- Aug 06, 2014
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Alex Light authored
Add patchoat selinux rules. Bug: 15358152 (cherry picked from commit fbc8ec2e) Change-Id: Ic84a370548393be62db740092e8393b662bcf345
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- Jul 15, 2014
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Ed Heyl authored
Change-Id: Ic9dde806a30d3e7b9c4a066f247a9207fe9b94b4
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- Jul 08, 2014
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Sreeram Ramachandran authored
This will be used to populate rt_tables (a mapping from routing table numbers to table names) that's read by the iproute2 utilities. Change-Id: I69deb1a64d5d6647470823405bf0cc55b24b22de
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Nick Kralevich authored
Create a new domain for the one-shot init service flash_recovery. This domain is initially in permissive_or_unconfined() for testing. Any SELinux denials won't be enforced for now. Change-Id: I7146dc154a5c78b6f3b4b6fb5d5855a05a30bfd8
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Jeff Sharkey authored
Earlier changes had extended the rules, but some additional changes are needed. avc: denied { relabelfrom } for name="vmdl-723825123.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=162910 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=dir Bug: 14975160 Change-Id: Ia644c73ec10460a2a529fe197ade6afe46694651
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- Jul 07, 2014
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Jeff Sharkey authored
Earlier changes had extended the rules, but some additional changes are needed. avc: denied { relabelfrom } for name="vmdl-723825123.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=162910 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0 tclass=dir Bug: 14975160 Change-Id: I875cfc3538d4b098d27c7c7b756d1868a54cc976
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- Jun 21, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
The init.rc one-shot services "defaultcrypto" and "encrypt" call out to the /system/bin/vdc command line to ask vold to perform encryption operations. Create a new domain for these one-shot services. Allow the vdc domain to talk to vold. Change-Id: I73dc2ee4cc265bc16056b27307c254254940fd9f
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- Jun 17, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
Some device-specific policies are improperly creating a security domain for logwrapper, rather than removing the logwrapper lines from init.device.rc. Don't allow that. Explicitly add an entry for /system/bin/logwrapper to force it to a system_file. Attempting to override this will result in the following compile time error: obj/ETC/file_contexts_intermediates/file_contexts: Multiple different specifications for /system/bin/logwrapper (u:object_r:logwrapper_exec:s0 and u:object_r:system_file:s0). Bug: 15616899 Change-Id: Ia55394247a9fa16e00434d61091fff9d9d4ff125
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- Jun 16, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
The following commits added support for runtime resource overlays. New command line tool 'idmap' * 65a05fd56dbc9fd9c2511a97f49c445a748fb3c5 Runtime resource overlay, iteration 2 * 48d22323ce39f9aab003dce74456889b6414af55 Runtime resource overlay, iteration 2, test cases * ad6ed950dbfa152c193dd7e49c369d9e831f1591 During SELinux tightening, support for these runtime resource overlays was unknowingly broken. Fix it. This change has been tested by hackbod and she reports that everything is working after this change. I haven't independently verified the functionality. Test cases are available for this by running: * python frameworks/base/core/tests/overlaytests/testrunner.py Change-Id: I1c70484011fd9041bec4ef34f93f7a5509906f40
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- Jun 04, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
As of sepolicy commit a16a59e2 (https://android-review.googlesource.com/94580), adf_device and graphics_device have the exact same security properties. Merge them into one type to avoid a proliferation of SELinux types. Change-Id: Ib1a24f5d880798600e103b9e14934e41abb1ef95
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- May 29, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
/data/property is only accessible by root and is used by the init property service for storing persistent property values. Create a separate type for it and only allow init to write to the directory and files within it. Ensure that we do not allow access to other domains in future changes or device-specific policy via a neverallow rule. Change-Id: Iff556b9606c5651c0f1bba902e30b59bdd6f063a Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- May 27, 2014
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Torne (Richard Coles) authored
Define a domain and appropriate access rules for shared RELRO files (used for loading the WebView native library). Any app is permitted to read the files as they are public data, but only the shared_relro process is permitted to create/update them. Bug: 13005501 Change-Id: I9d5ba9e9eedb9b8c80fe6f84a3fc85a68553d52e
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- May 22, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
zygote_secondary talks over a different socket named /dev/socket/zygote_secondary. Make sure it's properly labeled. See https://android-review.googlesource.com/89604 Addresses the following denial: <12>[ 48.442004] type=1400 audit(1400801842.179:5): avc: denied { write } for pid=1082 comm="main" name="zygote_secondary" dev="tmpfs" ino=9953 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=1 Bug: 13647418 Change-Id: I1ff5f1d614295a5870bb8a3992ad9167e1656c92
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- May 15, 2014
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Narayan Kamath authored
app_process is now a symlink to app_process32 or app_process64, so we have to update the selinux rules to explicitly refer to them. See change 5a7ee9ad63d for context. Change-Id: I7f7a107d79a8f7a3c193f97809e1e737540258f1
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- May 14, 2014
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Sreeram Ramachandran authored
(cherry picked from commit 7d51096d4106a441a15741592d9ccdd0bfaca907) Change-Id: Ib6198e19dbc306521a26fcecfdf6e8424d163fc9
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Sreeram Ramachandran authored
Change-Id: Ib6198e19dbc306521a26fcecfdf6e8424d163fc9
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- May 13, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Bug: 14833575 Change-Id: I23425b4ef1552ff31486d0a52ee2c69d6236691d Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- May 12, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
installd creates /data/.layout_version. Introduce a separate type for this file (and any other file created by installd under a directory labeled system_data_file) so that we can allow create/write access by installd without allowing it to any system data files created by other processes. This prevents installd from overwriting other system data files, and ensure that any files it creates will require explicit rules in order to access. Change-Id: Id04e49cd571390d18792949c8b2b13b1ac59c016 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- May 07, 2014
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Greg Hackmann authored
ADF is a modern replacement for fbdev. ADF's device nodes (/dev/adf[X]), interface nodes (/dev/adf-interface[X].[Y]), and overlay engine nodes (/dev/adf-overlay-engine[X].[Y]) are collectively used in similar contexts as fbdev nodes. Vendor HW composers (via SurfaceFlinger) and healthd will need to send R/W ioctls to these nodes to prepare and update the display. Ordinary apps should not talk to ADF directly. Change-Id: Ic0a76b1e82c0cc1e8f240f219928af1783e79343 Signed-off-by:
Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
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- May 05, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
Otherwise it is treated as a regex and matches any character. Change-Id: I9e23f01b0e104d3ef57993fd1a3d9a5b13201910 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Apr 09, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
I9b8e59e3bd7df8a1bf60fa7ffd376a24ba0eb42f added a profiles subdirectory to /data/dalvik-cache with files that must be app-writable. As a result, we have denials such as: W/Profiler( 3328): type=1400 audit(0.0:199): avc: denied { write } for name="com.google.android.setupwizard" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=106067 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file W/Profiler( 3328): type=1300 audit(0.0:199): arch=40000028 syscall=322 per=800000 success=yes exit=33 a0=ffffff9c a1=b8362708 a2=20002 a3=0 items=1 ppid=194 auid=4294967295 uid=10019 gid=10019 euid=10019 suid=10019 fsuid=10019 egid=10019 sgid=10019 fsgid=10019 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 exe="/system/bin/app_process" subj=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 key=(null) W/auditd ( 286): type=1307 audit(0.0:199): cwd="/" W/auditd ( 286): type=1302 audit(0.0:199): item=0 name="/data/dalvik-cache/profiles/com.google.android.setupwizard" inode=106067 dev=b3:1c mode=0100664 ouid=1012 ogid=50019 rdev=00:00 obj=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 We do not want to allow untrusted app domains to write to the existing type on other /data/dalvik-cache files as that could be used for code injection into another app domain, the zygote or the system_server. So define a new type for this subdirectory. The restorecon_recursive /data in init.rc will fix the labeling on devices that already have a profiles directory created. For correct labeling on first creation, we also need a separate change to installd under the same change id. Bug: 13927667 Change-Id: I4857d031f9e7e60d48b8c72fcb22a81b3a2ebaaa Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Apr 04, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
... otherwise zygote 64 won't run in the correct SELinux domain. Bug: 13647418 Change-Id: Iada2bf26623784535b70647c472f69b735b8f4fc
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- Mar 26, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
Change-Id: Ibeeec6637022ee8bc9868e102b3d55e3b0d4762c Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Mar 18, 2014
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Robert Craig authored
This change helps with the following denials. avc: denied { write } for pid=14157 comm="Thread-88" name="premium_sms_policy.xml" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=618998 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=14293 comm="Thread-89" name="sms" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=618952 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=dir Prior to this patch the directory was labeled as system_data_file which is a bit too generic. This directory contains xml files with regexs which represent premium numbers that are used to warn the user before sending. Change-Id: I98288b25aa1546477e05eee9f7622324b013e695 Signed-off-by:
rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
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- Mar 14, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
This appears to have been created to allow untrusted_app to access DownloadProvider cache files without needing to allow open access to platform_app_data_file. Now that platform_app_data_file is gone, there is no benefit to having this type. Retain a typealias for download_file to app_data_file until restorecon /data/data support is in place to provide compatibility. This change depends on: https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/87801/ Change-Id: Iab3c99d7d5448bdaa5c1e03a98fb6163804e1ec4 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Mar 12, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
hostapd creates sockets under /data/misc/wifi/hostapd. Ensure that they are labeled correctly both at runtime (type_transition) and during the init.rc restorecon_recursive /data (file_contexts). Addresses denials such as: avc: denied { create } for pid=20476 comm="hostapd" name="wlan0" scontext=u:r:hostapd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { setattr } for pid=20476 comm="hostapd" name="wlan0" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=619005 scontext=u:r:hostapd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=20476 comm="hostapd" name="wlan0" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=619005 scontext=u:r:hostapd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0 tclass=sock_file Change-Id: I80a443faeb6017a9d6cbdb8da9d7416f29a7b85f Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Mar 05, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
Label /proc/sysrq-trigger and allow access. Label /dev/socket/mtpd and allow access. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { call } for pid=1007 comm="Binder_8" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:su:s0 tclass=binder avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="watchdog" name="sysrq-trigger" dev="proc" ino=4026533682 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { write } for pid=11567 comm="LegacyVpnRunner" name="mtpd" dev="tmpfs" ino=36627 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:socket_device:s0 tclass=sock_file avc: denied { ptrace } for pid=10924 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { sigkill } for pid=26077 comm="NativeCrashRepo" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0 tclass=process avc: denied { write } for pid=1024 comm="android.bg" scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=netlink_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[11467]" dev="sockfs" ino=11467 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" path="socket:[12076]" dev="sockfs" ino=12076 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserv er:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" laddr=192.168.159.172 lport=51576 faddr=93.127.173.40 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=473 comm="FinalizerDaemon" lport=15658 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[443742]" dev="sockfs" ino=443742 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s 0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=21384 comm="rtsp" path="socket:[444842]" dev="sockfs" ino=444842 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1326 comm="Binder_9" lport=16216 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=udp_socket avc: denied { setopt } for pid=1676 comm="Binder_6" laddr=192.168.156.130 lport=51044 faddr=74.125.214.81 fport=554 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getattr } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" path="/dev/mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { read } for pid=10915 comm="system_server" name="mdm" dev="tmpfs" ino=7484 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file avc: denied { unlink } for pid=14866 comm="system_server" name="wallpaper" dev="mmcblk0p9" ino=285715 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:wallpaper_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=12114 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[219779]" dev="sockfs" ino=219779 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { getopt } for pid=32300 comm="Binder_1" laddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 lport=4939 faddr=::ffff:127.0.0.1 fport=53318 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { read write } for pid=10840 comm="pool-17-thread-" path="socket:[205990]" dev="sockfs" ino=205990 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=tcp_socket avc: denied { write } for pid=20817 comm="dumpsys" path="/mnt/shell/emulated/0/aupt-output/bugreport-2014-02-22-11-17-16.txt.tmp" dev="fuse" ino=3100784040 scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sdcard_internal:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: I481ac26667b487031a5d3317b0a028a027a8e641 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Mar 03, 2014
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Robert Craig authored
This new type will allow us to write finer-grained policy concerning asec containers. Some files of these containers need to be world readable. Signed-off-by:
rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil> (cherry picked from commit 48b18832) Change-Id: Ic75095397a11ad715c16a75a7374e9b0d131f3f7
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- Feb 28, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
This will ensure that any sockets created in this directory will default to wpa_socket unless a type_transition is defined. Define a type transition for system_server to keep its separate system_wpa_socket type assigned for its socket. Allow wpa to create and unlink sockets in the directory. We leave the already existing rules for wifi_data_file in place for compatibility with existing devices that have wifi_data_file on /data/misc/wifi/sockets. Change-Id: I9e35cc93abf89ce3594860aa3193f84a3b42ea6e Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Feb 25, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> (cherry picked from commit 96ff4c05) Change-Id: Idfd734f07687925c1f35d2629d4b59d46822d0d4
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Stephen Smalley authored
Change-Id: I620d4aef84a5d4565abb1695db54ce1653612bce Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Stephen Smalley authored
Change I6dacdc43bcc1a56e47655e37e825ee6a205eb56b switched the keystore to using binder instead of a socket, so this socket type and rules have been unused for a while. The type was only ever assigned to a /dev/socket socket file (tmpfs) so there is no issue with removing the type (no persistent files will have this xattr value). Change-Id: Id584233c58f6276774c3432ea76878aca28d6280 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Stephen Smalley authored
Change-Id: I0a06fa32a46e515671b4e9a6f68e1a3f8b2c21a8 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Feb 19, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
Add initial support for uncrypt, started via the pre-recovery service in init.rc. On an encrypted device, uncrypt reads an OTA zip file on /data, opens the underlying block device, and writes the unencrypted blocks on top of the encrypted blocks. This allows recovery, which can't normally read encrypted partitions, to reconstruct the OTA image and apply the update as normal. Add an exception to the neverallow rule for sys_rawio. This is needed to support writing to the raw block device. Add an exception to the neverallow rule for unlabeled block devices. The underlying block device for /data varies between devices within the same family (for example, "flo" vs "deb"), and the existing per-device file_context labeling isn't sufficient to cover these differences. Until I can resolve this problem, allow access to any block devices. Bug: 13083922 Change-Id: I7cd4c3493c151e682866fe4645c488b464322379
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Stephen Smalley authored
/data/data subdirectories are labeled by installd at creation time based on seapp_contexts, not based on file_contexts, so we do not need the /data/data/.* entry, and the wallpaper file was moved from under com.android.settings/files to /data/system/users/N long ago so we can delete the old entry for it. Change-Id: I32af6813ff284e8fe9fd4867df482a642c728755 Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- Feb 16, 2014
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Dan Willemsen authored
Change-Id: I4cd33a296de0d0597aa6166aa1be48f1b0b52129
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- Feb 13, 2014
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Nick Kralevich authored
* Allow writes to /proc/PID/oom_score_adj * Allow writes to /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/* Addresses the following denials: <5>[ 3.825371] type=1400 audit(9781555.430:5): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 48.874747] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:16): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="896" dev="proc" ino=9589 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 48.874889] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:17): avc: denied { dac_override } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" capability=1 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tclass=capability <5>[ 48.874982] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:18): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 48.875075] type=1400 audit(9781600.639:19): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=8942 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 49.409231] type=1400 audit(9781601.169:20): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="minfree" dev="sysfs" ino=6056 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:sysfs:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.081990] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:24): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1556" dev="proc" ino=10961 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.082240] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:25): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.082498] type=1400 audit(9781760.839:26): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11654 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:platform_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.119673] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:27): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1577" dev="proc" ino=12708 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.119937] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:28): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.120105] type=1400 audit(9781760.879:29): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11657 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.235597] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:30): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1600" dev="proc" ino=11659 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 209.235798] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:31): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 209.236006] type=1400 audit(9781760.999:32): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11667 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.297283] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:64): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.297415] type=1400 audit(9781766.059:65): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=11211 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.355060] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:66): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.355236] type=1400 audit(9781766.119:67): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12907 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.516920] type=1400 audit(9781766.279:68): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1907" dev="proc" ino=11742 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 214.678861] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:69): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.678992] type=1400 audit(9781766.439:70): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12915 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.708284] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:71): avc: denied { search } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="1765" dev="proc" ino=12851 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=dir <5>[ 214.708435] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:72): avc: denied { write } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 214.708648] type=1400 audit(9781766.469:73): avc: denied { open } for pid=176 comm="lmkd" name="oom_score_adj" dev="proc" ino=12870 scontext=u:r:lmkd:s0 tcontext=u:r:shared_app:s0 tclass=file Change-Id: Ie3c1ab8ce9e77742d0cc3c73f40010afd018ccd4
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- Feb 11, 2014
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Robert Craig authored
This new type will allow us to write finer-grained policy concerning asec containers. Some files of these containers need to be world readable. Change-Id: Iefee74214d664acd262edecbb4f981d633ff96ce Signed-off-by:
rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
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- Feb 04, 2014
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Stephen Smalley authored
So that we do not relabel them on a restorecon -R /data. Change-Id: I8dd915d9bb80067339621b905ea2b4ea0fa8d71e Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Stephen Smalley authored
This will ensure that any sockets created in this directory will default to wpa_socket unless a type_transition is defined. Define a type transition for system_server to keep its separate system_wpa_socket type assigned for its socket. Allow wpa to create and unlink sockets in the directory. We leave the already existing rules for wifi_data_file in place for compatibility with existing devices that have wifi_data_file on /data/misc/wifi/sockets. Change-Id: I9e35cc93abf89ce3594860aa3193f84a3b42ea6e Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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