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  1. Apr 24, 2017
    • Jeffrey Vander Stoep's avatar
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      Android.mk: fix dependency typo · 5edd96d9
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Bug: 37646565
      Test: build marlin-userdebug
      Change-Id: I3325d027fa7bdafb48f1f53ac052f2a68352c1dc
      5edd96d9
    • TreeHugger Robot's avatar
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      Retain neverallow rules in CIL files · b8787693
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Fixes issue where attributes used exlusively in neverallow
      rules were removed from policy.
      
      For on-device compile use the -N flag to skip neverallow tests.
      
      Policy size increases:
      vendor/etc/selinux/nonplat_sepolicy.cil 547849 -> 635637
      vendor/etc/selinux/precompiled_sepolicy 440248 -> 441076
      system/etc/selinux/plat_sepolicy.cil    567664 -> 745230
      
      For a total increase in system/vendor: 266182.
      
      Boot time changes:
      Pixel uses precompiled policy so boot time is not impacted.
      When forcing on-device compile on Marlin selinux policy compile
      time increases 510-520 ms -> 550-560 ms.
      
      Bug: 37357742
      Test: Build and boot Marlin.
      Test: Verify both precompiled and on-device compile work.
      Change-Id: Ib3cb53d376a96e34f55ac27d651a6ce2fabf6ba7
      b8787693
    • Alex Klyubin's avatar
      Assert apps can access only approved HwBinder services · 2a7f4fb0
      Alex Klyubin authored
      App domains which host arbitrary code must not have access to
      arbitrary HwBinder services. Such access unnecessarily increases the
      attack surface. The reason is twofold:
      1. HwBinder servers do not perform client authentication because HIDL
         currently does not expose caller UID information and, even if it
         did, many HwBinder services either operate at a layer below that of
         apps (e.g., HALs) or must not rely on app identity for
         authorization. Thus, to be safe, the default assumption is that
         a HwBinder service treats all its clients as equally authorized to
         perform operations offered by the service.
      2. HAL servers (a subset of HwBinder services) contain code with
         higher incidence rate of security issues than system/core
         components and have access to lower layes of the stack (all the way
         down to hardware) thus increasing opportunities for bypassing the
         Android security model.
      
      HwBinder services offered by core components (as opposed to vendor
      components) are considered safer because of point #2 above.
      
      Always same-process aka always-passthrough HwBinder services are
      considered safe for access by these apps. This is because these HALs
      by definition do not offer any additional access beyond what its
      client already as, because these services run in the process of the
      client.
      
      This commit thus introduces these two categories of HwBinder services
      in neverallow rules.
      
      Test: mmm system/sepolicy -- this does not change on-device policy
      Bug: 34454312
      Change-Id: I4f5f4dd10b3fc3bb9d262dda532d4a23dcdf061d
      2a7f4fb0
  2. Apr 22, 2017
  3. Apr 21, 2017
  4. Apr 20, 2017
  5. Apr 19, 2017
  6. Apr 18, 2017
    • Carmen Jackson's avatar
    • Carmen Jackson's avatar
      Add selinux rules for additional file contexts in userdebug · 25788df1
      Carmen Jackson authored
      These rules allow the additional tracepoints we need for running traceur
      in userdebug builds to be writeable.
      
      Bug: 37110010
      Test: I'm testing by running atrace -l and confirming that the
      tracepoints that I'm attempting to enable are available.
      
      Change-Id: Ia352100ed67819ae5acca2aad803fa392d8b80fd
      25788df1
    • Dan Cashman's avatar
      Remove vndservice_manager object classes. · 2f1c7ba7
      Dan Cashman authored
      vndservicemanager is a copy of servicemanager, and so has the exact
      same properties.  This should be reflected in the sharing of an object
      manager in SELinux policy, rather than creating a second one, which is
      effectively an attempt at namespacing based on object rather than type
      labels.  hwservicemanager, however, provides different and additional
      functionality that may be reflected in changed permissions, though they
      currently map to the existing servicemanager permissions.  Keep the new
      hwservice_manager object manager but remove the vndservice_manager one.
      
      Bug: 34454312
      Bug: 36052864
      Test: policy builds and device boots.
      Change-Id: I9e0c2757be4026101e32ba780f1fa67130cfa14e
      2f1c7ba7
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