Commit f277590b authored by Kirill A. Shutemov's avatar Kirill A. Shutemov Committed by Mark Salyzyn
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BACKPORT: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace

(cherry pick from commit ab676b7d)

As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.

This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.

[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html



[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
  this is the simple model.   - Linus ]

Signed-off-by: default avatarKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: default avatarKonstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Bug: 25739721
Change-Id: I3ecab3fee154f329258a051afc1b29531da74ee3
parent 3f3f88f1
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