Currently, both untrusted apps and priv-apps use the SELinux file label
"app_data_file" for files in their /data/data directory. This is
problematic, as we really want different rules for such files. For
example, we may want to allow untrusted apps to load executable code
from priv-app directories, but disallow untrusted apps from loading
executable code from their own home directories.

This change adds a new file type "privapp_data_file". For compatibility,
we adjust the policy to support access privapp_data_files almost
everywhere we were previously granting access to app_data_files
(adbd and run-as being exceptions). Additional future tightening is
possible here by removing some of these newly added rules.

This label will start getting used in a followup change to
system/sepolicy/private/seapp_contexts, similar to:

  -user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
  +user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user

For now, this newly introduced label has no usage, so this change
is essentially a no-op.

Test: Factory reset and boot - no problems on fresh install.
Test: Upgrade to new version and test. No compatibility problems on
      filesystem upgrade.

Change-Id: I9618b7d91d1c2bcb5837cdabc949f0cf741a2837

In particular, add assertions limiting which processes may
directly open files owned by apps. Reduce this to just apps, init,
and installd. App data is protected by a combination of selinux
permissions and Unix permissions, so limiting the open permission to
just apps (which are not allowed to have CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE or
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) ensures that only installd and init have
complete access an app's private directory.

In addition to apps/init/installd, other processes currently granted
open are mediaserver, uncrypt, and vold. Uncrypt's access appears to
be deprecated (b/80299612). Uncrypt now uses /data/ota_package
instead. b/80418809 and b/80300620 track removal for vold and
mediaserver.

Test: build/boot aosp_taimen-userdebug. Verify no "granted" audit
messages in the logs.
Bug: 80190017
Bug: 80300620
Bug: 80418809
Fixes: 80299612
Change-Id: I153bc7b62294b36ccd596254a5976dd887fed046

Create a new label for /data/system/dropbox, and neverallow direct
access to anything other than init and system_server.

While all apps may write to the dropbox service, only apps with
android.permission.READ_LOGS, a signature|privileged|development
permission, may read them. Grant access to priv_app, system_app,
and platform_app, and neverallow access to all untrusted_apps.

Bug: 31681871
Test: atest CtsStatsdHostTestCases
Test: atest DropBoxTest
Test: atest ErrorsTests
Change-Id: Ice302b74b13c4d66e07b069c1cdac55954d9f5df

Bug: 72177715
Test: flash device and check incident output
Change-Id: I16c172caec235d985a6767642134fbd5e5c23912

Bug: 73354384
Test: manual
Change-Id: Iaaeded69c287eae757aaf68dc18bc5a0c53b94e6

This CL adds the SELinux permissions required to execute
atrace and get userspace tracing events from system services.
This is to enable tracing of events coming from surfaceflinger,
audio HAL, etc.
atrace, when executed, sets a bunch of debug.atrace. properties
and sends an IPC via binder/hwbinder to tell the services to
reload that property.

This CL does NOT affect systrace. In that case (i.e. when
atrace is executed from adb/shell) atrace still runs in
the shell domain and none of those changes apply.

Change-Id: I11b096d5c5c5593f18bce87f06c1a7b1ffa7910e
Bug: b/73340039

UsbDeviceManager in system_server now
helps set up the endpoint files.

Bug: 72877174
Test: No selinux denials
Change-Id: I96b11ee68799ac29b756d2034e7f5e4660dbed98

Allows the traced_probes daemon to access the core ftrace
functionalities on user builds. Specifically this involves:
- Whitelisting the per_cpu/ subdirectory to access:
  1) trace_pipe_raw file to allow perfetto to read the raw
     ftrace buffer (rather than the text-based /trace endpoint)
  2) cpuX/stats and cpuX/buffer_size_kb that allow to
     tune the buffer size per-cpu pipe and to get basic
     statistics about the ftrace buffer (#events, overruns)
- Whitelistiing the full event directories rather than the
  /enable files. This gives also access to the /format files
  for the events that are already enabled on user builds.
  /format files simply describe the memory layout
  of the binary logs. Example: https://ghostbin.com/paste/f8m4k

This still does NOT allow enabling the events labeled as
"_debug" (mostly events that return activity on inodes).
We'll deal with that separately as soon as we get a POC
of inode resolution and a sensible blacklist/whitelist model.

Bug: 70942310
Change-Id: Ic15cca0a9d7bc0e45aa48097a94eadef44c333f8

This changes tracefs files to be default-enabled in debug mode, but
default-disabled with specific files enabled in user mode.

Bug: 64762598
Test: Successfully took traces in user mode.

Change-Id: I572ea22253e0c1e42065fbd1d2fd7845de06fceb

Test: Standard Traceur workflow works successfully with no
selinux denials on a user build.
Bug: 64762598
Change-Id: I0dfe506d463b63d70c5bda03f8706041ea7ab448

vendor_init exists on the system partition, but it is meant to be an
extention of init that runs with vendor permissions for executing
vendor scripts, therefore it is not meant to be in coredomain.

Bug: 62875318
Test: boot walleye
Merged-In: I01af5c9f8b198674b15b90620d02725a6e7c1da6
Change-Id: I01af5c9f8b198674b15b90620d02725a6e7c1da6

And grant appropriate permissions to more granular types.

Bug: 29319732
Bug: 65643247
Test: adb bugreport; no new denials to /proc or /sys files.

Change-Id: Ied99546164e79bfa6148822858c165177d3720a5

Bug: 65643247
Test: walleye boots with no denials from priv_app.

Change-Id: I9a7faf1253bdd79d780c2398c740109e2d84bc63

Bug: 65643247
Test: manual
Test: browse internet
Test: take a picture
Change-Id: I9faff44b7a025c7422404d777113e40842ea26dd

Bug: 65643247
Test: builds, the change doesn't affect runtime behavior.

Change-Id: I621a8006db7074f124cb16a12662c768bb31e465

Bug: 68388678
Test: storaged-unit-tests
Change-Id: Iea1ba0131a389dc4396ff3ebe2cdf68dbd688c8a

Perfetto is a performance instrumentation and logging framework,
living in AOSP's /external/pefetto.
Perfetto introduces in the system one binary and two daemons
(the binary can specialize in either depending on the cmdline).

1) traced: unprivileged daemon. This is architecturally similar to logd.
   It exposes two UNIX sockets:
   - /dev/socket/traced_producer : world-accessible, allows to stream
     tracing data. A tmpfs file descriptor is sent via SCM_RIGHTS
     from traced to each client process, which needs to be able to
     mmap it R/W (but not X)
   - /dev/socket/traced_consumer : privilege-accessible (only from:
     shell, statsd). It allows to configure tracing and read the trace
     buffer.
2) traced_probes: privileged daemon. This needs to:
   - access tracingfs (/d/tracing) to turn tracing on and off.
   - exec atrace
   - connect to traced_producer to stream data to traced.

init.rc file:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/external/perfetto/+/575382/14/perfetto.rc

Bug: 70942310
Change-Id: Ia3b5fdacbd5a8e6e23b82f1d6fabfa07e4abc405

This CL creates a traceur_app domain with userdebug privileges akin to
what shell has with regards to being able to find most services on
device. Previously, traceur was running as shell which was an
unintentional abuse of selinux architecture.

Bug: 68126425
Test: Traceur functions outside of shell user privilege
Change-Id: Ib5090e7e8225ad201b3ec24b506fe2717101d0f1

We rely on vendors to label all dependencies of healthd/charger under
/sys/class/power_supply with sysfs_batteryinfo type.

Bug: 65643247
Bug: 32659667
Test: boots without denials from healthd, to sysfs_batteryinfo or to
sysfs_msm_subsys.
Test: charging with device turned off works without /sys denials.

Change-Id: I893f309ecad8a0caf7d0b81f5f945725907255c2

Follow along with updates in the selinux policy.

Test: m
Test: manual
Change-Id: I0dfc6af8fbfc9c8b6860490ab16f02a220d41915

In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.

This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.

This is essentially:
  1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
     that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
     respectively.
  2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
  3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
  4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
     so that it covers all capabilities.  This set was used by several
     neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
     classes are still appropriate.

Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
      only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
      Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831

Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f

Added access to proc_uptime and proc_asound to address these denials:

avc: denied { read } for name="uptime" dev="proc" ino=4026532080
scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_uptime:s0 tclass=file
permissive=1

avc: denied { getattr } for path="/proc/asound/version" dev="proc"
ino=4026532017 scontext=u:r:shell:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_asound:s0
tclass=file permissive=1

Bug: 65643247
Test: device boots with no denial from 'shell' domain.
Test: lsmod, ps, top, netstat
Test: No denials triggered from CtsSecurityHostTestCases
Test: external/toybox/run-tests-on-android.sh does not pass, but triggers
no denials from 'shell' domain to 'proc' type.

Change-Id: Ia4c26fd616e33e5962c6707a855dc24e338ec153

Bug: 65643247
Test: cts-tradefed run cts-dev -m \
CtsMediaTestCases --compatibility:module-arg \
CtsMediaTestCases:include-annotation:\
android.platform.test.annotations.RequiresDevice
No denials from mediaserver domain to sysfs type are observed.
Change-Id: Icb5c12f04af213452d82e226993fe13085c5c33f

Bug: 65643247
Test: aosp_walleye-userdebug builds
Test: aosp_sailfish-userdebug builds
Change-Id: Iaebd368b84259783fbdc4778988bdb7ba0df300b

This reverts commit a61b99bb.

Reason for revert: breaks aosp_walleye-userdebug

Change-Id: I3246b8cac862b53fc76609df60b90149fbc8098d

Bug: 65643247
Test: walleye-userdebug builds
Change-Id: I12d8239ca85bb68eab76a2d0001a722fea3045c5

New types and files labeled with them:
1. proc_abi:
  /proc/sys/abi/swp

2. proc_dirty:
  /proc/sys/vm/dirty_background_ratio
  /proc/sys/vm/dirty_expire_centisecs

3. proc_diskstats:
  /proc/diskstats

4. proc_extra_free_kbytes:
  /proc/sys/vm/extra_free_kbytes

5. proc_hostname:
  /proc/sys/kernel/domainname
  /proc/sys/kernel/hostname

6. proc_hung_task:
  /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs

7. proc_max_map_count:
  /proc/sys/vm/max_map_count

8. proc_panic:
  /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_oops

9. proc_sched:
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_child_runs_first
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_latency_ns
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_rt_period_us
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_rt_runtime_us
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_tunable_scaling
  /proc/sys/kernel/sched_wakeup_granularity_ns

10. proc_uptime:
  /proc/uptime

Files labeled with already existing types:
1. proc_perf:
  /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid

2. proc_sysrq:
  /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq

3. usermodehelper:
  /proc/sys/kernel/core_pipe_limit

Changes to init domain:
1. Removed access to files with 'proc' label.
2. Added access to newly introduced types + proc_kmsg.

Bug: 68949041
Test: walleye boots without denials from u:r:init:s0.
Test: system/core/init/grab-bootchart.sh does not trigger denials from
u:r:init:s0
Change-Id: If1715c3821e277679c320956df33dd273e750ea2

Bug: 65643247
Test: build aosp_sailfish-userdebug
Test: build walleye-userdebug from internal
Change-Id: Ic7a212ce226dcfa4b363ed1acd3b2a249cee576b

Bug: 65643247
Test: build aosp_sailfish-userdebug
Test: build walleye-userdebug from internal
This CL does not change runtime behavior.
Change-Id: I82c520579b986ea2a4a6f030ec60d5345c00b54f

Core domains should not be allowed access to kernel interfaces,
which are not explicitly labeled. These interfaces include
(but are not limited to):

1. /proc
2. /sys
3. /dev
4. debugfs
5. tracefs
6. inotifyfs
7. pstorefs
8. configfs
9. functionfs
10. usbfs
11. binfmt_miscfs

We keep a lists of exceptions to the rule, which we will be gradually shrinking.
This will help us prevent accidental regressions in our efforts to label
kernel interfaces.

Bug: 68159582
Bug: 68792382
Test: build aosp_sailfish-user
Test: build aosp_sailfish-userdebug
Test: CP to internal and build walleye-user
Change-Id: I1b2890ce1efb02a08709a6132cf2f12f9d88fde7

This reverts commit 502e43f7.

Reason for revert: Suspected to have broken a build, see b/68792382

Bug: 68792382
Change-Id: Ib5d465b7a50a73e3d8d8edd4e6b3426a7bde4249

Core domains should not be allowed access to kernel interfaces,
which are not explicitly labeled. These interfaces include
(but are not limited to):

1. /proc
2. /sys
3. /dev
4. debugfs
5. tracefs
6. inotifyfs
7. pstorefs
8. configfs
9. functionfs
10. usbfs
11. binfmt_miscfs

We keep a lists of exceptions to the rule, which we will be gradually shrinking.
This will help us prevent accidental regressions in our efforts to label
kernel interfaces.

Bug: 68159582
Test: bullhead, sailfish can build
Change-Id: I8e466843e1856720f30964546c5c2c32989fa3a5

Only privileged apps are supposed to be able to get unique IDs from
attestation.

Test: CTS test verifies the negative condition, manual the positive
Bug: 34671471
Change-Id: I9ab3f71b1e11ed1d7866ff933feece73152d2578

CAP_SYS_PTRACE is no longer used by crash_dump. There's no reason to
exclude it from the neverallow compile time assertion.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ib2dced19091406553c16e6ce538cfb68bbc1e5aa

Replace the global debuggerd with a per-process debugging helper that
gets exec'ed by the process that crashed.

Bug: http://b/30705528
Test: crasher/crasher64, `debuggerd <pid>`, `kill -ABRT <pid>`
Change-Id: Iad1b7478f7a4e2690720db4b066417d8b66834ed

Allow storaged to read /proc/[pid]/io
Grant binder access to storaged
Add storaged service
Grant storaged_exec access to dumpstate
Grant storaged binder_call to dumpstate

Bug: 32221677

Change-Id: Iecc9dba266c5566817a99ac6251eb943a0bac630

In order to support platform changes without simultaneous updates from
non-platform components, the platform and non-platform policies must be
split.  In order to provide a guarantee that policy written for
non-platform objects continues to provide the same access, all types
exposed to non-platform policy are versioned by converting them and the
policy using them into attributes.

This change performs that split, the subsequent versioning and also
generates a mapping file to glue the different policy components
together.

Test: Device boots and runs.
Bug: 31369363
Change-Id: Ibfd3eb077bd9b8e2ff3b2e6a0ca87e44d78b1317