Update engine is responsible for updating various partitions, which
includes enabling or disabling the read-only bit on the underlying block
device.

Rather than try to list out each block device separately, generalize the
ioctl rules to apply to all block device nodes. If the ioctl permission
is granted via a normal allow rule, then the allowxperm statement will
allow BLKROGET and BLKROSET by default on those block devices.

Test: policy compiles
Bug: 118150702
Change-Id: I7bca52e0f442df7320748f6d6371e5016aa6dd0b

vold needs to securely delete content from various block devices. Allow
it.

Addresses the following denials:

type=1400 audit(0.0:66): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="secdiscard" path="/dev/block/dm-3" dev="tmpfs" ino=17945 ioctlcmd=0x127d scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dm_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0
type=1400 audit(0.0:43): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="secdiscard" path="/dev/block/sda45" dev="tmpfs" ino=17485 ioctlcmd=127d scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:userdata_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: Ie7b4b8ac4698d9002a4e8d142d4e463f8d42899a

Bug: 118161817
Test: SANITIZE_TARGET=address m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I4dabcb3692c59b810a06567e272bca9f0e9c3ecd

This prevents denials while taking a bugreport.

Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t
android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testNoBugreportDenials

Change-Id: I381b39fa127f82fcef5d820a04209fd1ba4f63cd

Allow BLKROGET and BLKROSET on the block devices underlying the /system
and rootfs partitions. As part of the Android boot process, the system
sets the block devices read-only to prevent accidental modification to
these partitions. Update engine needs the ability to adjust the block
device read-only flag in order to apply updates.

Addresses the following denials:

update_engine: type=1400 audit(0.0:96): avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/block/sda33" dev="tmpfs" ino=15369 ioctlcmd=125e scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0
update_engine: type=1400 audit(0.0:97): avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/block/sda33" dev="tmpfs" ino=15369 ioctlcmd=125d scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_block_device:s0 tclass=blk_file permissive=0

Test: policy compiles
Bug: 118150702
Change-Id: I65a3d041b6d6b7955bcd901637a543524fc34a06

system/sepolicy commit 4c8eaba7, reviewed in
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/system/sepolicy/+/793958
started enforcing explicit ioctl permission checks for all block device
files. As part of that commit, the following lines were added to
domain.te:

  # If a domain has access to perform an ioctl on a block device, allow these
  # very common, benign ioctls
  allowxperm domain dev_type:blk_file ioctl { BLKGETSIZE64 BLKSSZGET };

In essence, if a domain is granted ioctl access to any device in
policy (for example, via adding "ioctl" to the allow rule, or by using
the macro "r_file_perms" which includes the ioctl permission), then the
two ioctls BLKGETSIZE64 and BLKSSZGET will be automatically allowed. As
such, it is redundent for a domain to explicitly request these two
ioctls.

Delete the now redundant allowxperm rule.

Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I1964ed93a7c7601393cc9e2416f3640ea22db51b

What changed:
- Tightening neverallow forbidding vendor execution access in /system.
In it's current form the neverallow is loose because not all executables
have exec_type attribute, e.g. almost everything in /system/bin/. This
change tightens up the neverallow by instead targeting system_file_type
attribute, which must be applied to all files in /system.
- Adding a general neverallow forbidding all access to files in /system
(bar exceptions)

TODOs:
- Remove loopholes once Treble violations are fixed across all internal
build targets.

Bug: 111243627
Test: m selinux_policy; build-only change
Change-Id: I150195756c0c3258904c3da0812bbd942ea2f229

Change-Id: I19a9051a0ff3863db1be9ff706a8b31b1c151419

am: 368c7c08

Change-Id: Iad5faaaffc92f669a1eb6887ecb1d2ecaa246ee6

am: 10b250df

Change-Id: I1bbfc88a988bb5519cbd91fb5dd0e6d212e42b39

This reverts commit c855629e.

Reason for revert: breaks builds for some devices in master

Change-Id: I02c0967d6607ef0173b4188c06d2e781c3c93f4b

am: 4c8eaba7

Change-Id: Ic97b8aafa7f6edcf54e08230905b34500fbe677e

am: 2581761e

Change-Id: I42e8156eddf6315ff13fe16ad8ed7bc550f31c40

am: f5a1b1bf

Change-Id: Idd4890670d766d71d4b2f6feb0066993ca079b90

am: a8131148

Change-Id: Idf41a715fd959069be989a2d2000c21afad6290b

am: ecc09871

Change-Id: I43f3d98669537d24879f3a734e2684968813e148

am: a26763ec

Change-Id: I7f4be177f11ec0211b492b74f2c342df50d2617f

This change assumes that init need access to types, access to which
was not audited.

go/sedenials reports additional types needed by init: pmsg_device and
tty_device.

Bug: 110962171
Test: m selinux_policy
Change-Id: I227956b2c12efeef68cbfa041b9604d4e4f9b967

Start enforcing the use of ioctl restrictions on all Android block
devices. Domains which perform ioctls on block devices must be explicit
about what ioctls they issue. The only ioctls allowed by default are
BLKGETSIZE64, BLKSSZGET, FIOCLEX, and FIONCLEX.

Test: device boots and no problems.
Change-Id: I1195756b20cf2b50bede1eb04a48145a97a35867

Remove most of /proc/net access for priv_apps. Files in /proc/net leak
unique device identifiers and side channel information about other app's
network connections.

Access for most third party applications was removed in commit
d78e07cb. This change applies the same
constraints to priv-apps that we apply to normal apps.

Bug: 114475727
Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: policy compiles and device boots
Change-Id: I5c41ba57fcd6b81d72c4f3a40b310d2188fc79c3

Allow a process to determine if a fifo_file (aka pipe, created from the
pipe() or pipe2() syscall) is a tty.

Addresses the following denials:

type=1400 audit(0.0:1307): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="ls" path="pipe:[213117]" dev="pipefs" ino=213117 ioctlcmd=5401 scontext=u:r:hal_dumpstate_impl:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_dumpstate_impl:s0 tclass=fifo_file permissive=0
type=1400 audit(0.0:22): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="sh" path="pipe:[54971]" dev="pipefs" ino=54971 ioctlcmd=5401 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c512,c768 tclass=fifo_file permissive=0 app=com.zhihu.android
type=1400 audit(0.0:237): avc: denied { ioctl } for comm="sh" path="pipe:[56997]" dev="pipefs" ino=56997 ioctlcmd=5401 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app_25:s0:c512,c768 tclass=fifo_file permissive=0 app=fm.qingting.qtradio

Test: policy compiles and device builds.
Change-Id: Ic4c6441d0ec33de8cda3f13ff529e98374897364

No functional change. This reorg just makes it easier to perform diffs
against https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/blob/master/policy/flask/access_vectors

Test: policy builds.
Change-Id: I10cf9547d57981c76ee7e76daa382bb504e36d0b

apexd uses realpath(3) to ensure that the public key file that will use
is under /system/etc/security/apex directory. In order to support it,
allow apexd to getattr on apex_key_files.

The canonicalization is required because the key name from APEX might be
wrong. For example, if the key name from an APEX is '../../some/path'
then apexd will use '/system/etc/security/apex/../../some/path' as the
public key file, which is incorrect.

Bug: 115721587
Test: m apex.test; m
/apex/com.android.example.apex@1 exists

Change-Id: I6dc5efa0de369f8497e4f6526e0164e2de589c67

When running some apps in vendor partition, it report denials like:

avc: denied { getattr } for comm="Binder:901_2" path="/vendor/operator/app/Wechat/Wechat.apk" dev="sde14" ino=1707 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:vendor_app_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

am: afdcd959

Change-Id: Id2fe422a32a818648e7c31f27a5a894396061627

What changed:
- Tightening neverallow forbidding vendor execution access in /system.
In it's current form the neverallow is loose because not all executables
have exec_type attribute, e.g. almost everything in /system/bin/. This
change tightens up the neverallow by instead targeting system_file_type
attribute, which must be applied to all files in /system.
- Adding a general neverallow forbidding all access to files in /system
(bar exceptions)

TODOs:
- Remove loopholes once Treble violations are fixed across all internal
build targets.

Bug: 111243627
Test: m selinux_policy; build-only change
Change-Id: Ic8d71c8d139cad687ad7d7c9db7111240475f175

am: 5a7b8206

Change-Id: I753b83b0f59aa5ecec568ffb3cd11d88de99011c

am: a73f58ae

Change-Id: I573c72eb0795862a498772e74cb7f230876fa914

The ioctl number varies between MIPS devices and other devices.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I107ccd2eca626148d2573f51753ec433e20d6b74