Ephemeral apps cannot open files from external storage, but can be given
access to files via the file picker.

Test: ACTION_OPEN_DOCUMENTS from an ephemeral app returns a readable fd.
Change-Id: Ie21b64a9633eff258be254b9cd86f282db1509e8

Ephemeral apps are still apps with very similar capabilities, it makes
more sense to have them under appdomain and benefit from the shared
state (and all the neverallow rules) than to try and dupplicate them and
keep them in sync.

This is an initial move, there are parts of ephemeral_app that still
need to be locked down further and some parts of appdomain that should
be pushed down into the various app domains.

Test: Builds, ephemeral apps work without denials.
Change-Id: I1526b2c2aa783a91fbf6543ac7f6d0d9906d70af

Replace the global debuggerd with a per-process debugging helper that
gets exec'ed by the process that crashed.

Bug: http://b/30705528
Test: crasher/crasher64, `debuggerd <pid>`, `kill -ABRT <pid>`
Change-Id: Iad1b7478f7a4e2690720db4b066417d8b66834ed

Previously we published appfuse mount points to apps and apps open
appfuse file by themselves. We changed the design and we don't allow
apps to access appfuse mount point. Instead system server opens a file
on appfuse mount points and passes FD to apps.

The change updates apps and system server policies to adopt new design.

Bug: 29970149
Test: None
Change-Id: I0b35fee9816f61565705eecb88a472754ccffdca

This removes access to Bluetooth system properties from arbitrary
SELinux domains. Access remains granted to init, bluetooth, and
system_app domains. neverallow rules / CTS enforce that access is not
granted to Zygote and processes spawned from Zygote expcept for
system_app and bluetooth.

The reason is that some of these properties may leak persistent
identifiers not resettable by the user.

Test: Bluetooth pairing and data transfer works
Bug: 33700679
Change-Id: Icdcb3927a423c4011a62942340a498cc1b302472

Address denial type=1400 audit(0.0:42): avc: denied { call } for
scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768
tcontext=u:r:ephemeral_app:s0:c207,c258,c512,c768 tclass=binder

Test: Above denial no longer happens
Change-Id: I351269ee4671cfd51c981d3db5d0f3944d14e702

After a series of recent commits, installd has fully migrated over
to Binder, and all socket-based communication has been removed.

Test: builds, boots, apps install fine, pre-OTA dexopt works
Bug: 13758960, 30944031
Change-Id: Ia67b6260de58240d057c99b1bbd782b44376dfb5

Test: No media_rw_data_file related app denials
Change-Id: I1a977db09379f9a3e5bc52c597df12f52929ad19

In order to support platform changes without simultaneous updates from
non-platform components, the platform and non-platform policies must be
split.  In order to provide a guarantee that policy written for
non-platform objects continues to provide the same access, all types
exposed to non-platform policy are versioned by converting them and the
policy using them into attributes.

This change performs that split, the subsequent versioning and also
generates a mapping file to glue the different policy components
together.

Test: Device boots and runs.
Bug: 31369363
Change-Id: Ibfd3eb077bd9b8e2ff3b2e6a0ca87e44d78b1317

The other domains either don't have the same backwards compatibility
issues (isolated_app) or are privileged components that are pretty much
part of the platform and can be expected to meet a higher standard.

It would be possible to expose a build option for disabling the ART JIT,
allowing conditional removal of execmem from some of these domains too
(ones not ever using the WebView, until that's always in isolated_app).

Bug: 20013628
Change-Id: Ic22513157fc8b958b2a3d60381be0c07b5252fa5

external/toybox commit a583afc812cf7be74ebab72294c8df485908ff04 started
having dmesg use /dev/kmsg, which is unreadable to the unprivileged
shell user. Revoke syslog(2) to the shell user for consistency.

The kernel dmesg log is a source of kernel pointers, which can leak
kASLR information from the kernel. Restricting access to kernel
information will make attacks against Android more difficult. Having
said that, dmesg information is still available from "adb bugreport", so
this change doesn't completely shutdown kernel info leaks.

This change essentially reverts us to the state we were in between Nov 8
2011 and May 27 2014. During that almost 3 year period, the unprivileged
shell user was unable to access dmesg, and there was only one complaint
during that time.

References:
* https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/f9557fb
* https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/sepolicy/+/f821b5a

TODO: Further unify /dev/kmsg permissions with syslog_read permissions.

Test: policy compiles, no dmesg output
Change-Id: Icfff6f765055bdbbe85f302b781aed2568ef532f

su is an appdomain, and as such, any auditallow statements applicable to
appdomain also apply to su. However, su is never enforced, so generating
SELinux denials for such domains is pointless. Exclude su from
ion_device auditallow rules.

Addresses the following auditallow spam:

  avc: granted { ioctl } for comm="screencap" path="/dev/ion" dev="tmpfs"
  ino=10230 ioctlcmd=4906 scontext=u:r:su:s0
  tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I2e783624b9e53ad365669bd6f2d4db40da475a16

Bug: 29970149
Test: None
Change-Id: I59f49f3bf20d93effde5e1a9a3c1ed64fbecb7a8

Allow SurfaceFlinger to call into IAllocator, and allow everyone to access
IAllocator's fd.

Specifically,

hwbinder_use(...) for
avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1
avc: denied { transfer } for scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1

allow ... ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms for
avc: denied { read } for name="ion" dev="tmpfs" ino=15014 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/ion" dev="tmpfs" ino=15014 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/ion" dev="tmpfs" ino=15014 ioctlcmd=4900 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ion_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1

allow ... gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; for
avc: denied { read write } for name="kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=14956 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { open } for path="/dev/kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=14956 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1
avc: denied { ioctl } for path="/dev/kgsl-3d0" dev="tmpfs" ino=14956 ioctlcmd=940 scontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:gpu_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=1

binder_call(surfaceflinger, ...) for
avc: denied { call } for scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tclass=binder permissive=1

allow ... ...:fd use for
avc: denied { use } for path="anon_inode:dmabuf" dev="anon_inodefs" ino=12794 scontext=u:r:surfaceflinger:s0 tcontext=u:r:hal_graphics_allocator:s0 tclass=fd permissive=1

Bug: 32021161
Test: make bootimage
Change-Id: Ie7700142313407ac438c43dd1a85544dc4c67f13

Remove and neverallow isolated_app access to external storage and
USB accessories.

Test: aosp_angler-userdebug builds
Bug: 21643067
Change-Id: Ie912706a954a38610f2afd742b1ab4b8cd4b1f36

Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c

Test: builds and boots on Bullhead with no selinux audit messages.

Bug: 29795149
Bug: 30400942
Change-Id: I93295424a03488234b233d5e2f86d3bf329e53fd

Grant access to all processes and audit access. The end goal is to
whitelist all access to the interpreter. Several processes including
dex2oat, apps, and zygote were observed using libart, so omit them
from auditing and explicitly grant them access.

Test: Angler builds and boots

Bug: 29795519
Change-Id: I9b93c7dbef5c49b95a18fd26307955d05a1c8e88

Apparently some manufacturers sign APKs with the platform key
which use renderscript. Renderscript works by compiling the
.so file, and placing it in the app's home directory, where the
app loads the content.

Drop platform_app from the neverallow restriction to allow partners
to add rules allowing /data execute for this class of apps.

We should revisit this in the future after we have a better
solution for apps which use renderscript.

(cherry picked from commit c55cf17a)

Bug: 29857189
Change-Id: I058a802ad5eb2a67e657b6d759a3ef4e21cbb8cc

Previously appdomains allowed to execute off of /data
where whitelisted. This had the unfortunate side effect of
disallowing the creation of device specific app domains
with fewer permissions than untrusted_app. Instead grant
all apps a neverallow exemption and blacklist specific app
domains that should still abide by the restriction.

This allows devices to add new app domains that need
/data execute permission without conflicting with this rule.

Bug: 26906711

(cherry picked from commit c5266df9)

Change-Id: I4adb58e8c8b35122d6295db58cedaa355cdd3924

Grant permissions observed.

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ie63cda709319bbf635ef7bffbba3477c2cccc11b

Grant permissions observed.

(cherry picked from commit 9c820a11)

Merged-in: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303
Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303

Bug: 28746284
Change-Id: I59aa235ecba05e22aaa531e387a77f47267ac9ae

Apparently some manufacturers sign APKs with the platform key
which use renderscript. Renderscript works by compiling the
.so file, and placing it in the app's home directory, where the
app loads the content.

Drop platform_app from the neverallow restriction to allow partners
to add rules allowing /data execute for this class of apps.

We should revisit this in the future after we have a better
solution for apps which use renderscript.

Bug: 29857189
Change-Id: I058a802ad5eb2a67e657b6d759a3ef4e21cbb8cc

Previously appdomains allowed to execute off of /data
where whitelisted. This had the unfortunate side effect of
disallowing the creation of device specific app domains
with fewer permissions than untrusted_app. Instead grant
all apps a neverallow exemption and blacklist specific app
domains that should still abide by the restriction.

This allows devices to add new app domains that need
/data execute permission without conflicting with this rule.

Bug: 26906711

(cherry picked from commit c5266df9)

Change-Id: I4adb58e8c8b35122d6295db58cedaa355cdd3924

Applications should not access /dev/input/* for events, but
rather use events handled via the activity mechanism.

Change-Id: I0182b6be1b7c69d96e4366ba59f14cee67be4beb
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>

Change-Id: I4c318efba76e61b6ab0be9491c352f281b1c2bff
Bug: 19160983

Previously appdomains allowed to execute off of /data
where whitelisted. This had the unfortunate side effect of
disallowing the creation of device specific app domains
with fewer permissions than untrusted_app. Instead grant
all apps a neverallow exemption and blacklist specific app
domains that should still abide by the restriction.

This allows devices to add new app domains that need
/data execute permission without conflicting with this rule.

Bug: 26906711
Change-Id: Ia876cc1dfd5b12908c59bd9e8620a6b890729c28

Only used by Flounder.

Bug: 8435593
Change-Id: I06655e897ab68a1724190950e128cd390617f2bd

Address denials:
avc: denied { read } for name="meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026544360 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 28722489
Change-Id: I3c55bd95bb82ec54e88e9e9bc42d6392a216a936

(cherry-picked from commit cc8a09f5)

camera_device was previously removed in AOSP commit: b7aace2d
"camera_device: remove type and add typealias" because the
same domains required access to both without exception, meaning
there was no benefit to distinguishing between the two. However,
with the split up of mediaserver this is no longer the case and
distinguishing between the camera and video  provides a legitimate
security benefit. For example, the mediacodec domain requires access
to the video_device for access to hardware accelerated codecs but does
not require access to the camera.

Bug: 28359909
Change-Id: I8a4592722d8e6391c0e91b440914284b7245e232

To avoid audit messages that arise because there is no way to create a
file without also trying to open and read it.

Bug: 28241500
Change-Id: Id1daaf190b36eda9775e00701cd7241991f65a2a

camera_device was previously removed in AOSP commit: b7aace2d
"camera_device: remove type and add typealias" because the
same domains required access to both without exception, meaning
there was no benefit to distinguishing between the two. However,
with the split up of mediaserver this is no longer the case and
distinguishing between the camera and video  provides a legitimate
security benefit. For example, the mediacodec domain requires access
to the video_device for access to hardware accelerated codecs but does
not require access to the camera.

Bug: 28359909
Change-Id: I8a4592722d8e6391c0e91b440914284b7245e232

This directory is no longer used.

Change-Id: Ic32a7dd160b23ef8d1d4ffe3f7b1af56c973d73c

Allow adbd and app domains to read the symlink at /mnt/sdcard.
This symlink was suppose to have been removed in the Gingerbread
time frame, but lives on.

Read access for this symlink was removed from adbd and the shell user in
8ca19368, and from untrusted_app in
cbf7ba18.

Addresses the following denials:

  avc: denied { read } for name="sdcard" dev="tmpfs" ino=9486 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:tmpfs:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=0
  avc: denied { read } for pid=4161 comm=73657276696365203137 name="sdcard" dev="tmpfs" ino=5114 scontext=u:r:adbd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tmpfs:s0 tclass=lnk_file permissive=0

Bug: 25801877
Bug: 28108983
Change-Id: Ia31cd8b53c9c3a5b7d11be42c2fde170f96affb0

Remove references to /data/security and the corresponding
type securitly_file.

Bug: 26544104
Change-Id: Iac00c293daa6b781a24c2bd4c12168dfb1cceac6

BUG: 27583869
Change-Id: I0a25bd03f3998d48dba355b91140611e38ce7b0d

... and client apps to read them.

A full path looks like this:
/data/system_ce/[user-id]/shortcut_service/bitmaps/[creator-app-package]/[timestamp].png

System server will:
- Create/delete the directories.
- Write/remove PNG files in them.
- Open the PNG files and return file descriptors to client apps

Client apps will:
- Receive file descriptors and read from them.

Bug 27548047

Change-Id: I3d9ac6ab0c92b2953b84c3c5aabe1f653e6bea6b

Bug: 27511071
Change-Id: I99ea21638a4df8ad1f815d91bb970e1f8f143030

- Required to query cpusets information.

Bug: 22855417
Bug: 27381794
Bug: 27498731

Change-Id: I6d192aad2135d99a6c9cdaf97696b0822bd21897