selinux: always check the file label in selinux_kernel_read_file()
Commit 2039bda1 ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook") added a new flag to the security_kernel_read_file() LSM hook, "contents", which was set if a file was being read in its entirety or if it was the first chunk read in a multi-step process. The SELinux LSM callback was updated to only check against the file label if this "contents" flag was set, meaning that in multi-step reads the file label was not considered in the access control decision after the initial chunk. Thankfully the only in-tree user that performs a multi-step read is the "bcm-vk" driver and it is loading firmware, not a kernel module, so there are no security regressions to worry about. However, we still want to ensure that the SELinux code does the right thing, and *always* checks the file label, especially as there is a chance the file could change between chunk reads. Fixes: 2039bda1 ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook") Signed-off-by:Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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