Bug: 111655771
Test: builds
Change-Id: I67850d910770109005b2243c628282ad638c88fb

Linux kernel 4.14+ SELinux starts explicit map
permission check for file mmap operations.  Add this
permission to system_server for data file access,
which is used in scenario such as "adb install" of
APK's.

test: no longer see SELinux map denial on "adb install"
Change-Id: Id6016dd0b3f15dfdb0f02509ea812dee61ac78ed

Allow lmkd write access to sys.lmk. properties to be able to set
sys.lmk.minfree_levels.

Bug: 111521182
Test: getprop sys.lmk.minfree_levels returns value set by lmkd
Change-Id: I86ff11d75917966857d3a76876a56799bb92a5ad
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>

Test: builds
Test: vts
Bug: 111655771
Change-Id: Iabad3d124bf476cb624addf7d7898e0c2894d550

This is needed to dump ANR traces for the process.

Bug: 111604912
Test: adb shell am hang
Change-Id: Icadc2de95a12818fe623271d1afb955843ccddbf

Certain pm.* properties, which are especially needed for
Go-targets, are not listed in property_contexts.
Init will not be able to set these properties on bootup
without the correct selinux contexts assigned to the
properties.

BUG: 111738816

Test: In selinux-enforcing mode, on bootup, these
      properties are now correctly set by init.

Change-Id: I6ea0fb229c93725e2987b1e021d5804a132d093d

Test: n/a
Change-Id: I929772fa36da6b96494d14cfa48b47dcc76cccd4

/cache/overlay directory in support of overlayfs mounts on userdebug
and eng devices.  Overlayfs in turn can be capable of supporting
adb remount for read-only or restricted-storage filesystems like
squashfs or right-sized (zero free space) system partitions
respectively.

Test: compile
Bug: 109821005
Bug: 110985612
Change-Id: I3ece03886db7cc97f864497cf93ec6c6c39bccd1

Text relocation support was removed from the linker for apps targeting
API >= 23. See
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/bionic/+/master/android-changes-for-ndk-developers.md#text-relocations-enforced-for-api-level-23

However, the security policy was not updated to remove the execmod
permission at that time, since we didn't have support for targeting
SELinux policies to API versions.

Remove execmod permissions for apps targeting API 26 or greater. The
linker support was removed, so it's pointless to keep around the SELinux
permissions.

Retain execmod support for apps targeting API 25 or lower. While in
theory we could remove support for API 23-25, that would involve the
introduction of a new SELinux domain (and the associated rule
explosion), which I would prefer to avoid.

This change helps protect application executable code from modification,
enforcing W^X properties on executable code pages loaded from files.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W%5EX

Test: auditallow rules were added and nothing triggered for apps
      targeting API >= 26. Code compiles and device boots.
Bug: 111544476

Change-Id: Iab9a0bd297411e99699e3651c110e57eb02a3a41

/vendor/bin/bcc being a dependency of renderscript should be labeled as
same_process_hal_file. To facilitate that we relax neverallow rules for
executing same_process_hal_file from coredomain.

See details on /vendor/bin/bcc:
https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/vndk/renderscript

Bug: n/a
Test: build-time change
Change-Id: Ie996fb863090bf08b3d3ef653da827d0b22937d7

Bug: N/A
Test: boot
Change-Id: I67e3554383977c3fb5e89f236838a9cb39fb257e

Kernels above 4.14 have a new mmap permission. However, neverallow rules
exclude the use of mmap, even when file FDs are passable across the
vendor/non-vendor boundary. Since we allow reading / writing of passed
file descriptors, also allow the use of mmap for passed file
descriptors.

Bug: 112171217
Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I8176f86960bdff0cf5de770809510e9df5d62db9

This reverts commit 0f11ffcc.

Reason for revert: libmono crashes

Bug: 112292089
Bug: 111544476
Test: policy compiles, device boots
Change-Id: I064090aa9337cf17b80cd2c9af9342df851a3b27

Bug: 112104996
Change-Id: Icf411d8b04e12dd33dd82a26328b4156585cb5ff

Bug: 112292714
Change-Id: I0026c13fd4335e0365496bc00c26021d83f3c39d
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <gaoxiang25@huawei.com>

am: 4738b93d

Change-Id: I4278bd3d4e7786be716324d1817a81b6c19eec2e

am: 41b21ee9

Change-Id: I85087c37b7c575e9b50d7090d155281d4f7c4f74

Executing files from an application home directory violates
W^X (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W%5EX) constraints (loading executable code
from a writable file) and is an unsafe application behavior. Test to see if we
can get rid of it and establish some baseline metrics.

Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Change-Id: I756c281fcbf750821307327642cc0d06605951b0

As of https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/system/sepolicy/+/536356 ,
the untrusted_v2_app domain is no longer used.

Bug: 112233317
Test: policy compiles, device boots, and no problems
Change-Id: I5a47c8305bef374b7fea06cd789e06cd48b847e6

am: 8b2c8580  -s ours

Change-Id: If21fba6ab5506a8ba74a55d4cd816c218b4078b1

(cherrypicked from commit f2afca7c)

Bug: 109653662
Test: Build policy.
Change-Id: I6c71a8bc24d7a144b801d16f1bcad31fb8f2aba5
Merged-In: I6c71a8bc24d7a144b801d16f1bcad31fb8f2aba5

Bug: None
Test: I solemnly swear I tested this conflict resolution.
Change-Id: Ic6dd370d6549c9dd1eb1e690c1c2f2fa441624b9

am: c5601de4

Change-Id: Ie61645bd9b276f67e96ac7f823c1a1048a35ef8e

am: 938ab05d

Change-Id: If632608a9e7acc6e59b468674207bc80a4833a26

Test: boot hikey
Change-Id: I8f26f858af8ccde1d7f4b346966bbb6bbeab5a92

Currently, both untrusted apps and priv-apps use the SELinux file label
"app_data_file" for files in their /data/data directory. This is
problematic, as we really want different rules for such files. For
example, we may want to allow untrusted apps to load executable code
from priv-app directories, but disallow untrusted apps from loading
executable code from their own home directories.

Commit 23c9d91b introduced a new type
called privapp_data_file and added rules necessary to preserve
compatibility. However, that change did not relabel any existing files,
so effectively the change was a no-op.

This change performs the switch, relabeling priv-app's /data/data files
from app_data_file to privapp_data_file. Due to the compatibility rules
added in 23c9d91b, there should be no
noticeable effect from this change.

Test: Factory reset and boot - no problems on fresh install.
Test: Upgrade to new version and test. No compatibility problems on
      filesystem upgrade.

Merged-In: I9a476726bf01f4bcc7952d11fd57dba803a9fd8d
Change-Id: I23a26cd3906fc43cbd225c05c3a2abd3cab8bd06

Bug: 111890351
Test: Device boots and no selinux denials when vold mounts
      at /mnt/user/.*

Change-Id: Id962a85af9f99c54421f0820a22880be36c2e478

This is do aid developers pushing debug services to not need to modify
the underlying SEPolicy

avc: denied { transition } for comm="init" path="/system/bin/awk"
dev="dm-0" ino=1934 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0
tclass=process
avc: denied { rlimitinh } for comm="awk" scontext=u:r:init:s0
tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=process
avc: denied { siginh } for comm="awk" scontext=u:r:init:s0
tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=process
avc: denied { noatsecure } for comm="awk" scontext=u:r:init:s0
tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=process

Test: init can execute a system_file marked with seclabel u:r:su:s0
Change-Id: I85d9528341fe08dbb2fb9a91e34a41f41aa093be

am: d840374e

Change-Id: I93264ded0479ab0e101d0449c2ff52b9a92e3d6e

Bug: 73660730
Test: watchdogd still runs
Change-Id: I31697c7c6fa2f7009731ff48c659af051838e42f

am: 23c9d91b

Change-Id: Id99688b1e9b4d8d43eb1833904ac47c2796166ab

Currently, both untrusted apps and priv-apps use the SELinux file label
"app_data_file" for files in their /data/data directory. This is
problematic, as we really want different rules for such files. For
example, we may want to allow untrusted apps to load executable code
from priv-app directories, but disallow untrusted apps from loading
executable code from their own home directories.

This change adds a new file type "privapp_data_file". For compatibility,
we adjust the policy to support access privapp_data_files almost
everywhere we were previously granting access to app_data_files
(adbd and run-as being exceptions). Additional future tightening is
possible here by removing some of these newly added rules.

This label will start getting used in a followup change to
system/sepolicy/private/seapp_contexts, similar to:

  -user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
  +user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user

For now, this newly introduced label has no usage, so this change
is essentially a no-op.

Test: Factory reset and boot - no problems on fresh install.
Test: Upgrade to new version and test. No compatibility problems on
      filesystem upgrade.

Change-Id: I9618b7d91d1c2bcb5837cdabc949f0cf741a2837