: 64114943
Change-Id: I2bbf84a6e472d720f02282e10d56795b75ac62d1

Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.

To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.

Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
    navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
    Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest

Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 08731895)

Bug: 65643247
Test: device boots without denials from init to proc_*
Change-Id: I44729e791366cdedec27603558b2e929fa414168

Bug: 77335096
Test: booted device with metadata encryption and without
Change-Id: I5bc5d46deb4e91912725c4887fde0c3a41c9fc91

Create a new label for /data/system/dropbox, and neverallow direct
access to anything other than init and system_server.

While all apps may write to the dropbox service, only apps with
android.permission.READ_LOGS, a signature|privileged|development
permission, may read them. Grant access to priv_app, system_app,
and platform_app, and neverallow access to all untrusted_apps.

Bug: 31681871
Test: atest CtsStatsdHostTestCases
Test: atest DropBoxTest
Test: atest ErrorsTests
Change-Id: Ice302b74b13c4d66e07b069c1cdac55954d9f5df

cgroupfs doesn't allow files to be created, so this can't be needed.

Also remove redundant neverallow and dontaudit rules. These are now
more broadly handled by domain.te.

Bug: 74182216

Test: Denials remain silenced.

Change-Id: If7eb0e59f567695d987272a2fd36dbc251516e9f

(cherry picked from commit 8e8c1093)

Allow init the ability to relabel recovery block devices. In the case
where we have recovery as a chain partition, due to its presence in
early mount node, init, in first stage itself would require relabel
permissions for the restorecon operation on recovery block device.

Bug: 73642793
Test: On bootup, recovery partition gets the appropriate se-label.
      Perform OTA on non-A/B device with recovery as chain partition,
      now the recovery partition gets upgraded successfully, now that
      it has the correct se-label.

Change-Id: I370c510320e78ab78c9c55573073415b4983d0f6

The write is here: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/master/rootdir/init.rc#257.

Denials (on a device with the sysfs_vibrator label properly applied):
denied { write } for name="vibrator" dev="sysfs" ino=49613 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_vibrator:s0 tclass=dir
denied { write } for name="trigger" dev="sysfs" ino=49620 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_vibrator:s0 tclass=file
denied { open } for path="/sys/devices/<redacted>/vibrator/trigger" dev="sysfs" ino=49620 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs_vibrator:s0 tclass=file

Bug: b/72643420
Test: Device boots, denials gone

Change-Id: Ib50d9a8533303daccb1330685e3204bea3fbd8a8

This required for kernel to do loopback mounts on filesystem
images created by the kernel system call tests in LTP.

Add a corresponding neverallow to stop all domains from accessing
the location at /data/local/tmp/ltp.

Bug: 73220071
Test: Boot sailfish successfully
Test: run vts-kernel -m VtsKernelLtp -t syscalls.fchown04

Change-Id: I73f5f14017e22971fc246a05751ba67be4653bca
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

This changes tracefs files to be default-enabled in debug mode, but
default-disabled with specific files enabled in user mode.

Bug: 64762598
Test: Successfully took traces in user mode.

Change-Id: I572ea22253e0c1e42065fbd1d2fd7845de06fceb

Init tries to write /proc/sys/vm/min_free_order_shift but fails due to
a SELinux denial.  This gives the file a new label and gives init the
ability to write it.

Test: Build and booted Sailfish (a couple of days ago).
Change-Id: Ic93862b85c468afccff2019d84b927af9ed2a84d

This reverts commit 640e595a. The
corresponding code in libcutils was removed, so this is now unneeded.

Bug: 71632076
Test: aosp_sailfish still works

Change-Id: I615bab83e9a83bc14439b8ab90c00d3156b0a7c4

Commit erroneously 55039509 removed init's read access to
/sys/devices/virtual/block/zram*. Restore access.

Test: cat /proc/meminfo
    ...
    SwapTotal:        524284 kB
    SwapFree:         524284 kB
    ...
Bug: 71510938

Change-Id: I20268168caa541a7dafa1e32339641095e1e524b

Some necessary sepolicy rule changes for init process to create directory,
mount cgroupv2 module and mount bpf filesystem. Also allow netd to create
and pin bpf object as files and read it back from file under the
directory where bpf filesystem is mounted.

Test: bpf maps show up under /sys/fs/bpf/
Change-Id: I579d04f60d7e20bd800d970cd28cd39fda9d20a0

Removes open, read, setattr permissions to sysfs_type.
Adds explicit permissions to:
sysfs_dt_firmware_android
sysfs_vibrator
sysfs_wake_lock

Bug: 65643247
Test: walleye boots without denials to sysfs_type.
Change-Id: I2e344831655c2c8e8e48b07ecce6a2704f2a206a

Allow init to create a serialized property_info file and allow all
processes to read it.

Bug: 36001741
Test: boot bullhead, walleye using property_info

Change-Id: Ie51d4c0f0221b128dd087029c811fda15b4d7093

Add write access to:
sysfs_android_usb
sysfs_leds
sysfs_power
sysfs_zram

Add setattr access to:
sysfs_android_usb
sysfs_devices_system_cpu
sysfs_lowmemorykiller
sysfs_power
sysfs_leds
sysfs_ipv4

Bug: 70040773
Bug: 65643247
Change-Id: I68e2e796f5599c9d281897759c8d8eef9363559a
Test: walleye boots with no denials from init to sysfs.

This reverts commit c2241a8d.

Reason for revert: build breakage b/70040773

Change-Id: I6af098ae20c4771a1070800d02c98e5783999a39

Add write access to:
sysfs_android_usb
sysfs_leds
sysfs_power
sysfs_zram

Add setattr access to:
sysfs_android_usb
sysfs_devices_system_cpu
sysfs_lowmemorykiller
sysfs_power
sysfs_leds
sysfs_ipv4

Bug: 65643247
Test: walleye boots with no denials from init to sysfs.

Change-Id: Ibc9a54a5f43f3d53ab7cbb0fdb9589959b31ebde

Now that creating a symlink automatically sets its context,
init needs permission to create this file.

Bug: 69965807
Test: Booted device and tested wifi and camera.
Change-Id: I41f5ca8f4d877312c9b2a909001fe9cd80c3d458

In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.

This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.

This is essentially:
  1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
     that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
     respectively.
  2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
  3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
  4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
     so that it covers all capabilities.  This set was used by several
     neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
     classes are still appropriate.

Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
      only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
      Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831

Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f

New types and files labeled with them:
1. proc_abi:
  /proc/sys/abi/swp

2. proc_dirty:
  /proc/sys/vm/dirty_background_ratio
  /proc/sys/vm/dirty_expire_centisecs

3. proc_diskstats:
  /proc/diskstats

4. proc_extra_free_kbytes:
  /proc/sys/vm/extra_free_kbytes

5. proc_hostname:
  /proc/sys/kernel/domainname
  /proc/sys/kernel/hostname

6. proc_hung_task:
  /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs

7. proc_max_map_count:
  /proc/sys/vm/max_map_count

8. proc_panic:
  /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_oops

9. proc_sched:
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_child_runs_first
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_latency_ns
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_rt_period_us
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_rt_runtime_us
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_tunable_scaling
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_wakeup_granularity_ns

10. proc_uptime:
  /proc/uptime

Files labeled with already existing types:
1. proc_perf:
  /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid

2. proc_sysrq:
  /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq

3. usermodehelper:
  /proc/sys/kernel/core_pipe_limit

Changes to init domain:
1. Removed access to files with 'proc' label.
2. Added access to newly introduced types + proc_kmsg.

Bug: 68949041
Test: walleye boots without denials from u:r:init:s0.
Test: system/core/init/grab-bootchart.sh does not trigger denials from
u:r:init:s0
Change-Id: If1715c3821e277679c320956df33dd273e750ea2

Bug: 68949041
Test: device builds, boots, no denials from init.

Change-Id: Iedefac8d70512fd614ca06117f42a7887f6ab649

Bug: 62378620
Test: Android in Chrome OS can call uevent_kernel_recv() and not fail
      with EIO.
Test: bullhead networking still works

Change-Id: I4dd5d2148ee1704c4fa23d7fd82d1ade19b58cbd

Test: boot sailfish with no audit when writing to page-cluster
Change-Id: I2bfebdf9342594d66d95daaec92d71195c93ffc8

Bug: 37916906
Test: Builds 'n' boots.
Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668
Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb

Bug: 37916906
Test: Builds 'n' boots.
Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668
Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb

avc:  denied  { relabelto } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="misc" dev="tmpfs" ino=3855 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:misc_block_device:s0 tclass=lnk_file

If misc partition is used during early mount, it will carry a label of
tmpfs (instead of block_device), which will fail restorecon with the
above denial.

Bug: 65378733
Test: Build and flash a target that uses misc in early mount. No longer
      observe the above denial.
Change-Id: I44cd43dbd2a8a4f9f423ebc8ac0dd046b167ef72

Add /dev/kmsg_debug on userdebug devices, to allow crash_dump to log
crashes to dmesg when logd isn't up yet (or is the one crashing).

Bug: http://b/36574794
Test: stop tombstoned; crasher; dmesg
Change-Id: I6ffe11bc613e88198893e82712719522b74fe1be

This should improve performance, as file_contexts is slower than
genfs_contexts.

Bug: 62413700
Test: Built, flashed, and booted Sailfish.  Verified that the
files have the correct context and that wifi, web, and atrace work.

Merged-In: Ia28707ec565a0792bc882fbffe9e8ab9968535f5
Change-Id: I9546f3af3c95e3443684ae4764881b69987611ef

Prevent files in /proc from incorrectly having sysfs_type attribute.

Rework neverallows so that ueventd has write access to all of
/sys which it needs to handle uevents.

Bug: 63147833
Test: Build. Flash angler, verify files are correctly labeled and no
    new denials are in the logs.

Change-Id: Ib94d44e78cee0e83e2ac924f1c72e611e8e73558

Add /dev/kmsg_debug on userdebug devices, to allow crash_dump to log
crashes to dmesg when logd isn't up yet (or is the one crashing).

(Originally commited in a015186f)
Bug: 36574794
Bug: 62101480
Test: Builds and boots.
Change-Id: I249e11291c58fee77098dec3fd3271ea23363ac9

In libprocessgroup, we want to only send signals once to processes,
particularly for SIGTERM.  We must send the signal both to all
processes within a POSIX process group and a cgroup.  To ensure that
we do not duplicate the signals being sent, we check the processes in
the cgroup to see if they're in the POSIX process groups that we're
killing.  If they are, we skip sending a second signal.  This requires
getpgid permissions, hence this SELinux change.

avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process permissive=1

Bug: 37853905
Bug: 62418791
Test: Boot, kill zygote, reboot
Change-Id: Ib6c265dbaac8833c47145ae28fb6594ca8545570
(cherry picked from commit c59eb4d8)

Allow lmkd to access /dev/memcg once again.

Test: lmkd can access memcg
bug 36588803

Change-Id: I47b4e79260bcd2967d85d8151c83e624d432f409

This reverts commit 527f64e6.

Change-Id: Ibc48af53431a8f7c7211999dcb571f492fb5ddb4

In libprocessgroup, we want to only send signals once to processes,
particularly for SIGTERM.  We must send the signal both to all
processes within a POSIX process group and a cgroup.  To ensure that
we do not duplicate the signals being sent, we check the processes in
the cgroup to see if they're in the POSIX process groups that we're
killing.  If they are, we skip sending a second signal.  This requires
getpgid permissions, hence this SELinux change.

avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=797 comm="ActivityManager" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process permissive=1
avc: denied { getpgid } for pid=1 comm="init" scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process permissive=1

Bug: 37853905
Bug: 62418791
Test: Boot, kill zygote, reboot
Change-Id: Ib6c265dbaac8833c47145ae28fb6594ca8545570

Allow lmkd to access /dev/memcg once again.

Test: lmkd can access memcg
bug 36588803

Change-Id: Ia57dbbc3987d8858c932103c4e546cbb88893207

This should improve performance, as file_contexts is slower than
genfs_contexts.

Bug: 62413700
Test: Built, flashed, and booted Marlin.  Verified that some of the
files have the correct context.
Change-Id: Ia28707ec565a0792bc882fbffe9e8ab9968535f5