Bug: http://b/34228376
Test: m
Change-Id: I1321ada1521bb3e3fd08105f1a41d519ee486683

Test: builds
Bug: 32206268
Change-Id: I236105b029178f96da519c2295c66c686dcae7cb

Bug: 31972505
Test: VTS test passes, Bluetooth starts/stops
Change-Id: Ic068c9fca7c50e63c5b6e3d86a2ee6cc53207e08

Bug: 30222631
Change-Id: I30ad019872881e21f61a53e4397112ea0e99688b

This leaves only the existence of platform_app domain as public API.
All other rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and
are thus now private.

Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for
      disappearance of all allow rules from platform_app_current
      attribute (as expected).
Bug: 31364497

Change-Id: I47bb59fdfc07878c91fd5e207735cd0c07a128da

Bug: 33746381
Test: Device boots with no extra denials.
Change-Id: I2f0da92367851142e0d7df4afec8861ceaed9d3e

No relevant collected denials.

Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Test: no collected denials.
Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Idcf939b3cbdb1dec835d59150181047d062e6c48

This is already provided in app.te via create_file_perms for
notdevfile_class_set.

Change-Id: I89ed3537fd1e167571fe259bd4804f8fcc937b95

All SELinux domains are already granted the ability to read the
filenames in /proc, so it's unnecessary to add it to storaged.te.

  $ grep "proc:dir r_dir_perms" public/domain.te
  allow domain proc:dir r_dir_perms;

Remove redundant rule.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I8779cda19176f7eb914778f131bb5b14e5b14448

* changes:
  Storaged permissions for task I/O
  Storaged permission setting

Allow storaged to read /proc/[pid]/io
Grant binder access to storaged
Add storaged service
Grant storaged_exec access to dumpstate
Grant storaged binder_call to dumpstate

Bug: 32221677

Change-Id: Iecc9dba266c5566817a99ac6251eb943a0bac630

Allowing storaged for reading from pseudo filesystems and debugfs.

Bug: 32221677

Change-Id: I837cead9a68f0b399703b64d724cb9c4b205c335

No denials collected.

Bug: 28760354
Test: no denials collected.
Test: device boots and no obvious problems
Change-Id: I7fc053ecae2db3bb2ca7c298634453e930713bec

No audits have been recorded for these rules. Remove them.

Originally added for backwards compatibility in
549ccf77 as part of the split
between cache_file and cache_recovery_file.

Bug: 25351711
Test: No audit records recorded
Change-Id: I5133028b5fcc99a731aabea90305171dee0edf47

Don't allow processes to list out the contents of the directory
/dev/__properties__. This is an implementation specific detail that
shouldn't be visible to processes.

Test: Device boots and no problems reading individual properties.
Test: ls -la /dev/__properties__ fails
Change-Id: I4df6a829b0d22e30fb2c38030c690fc4a356f6a3

This leaves only the existence of system_app domain as public API.
All other rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and
are thus now private.

Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for
      disappearance of all allow rules from system_app_current
      attribute (as expected).
Bug: 31364497

Change-Id: Ifc7d350ed9749a32b0c38a78ac5f41c819dbdb96

This leaves only the existence of isolated_app domain as public API.
All other rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and
are thus now private.

Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for
      disappearance of all allow rules from isolated_app_current
      attribute (as expected).
Bug: 31364497

Change-Id: I499a648e515628932b7bcd188ecbfbe4a247f2f3

This leaves the existence of priv_app domain as public API. All other
rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and are thus
now private.

Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for
      disappearance of all allow rules from priv_app_current
      attribute (as expected) except for
      allow priv_app_current update_engine_current:binder transfer;
      which is caused by public update_engine.te rules and will go
      away once update_engine rules go private.
Bug: 31364497

Change-Id: Iea583127fbf0a19c37dd42bf1ef2ae0454793391

This leaves only the existence of untrusted_app domain as public API.
All other rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and
are thus now private.

Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for
      disappearance of all allow rules from untrusted_domain_current
      attribute (as expected).
Bug: 31364497

Change-Id: Ief71fa16cfc38437cbe5c58100bba48b9a497c92

Commit fee49159 introduced the net_radio_prop and system_radio_prop
properties, and added allow rules for backwards compatibility. In
addition, auditallow rules were added to see if the allow rules were
necessary.

The auditallow rules for radio net_radio_prop are triggering, so it's
clear these properties are being set by the radio process. Drop the
auditallow statement.

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I7fa6df18ed4dd4cb8e0c9098373cc28134615330

Simulate platform and non-platform split by compiling two different
file_contexts files and loading them together on-device.  Leave the existing
file_contexts.bin in place until we're ready to build images based on the new
files.

Bug: 31363362
Test: Builds and boots without additional denials.
Change-Id: I7248f876e2230cee3b3cbf386422063da1e3dde0

Bring back file_contexts.bin.

Change-Id: Ifec2c363579151080fdec48e8bc46bbbc8c97674
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

/proc/tty/drivers is read by applications to figure out if they are
running in an emulated environment. Specifically, they look for the
string "goldfish" within that file.

Arguably this is not an Android API, and really shouldn't be exposed to
applications, but:

1) A largish number of applications break if they can't read this file;
2) The information here isn't particularly sensitive

While we could spend a bunch of time trying to get applications fixed,
there are bigger fish to fry. It's not worth the battle.

Test: "ls -laZ /proc/tty/drivers" is labeled properly.
Bug: 33214085
Bug: 33814662
Bug: 33791054
Bug: 33211769
Bug: 26813932
Change-Id: Icc05bdc1c917547a6dca7d76636a1009369bde49

Change-Id: I79a305407c3a362d7be11f4c026f31f1e9666f1c
Signed-off-by: Alexey Polyudov <apolyudov@google.com>

Allow init to send userspace generated SELinux denials to the kernel
audit subsystem.

Test: "setprop asdf asdf" from the unprivileged adb shell user
      generated an SELinux denial processed by logd.
Bug: 27878170
Change-Id: I0ecd0601408bbda8227802c13689f98e507282d1

We allow domains to manually transition to logpersist for userdebug
or eng debug logging permissions that would be counter to monitoring
limits on a released user build.

Test: compile
Bug: 30566487
Change-Id: I03a81c75cbd2b44617e4b27c4c083a26a0e0fa87