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  1. Aug 06, 2014
  2. Jul 15, 2014
  3. Jul 08, 2014
    • Sreeram Ramachandran's avatar
      Allow netd to create data files in /data/misc/net/. · 65edb75d
      Sreeram Ramachandran authored
      This will be used to populate rt_tables (a mapping from routing table numbers to
      table names) that's read by the iproute2 utilities.
      
      Change-Id: I69deb1a64d5d6647470823405bf0cc55b24b22de
      65edb75d
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      New domain "install_recovery" · 9f6af083
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Create a new domain for the one-shot init service flash_recovery.
      
      This domain is initially in permissive_or_unconfined() for
      testing. Any SELinux denials won't be enforced for now.
      
      Change-Id: I7146dc154a5c78b6f3b4b6fb5d5855a05a30bfd8
      9f6af083
    • Jeff Sharkey's avatar
      Rules to allow installing package directories. · c02c98d3
      Jeff Sharkey authored
      Earlier changes had extended the rules, but some additional changes
      are needed.
      
      avc: denied { relabelfrom } for name="vmdl-723825123.tmp"
          dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=162910 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
          tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
      
      Bug: 14975160
      Change-Id: Ia644c73ec10460a2a529fe197ade6afe46694651
      c02c98d3
  4. Jul 07, 2014
    • Jeff Sharkey's avatar
      Rules to allow installing package directories. · be092af0
      Jeff Sharkey authored
      Earlier changes had extended the rules, but some additional changes
      are needed.
      
      avc: denied { relabelfrom } for name="vmdl-723825123.tmp"
          dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=162910 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
          tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
      
      Bug: 14975160
      Change-Id: I875cfc3538d4b098d27c7c7b756d1868a54cc976
      be092af0
  5. Jun 21, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Create vdc domain · bf8a37b8
      Nick Kralevich authored
      The init.rc one-shot services "defaultcrypto" and "encrypt" call
      out to the /system/bin/vdc command line to ask vold to perform
      encryption operations. Create a new domain for these one-shot
      services. Allow the vdc domain to talk to vold.
      
      Change-Id: I73dc2ee4cc265bc16056b27307c254254940fd9f
      bf8a37b8
  6. Jun 17, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Force logwrapper to system_file · b4adc62a
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Some device-specific policies are improperly creating a security
      domain for logwrapper, rather than removing the logwrapper
      lines from init.device.rc. Don't allow that. Explicitly add an entry
      for /system/bin/logwrapper to force it to a system_file. Attempting
      to override this will result in the following compile time error:
      
        obj/ETC/file_contexts_intermediates/file_contexts: Multiple different
        specifications for /system/bin/logwrapper
        (u:object_r:logwrapper_exec:s0 and u:object_r:system_file:s0).
      
      Bug: 15616899
      Change-Id: Ia55394247a9fa16e00434d61091fff9d9d4ff125
      b4adc62a
  7. Jun 16, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Fix SELinux policies to allow resource overlays. · fad4d5fb
      Nick Kralevich authored
      The following commits added support for runtime resource overlays.
      
        New command line tool 'idmap'
        * 65a05fd56dbc9fd9c2511a97f49c445a748fb3c5
        Runtime resource overlay, iteration 2
        * 48d22323ce39f9aab003dce74456889b6414af55
        Runtime resource overlay, iteration 2, test cases
        * ad6ed950dbfa152c193dd7e49c369d9e831f1591
      
      During SELinux tightening, support for these runtime resource
      overlays was unknowingly broken. Fix it.
      
      This change has been tested by hackbod and she reports that
      everything is working after this change. I haven't independently
      verified the functionality.
      
      Test cases are available for this by running:
        * python frameworks/base/core/tests/overlaytests/testrunner.py
      
      Change-Id: I1c70484011fd9041bec4ef34f93f7a5509906f40
      fad4d5fb
  8. Jun 04, 2014
  9. May 29, 2014
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Protect /data/property. · ad0d0fc7
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      /data/property is only accessible by root and is used by the init
      property service for storing persistent property values.  Create
      a separate type for it and only allow init to write to the directory
      and files within it.  Ensure that we do not allow access to other domains
      in future changes or device-specific policy via a neverallow rule.
      
      Change-Id: Iff556b9606c5651c0f1bba902e30b59bdd6f063a
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      ad0d0fc7
  10. May 27, 2014
    • Torne (Richard Coles)'s avatar
      Define SELinux policy for RELRO sharing support. · 9786af2b
      Torne (Richard Coles) authored
      Define a domain and appropriate access rules for shared RELRO files
      (used for loading the WebView native library). Any app is permitted to
      read the files as they are public data, but only the shared_relro
      process is permitted to create/update them.
      
      Bug: 13005501
      Change-Id: I9d5ba9e9eedb9b8c80fe6f84a3fc85a68553d52e
      9786af2b
  11. May 22, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Label /dev/socket/zygote_secondary · 7cba5da2
      Nick Kralevich authored
      zygote_secondary talks over a different socket named
      /dev/socket/zygote_secondary. Make sure it's properly labeled.
      
      See https://android-review.googlesource.com/89604
      
      Addresses the following denial:
      
      <12>[   48.442004] type=1400 audit(1400801842.179:5): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1082 comm="main" name="zygote_secondary" dev="tmpfs" ino=9953 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=1
      
      Bug: 13647418
      Change-Id: I1ff5f1d614295a5870bb8a3992ad9167e1656c92
      7cba5da2
  12. May 15, 2014
    • Narayan Kamath's avatar
      app_process is now a symlink. · 5c655876
      Narayan Kamath authored
      app_process is now a symlink to app_process32 or
      app_process64, so we have to update the selinux
      rules to explicitly refer to them.
      
      See change 5a7ee9ad63d for context.
      
      Change-Id: I7f7a107d79a8f7a3c193f97809e1e737540258f1
      5c655876
  13. May 14, 2014
  14. May 13, 2014
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      DO NOT MERGE: Address system_server denials. · dfee702c
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access.
      Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access.
      
      Resolves denials such as:
      avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder
      
      avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
      
      avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file
      
      avc:  denied  { ptrace } for  pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process
      
      avc:  denied  { sigkill } for  pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process
      
      avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv
      er:s0 tclass=udp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]"
      dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s
      0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { setopt } for  pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { setopt } for  pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
      
      avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
      
      avc:  denied  { unlink } for  pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file
      
      avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file
      
      Bug: 14833575
      
      Change-Id: I23425b4ef1552ff31486d0a52ee2c69d6236691d
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      dfee702c
  15. May 12, 2014
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Label /data/.layout_version with its own type. · baf49bd5
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      installd creates /data/.layout_version.  Introduce a separate type
      for this file (and any other file created by installd under a directory
      labeled system_data_file) so that we can allow create/write access by
      installd without allowing it to any system data files created by other
      processes.  This prevents installd from overwriting other system data
      files, and ensure that any files it creates will require explicit
      rules in order to access.
      
      Change-Id: Id04e49cd571390d18792949c8b2b13b1ac59c016
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      baf49bd5
  16. May 07, 2014
    • Greg Hackmann's avatar
      Add policies for Atomic Display Framework · 7004789d
      Greg Hackmann authored
      
      ADF is a modern replacement for fbdev.
      
      ADF's device nodes (/dev/adf[X]), interface nodes
      (/dev/adf-interface[X].[Y]), and overlay engine nodes
      (/dev/adf-overlay-engine[X].[Y]) are collectively used in similar
      contexts as fbdev nodes.  Vendor HW composers (via SurfaceFlinger) and
      healthd will need to send R/W ioctls to these nodes to prepare and
      update the display.
      
      Ordinary apps should not talk to ADF directly.
      
      Change-Id: Ic0a76b1e82c0cc1e8f240f219928af1783e79343
      Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
      7004789d
  17. May 05, 2014
  18. Apr 09, 2014
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Define a type for /data/dalvik-cache/profiles. · 19c50903
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      I9b8e59e3bd7df8a1bf60fa7ffd376a24ba0eb42f added a profiles
      subdirectory to /data/dalvik-cache with files that must be
      app-writable.  As a result, we have denials such as:
      W/Profiler( 3328): type=1400 audit(0.0:199): avc:  denied  { write } for  name="com.google.android.setupwizard" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=106067 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file
      W/Profiler( 3328): type=1300 audit(0.0:199): arch=40000028 syscall=322 per=800000 success=yes exit=33 a0=ffffff9c a1=b8362708 a2=20002 a3=0 items=1 ppid=194 auid=4294967295 uid=10019 gid=10019 euid=10019 suid=10019 fsuid=10019 egid=10019 sgid=10019 fsgid=10019 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 exe="/system/bin/app_process" subj=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 key=(null)
      W/auditd  (  286): type=1307 audit(0.0:199):  cwd="/"
      W/auditd  (  286): type=1302 audit(0.0:199): item=0 name="/data/dalvik-cache/profiles/com.google.android.setupwizard" inode=106067 dev=b3:1c mode=0100664 ouid=1012 ogid=50019 rdev=00:00 obj=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
      
      We do not want to allow untrusted app domains to write to the
      existing type on other /data/dalvik-cache files as that could be used
      for code injection into another app domain, the zygote or the system_server.
      So define a new type for this subdirectory.  The restorecon_recursive /data
      in init.rc will fix the labeling on devices that already have a profiles
      directory created.  For correct labeling on first creation, we also need
      a separate change to installd under the same change id.
      
      Bug: 13927667
      Change-Id: I4857d031f9e7e60d48b8c72fcb22a81b3a2ebaaa
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      19c50903
  19. Apr 04, 2014
  20. Mar 26, 2014
  21. Mar 18, 2014
    • Robert Craig's avatar
      Label /data/misc/sms as a radio_data_file. · a00fb29b
      Robert Craig authored
      
      This change helps with the following denials.
        avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=14157 comm="Thread-88" name="premium_sms_policy.xml" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=618998 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
        avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=14293 comm="Thread-89" name="sms" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=618952 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
      
      Prior to this patch the directory was labeled as
      system_data_file which is a bit too generic. This
      directory contains xml files with regexs which
      represent premium numbers that are used to warn
      the user before sending.
      
      Change-Id: I98288b25aa1546477e05eee9f7622324b013e695
      Signed-off-by: default avatarrpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
      a00fb29b
  22. Mar 14, 2014
  23. Mar 12, 2014
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Label /data/misc/wifi/hostapd with wpa_socket type. · 5f8d9f85
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      hostapd creates sockets under /data/misc/wifi/hostapd.
      Ensure that they are labeled correctly both at runtime
      (type_transition) and during the init.rc restorecon_recursive /data
      (file_contexts).
      
      Addresses denials such as:
       avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=20476 comm="hostapd" name="wlan0" scontext=u:r:hostapd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0 tclass=sock_file
       avc:  denied  { setattr } for  pid=20476 comm="hostapd" name="wlan0" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=619005 scontext=u:r:hostapd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0 tclass=sock_file
       avc:  denied  { unlink } for  pid=20476 comm="hostapd" name="wlan0" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=619005 scontext=u:r:hostapd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0 tclass=sock_file
      
      Change-Id: I80a443faeb6017a9d6cbdb8da9d7416f29a7b85f
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      5f8d9f85
  24. Mar 05, 2014
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Address system_server denials. · 3dad7b61
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access.
      Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access.
      
      Resolves denials such as:
      avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { call } for  pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder
      
      avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
      
      avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file
      
      avc:  denied  { ptrace } for  pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process
      
      avc:  denied  { sigkill } for  pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process
      
      avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv
      er:s0 tclass=udp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]"
      dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s
      0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { setopt } for  pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { setopt } for  pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
      
      avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
      
      avc:  denied  { unlink } for  pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file
      
      avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { getopt } for  pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { read write } for  pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket
      
      avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file
      
      Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      3dad7b61
  25. Mar 03, 2014
  26. Feb 28, 2014
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Label /data/misc/wifi/sockets with wpa_socket. · 23c65b5c
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      This will ensure that any sockets created in this directory
      will default to wpa_socket unless a type_transition is defined.
      Define a type transition for system_server to keep its separate
      system_wpa_socket type assigned for its socket.  Allow wpa
      to create and unlink sockets in the directory.  We leave the
      already existing rules for wifi_data_file in place for compatibility
      with existing devices that have wifi_data_file on /data/misc/wifi/sockets.
      
      Change-Id: I9e35cc93abf89ce3594860aa3193f84a3b42ea6e
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      23c65b5c
  27. Feb 25, 2014
  28. Feb 19, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      initial policy for uncrypt. · 96eeb1ec
      Nick Kralevich authored
      Add initial support for uncrypt, started via the
      pre-recovery service in init.rc. On an encrypted device,
      uncrypt reads an OTA zip file on /data, opens the underlying
      block device, and writes the unencrypted blocks on top of the
      encrypted blocks. This allows recovery, which can't normally
      read encrypted partitions, to reconstruct the OTA image and apply
      the update as normal.
      
      Add an exception to the neverallow rule for sys_rawio. This is
      needed to support writing to the raw block device.
      
      Add an exception to the neverallow rule for unlabeled block devices.
      The underlying block device for /data varies between devices
      within the same family (for example, "flo" vs "deb"), and the existing
      per-device file_context labeling isn't sufficient to cover these
      differences. Until I can resolve this problem, allow access to any
      block devices.
      
      Bug: 13083922
      Change-Id: I7cd4c3493c151e682866fe4645c488b464322379
      96eeb1ec
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Delete unnecessary /data/data entries. · f4c6579b
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      /data/data subdirectories are labeled by installd at creation time
      based on seapp_contexts, not based on file_contexts, so we do not
      need the /data/data/.* entry, and the wallpaper file was moved from
      under com.android.settings/files to /data/system/users/N long ago so we can
      delete the old entry for it.
      
      Change-Id: I32af6813ff284e8fe9fd4867df482a642c728755
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      f4c6579b
  29. Feb 16, 2014
  30. Feb 13, 2014
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      initial lmkd policy. · 5467fce6
      Nick Kralevich authored
      * Allow writes to /proc/PID/oom_score_adj
      * Allow writes to /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/*
      
      Addresses the following denials:
      <5>[    3.825371] type=1400 audit(9781555.430:5): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[   48.874747] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:16): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="896" dev="proc" ino=9589 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=dir
      <5>[   48.874889] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:17): avc:  denied  { dac_override } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" capability=1  scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tclass=capability
      <5>[   48.874982] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:18): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[   48.875075] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:19): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[   49.409231] type=1400 audit(9781601.169:20): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  209.081990] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:24): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1556" dev="proc" ino=10961 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=dir
      <5>[  209.082240] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:25): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  209.082498] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:26): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  209.119673] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:27): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1577" dev="proc" ino=12708 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=dir
      <5>[  209.119937] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:28): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  209.120105] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:29): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  209.235597] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:30): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1600" dev="proc" ino=11659 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir
      <5>[  209.235798] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:31): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  209.236006] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:32): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  214.297283] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:64): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  214.297415] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:65): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  214.355060] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:66): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  214.355236] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:67): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  214.516920] type=1400 audit(9781766.279:68): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1907" dev="proc" ino=11742 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=dir
      <5>[  214.678861] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:69): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  214.678992] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:70): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  214.708284] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:71): avc:  denied  { search } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1765" dev="proc" ino=12851 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir
      <5>[  214.708435] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:72): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file
      <5>[  214.708648] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:73): avc:  denied  { open } for  pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file
      
      Change-Id: Ie3c1ab8ce9e77742d0cc3c73f40010afd018ccd4
      5467fce6
  31. Feb 11, 2014
  32. Feb 04, 2014
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Add file_contexts entries for socket files. · a7e4ace1
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      So that we do not relabel them on a restorecon -R /data.
      
      Change-Id: I8dd915d9bb80067339621b905ea2b4ea0fa8d71e
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      a7e4ace1
    • Stephen Smalley's avatar
      Label /data/misc/wifi/sockets with wpa_socket. · 418e2abd
      Stephen Smalley authored
      
      This will ensure that any sockets created in this directory
      will default to wpa_socket unless a type_transition is defined.
      Define a type transition for system_server to keep its separate
      system_wpa_socket type assigned for its socket.  Allow wpa
      to create and unlink sockets in the directory.  We leave the
      already existing rules for wifi_data_file in place for compatibility
      with existing devices that have wifi_data_file on /data/misc/wifi/sockets.
      
      Change-Id: I9e35cc93abf89ce3594860aa3193f84a3b42ea6e
      Signed-off-by: default avatarStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      418e2abd
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