The change makes 'vendor_overlay_file' accessible only to few platform
domains like idmap, system_server, zygote and appdomain.

The overlay files contains RROs (runtime resource overlays)

Bug: 36681210
Test: Boot sailfish (treble device) from wiped flashall
Test: Connect to wifi and launch chrome to load few websites.
Test: Launch camera and record + playback video

Change-Id: I3596ca89ad51d0e7d78c75121f22ea71209ee332
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

The change makes 'vendor_app_file' accessible only to few platform
domains like dex2oat, idmap, installd, system_server and appdomain.

Bug: 36681210
Test: Boot sailfish (treble device) from wiped flashall
Test: Connect to wifi and launch chrome to load few websites.
Test: Launch camera and record + playback video

Change-Id: Ib8757fedbf2e19c8381c8cd0f8f2693b2345534b
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

The CL splits /vendor labeling from /system. Which was allowing all
processes read, execute access to /vendor.

Following directories will remain world readable
 /vendor/etc
 /vendor/lib(64)/hw/

Following are currently world readable but their scope
will be minimized to platform processes that require access
 /vendor/app
 /vendor/framework/
 /vendor/overlay

Files labelled with 'same_process_hal_file' are allowed to be
read + executed from by the world. This is for Same process HALs and
their dependencies.

Bug: 36527360
Bug: 36832490
Bug: 36681210
Bug: 36680116
Bug: 36690845
Bug: 36697328
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36806861
Bug: 36656392
Bug: 36696623
Bug: 36792803

All of the tests were done on sailfish, angler, bullhead, dragon
Test: Boot and connect to wifi
Test: Run chrome and load websites, play video in youtube, load maps w/
      current location, take pictures and record video in camera,
      playback recorded video.
Test: Connect to BT headset and ensure BT audio playback works.
Test: OTA sideload using recovery
Test: CTS SELinuxHostTest pass

Change-Id: I278435b72f7551a28f3c229f720ca608b77a7029
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

Add selinux policies for init script and shell script to unzip a tar
containing ASAN libraries on boot.

Bug: 36458146
Test: m && m SANITIZE_TARGET=address
Test: manual (build steps for tar missing)
Change-Id: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7
(cherry picked from commit 0b743050)
Merged-In: I5c3cb233aae93ee9985431090af902b0e3c1b0a7

Remove system_file:file { lock ioctl } from domain_deprecated. The only
domains triggering this were dex2oat and netd, which are fixed in this
change.

Addresses the following logspam similar to:

  avc: granted { lock } for comm="iptables"
  path="/system/etc/xtables.lock" dev="sda22" ino=3745
  scontext=u:r:netd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=file

  avc: granted { lock } for comm="dex2oat"
  path="/system/framework/arm/boot-okhttp.art" dev="dm-0" ino=1295
  scontext=u:r:dex2oat:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=file

Test: device boots and no obvious problems.
Bug: 28760354
Bug: 36879751
Change-Id: Iac851c0e49a52ce4000fdfe16e68c17ff819693f

Currently update_verifier only verifies the blocks when dm-verity is in
'enforcing' mode; and dm-verity will reboot the device upon detection of
errors. However, sometimes the verity mode is not guaranteed to be
correct. When mode is 'eio' for example, dm-verity will not trigger
a reboot but rather fail the read. So update_verifier need to take the
responsibility to reboot the device. Otherwise the device will continue
to boot without setting the flag "isSlotMarkedSuccessful".

Denial message:
update_verifier: type=1400 audit(0.0:18): avc: denied { write } for
name="property_service" dev="tmpfs" ino=14678 scontext=u:r:update_verifier:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:property_socket:s0 tclass=sock_file permissive=0

Bug: 36260064
Test: powerctl property sets successfully

Change-Id: I1260e60f2ef4db50573e515ba95c332512c8ae62
(cherry picked from commit 0d8c1e0a)

Test: manual (verified no denials in basic telephony operations)
Bug: 36613472
Change-Id: I31274adee2cb6293102446cd2d6d547c50616836

android.framework.sensorservice@1.0 pass a file
descriptor from hidl_memory into
android.hardware.sensors@1.0, hence requiring the latter
to use the file descriptor.

Test: VtsHalSensorManagerV1_0TargetTest under selinux
enforcing mode
Bug: 35219747
Change-Id: I0185c8af0714776842c90ebb687b684324b55cd8

when GMSCore collects information for uploading via 'dumpsys
media.metrics', it provides the metrics service with a file descriptor
to hold the data, which is post-processed by the log collecting code
in GMScore.  This temp file lives in /data/, a place where our
restrictive policies for media.metrics doesn't allow any writing.

This relaxes the restrictions -- allowing media.metrics to
write to already open file descriptors it might be given on that
partition.

Bug: 36660639
Test: build/boot
Change-Id: Icbaa76b04ecf731014b6b1bb1283bc2951a6ae4b

Test: works on internal marlin
Bug: 34274385
Change-Id: Idd35e5cdccb595b4e5994eb1d78fdeece0aec0a6

Test: Test: make cts && \
      cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
      --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi arm64-v8a \
      --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases \
      -t android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testNoExemptionsForBinderInVendorBan
      Fails as expected.
Bug: 36002573

Change-Id: I298c526789b25734d5f18666c64497e5d1e181d0

So we can limit vndservicemanager access to
just vndservice_contexts.

Bug: 36052864
Test: servicemanager,vndservicemanager work
Change-Id: I7b132d4f616ba1edd0daf7be750d4b7174c4e188

The tee domain is a vendor domain. Thus it cannot be accessed by
non-vendor components over Unix domain sockets.

It appears that the rules granting this access are not needed.

Test: Flash a clean build with this change. Confirm that bullhead,
      angler, sailfish, ryu, boot without new denials.
      Confirm that YouTube, Netflix, Google Play Movies play back
      videos without new denials.
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36715266

Change-Id: I639cecd07c9a3cfb257e62622b51b7823613472a

"tee" domain is a vendor domain. Hence its rules should live on the
vendor image.

What's left as public API is that:
1. tee domain exists and that it is permitted to sys_rawio capability,
2. tee_device type exists and apps are not permitted to access
   character devices labeled tee_device.

If you were relying on system/sepolicy automatically labeling
/dev/tf_driver as tee_device or labeling /system/bin/tf_daemon as
tee_exec, then you need to add these rules to your device-specific
file_contexts.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Test: bullhead, angler, and sailfish boot up without new denials
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36720355
Change-Id: Ie21619ff3c44ef58675c369061b4afdd7e8501c6

Bug: 36855921
Test: compile, wifi works with toggling
Change-Id: Ib0819a2d552472e482e192a69530441cfc2c0fd7

Vendor and system components are only allowed to share files by
passing open FDs over HIDL. Ban all directory access and all file
accesses other than what can be applied to an open FD such as
ioctl/stat/read/write/append.

This commit asserts that core components marked with attribute
coredomain may only access core data types marked with attribute
core_data_file_type.

A temporary exemption is granted to domains that currently rely on
access.

(cherry picked from commit cd97e710)

Bug: 34980020
Test: build Marlin policy
Change-Id: I2f0442f2628fbac1f2f7aa5ddf2a13e16b2546cc

Bug: 33239267
Test: compile, run wifi, no selinux complaint for wificond
Change-Id: I9b3e874381ac6cd7c6ff1058cc4f313bd85481b8

Init is no longer calling vdc with logwrapper, so it must take care of
logging to kmsg directly.

avc: denied { write } for pid=367 comm="vdc" name="kmsg" dev="tmpfs" ino=11056 scontext=u:r:vdc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0 tclass=chr_file permissive=0

Bug: 36278706
Test: observe vdc logging in kmsg on boot and stderr on normal usage

(cherry picked from commit bc4d3630)

Change-Id: Id7bc2fa87518aa0678c09495267c9e198ca8c968

Test: build, flash; adb shell lshal
Bug: 36562029
Change-Id: If8f6d8dbd99d31e6627fa4b7c1fd4faea3b75cf2

/data/misc/zoneinfo is provided by libc and is considered to be
VNDK stable. Grant read access to all domains and exempt from
neverallow rules asserting no vendor access to core data types.

Bug: 36730929
Test: Marlin Policy builds
Change-Id: I13766a661d6314f5393639fc20f1ab55d802f35f

This futher restricts neverallows for sockets which may be exposed as
filesystem nodes. This is achieved by labelling all such sockets
created by core/non-vendor domains using the new coredomain_socket
attribute, and then adding neverallow rules targeting that attribute.

This has now effect on what domains are permitted to do. This only
changes neverallow rules.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 36577153

(cherry picked from commit cf2ffdf0)

Change-Id: Iffeee571a2ff61fb9515fa6849d060649636524e

VR HWC is being split out of VR Window Manager. It creates a HW binder
interface used by SurfaceFlinger which implements the HWComposer HAL and
a regular binder interface which will be used by a system app to receive
the SurfaceFlinger output.

Bug: b/36051907
Test: Ran in permissive mode and ensured no permission errors show in
logcat.

Change-Id: If1360bc8fa339a80100124c4e89e69c64b29d2ae

This removes access to
* contexthub_service
* device_policy_service
* ethernet_service
* fingerprint_service
* shortcut_service
* trust_service
* usb_service

Test: cts-tradefed run commandAndExit cts-dev -m
CtsAppSecurityHostTestCases -t
android.appsecurity.cts.EphemeralTest
Bug: 33349998

Change-Id: Iad9302041d7674ae6ebeb1c559c64d13df62c304

the list to update was determined by looking
at who currently has access to surfaceflinger
for ipc and FD use.

Test: try some media stuff
Bug: 36333314
Change-Id: I474d0c44f8cb3868aad7a64e5a3640cf212d264d

Runas/libselinux needs access to seapp_contexts_file to determine
transitions into app domains.

Addresses:
avc: denied { read } for pid=7154 comm="run-as" name="plat_seapp_contexts"
dev="rootfs" ino=9827 scontext=u:r:runas:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 36782586
Test: Marlin policy builds
Change-Id: I0f0e937e56721d458e250d48ce62f80e3694900f

This tightens neverallows for looking up Binder servicemanager
services from vendor components. In particular, vendor components,
other than apps, are not permitted to look up any Binder services.
Vendor apps are permitted to look up only stable public API services
which is exactly what non-vendor apps are permitted to use as well.
If we permitted vendor apps to use non-stable/hidden Binder services,
they might break when core components get updated without updating
vendor components.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 35870313

Change-Id: I47d40d5d42cf4205d9e4e5e5f9d0794104efc28f

Devices that store their BT MAC address in /data/misc/bluedroid/ need
to find another place for that file.

Bug: 36602160
Test: Restart Bluetooth, check for selinux denials/files in /data/misc
Change-Id: Ib8d610f201a8c35f95b464c24857c6639205bc66

This reverts commit 5c09d123.

Broke the build

Bug: 35870313
Test: source build/envsetup.sh && lunch marlin-userdebug && m -j40
Change-Id: I71c968be6e89462fd286be5663933552d478f8bf

Add a new type and context for IpSec to system SEPolicy

Bug: 35923241
Test: service starts + talks to NetD
Change-Id: I69356c8525b426d344fcc4858fc499ab12405b20
(cherry picked from commit 641b1a7a)

In order to perform XFRM operations NetD needs the
ability to both read and write Netlink XFRM messages.

Bug: 34811756
Test: 34812052

Change-Id: I26831c58b24a4c1f344b113f0b5cf47ed2c93fee
(cherry picked from commit 7eb3dd3b)

This tightens neverallows for looking up Binder servicemanager
services from vendor components. In particular, vendor components,
other than apps, are not permitted to look up any Binder services.
Vendor apps are permitted to look up only stable public API services
which is exactly what non-vendor apps are permitted to use as well.
If we permitted vendor apps to use non-stable/hidden Binder services,
they might break when core components get updated without updating
vendor components.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 35870313
Change-Id: I949d62b3528cadb4bfe6f5985c25d1f497df0d5a

Moving the wpa_supplicant interaction from the binder keystore service
to the new wifi keystore HAL.

Denials addressed:
03-29 00:04:52.075   734   734 E SELinux : avc:  denied  { get } for
pid=638 uid=1010 scontext=u:r:hal_wifi_keystore_default:s0
tcontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tclass=keystore_key

Bug: 34603782
Test: Able to connect to wifi passpoint networks. Denials no longer
seen.
Change-Id: I97eb9a4aa9968056a2f1fcc7ce5509ceb62fd41e

As a result, Keymaster and DRM HALs are permitted to talk to tee domain
over sockets. Unfortunately, the tee domain needs to remain on the
exemptions list because drmserver, mediaserver, and surfaceflinger are
currently permitted to talk to this domain over sockets.

We need to figure out why global policy even defines a TEE domain...

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Bug: 36601092
Bug: 36601602
Bug: 36714625
Bug: 36715266
Change-Id: I0b95e23361204bd046ae5ad22f9f953c810c1895

We don't want to prevent access from vendor platform apps to system app
data. The issue with the referencing system_app explicitly in
neverallows is that vendor platform apps which need sandboxes similar to
system_app cannot be placed under system_app without modifying the
policy for all platform apps.

Test: mmm system/sepolicy
Change-Id: Ic0052602c31be4d74b02eeea129e2d8bfbd9c8d3

W Binder:538_2: type=1400 audit(0.0:9): avc: denied { getattr } for path="/data/media/0/Qtc88.mp4" dev="dm-0" ino=678654 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

W generic : type=1400 audit(0.0:9): avc: denied { read } for path="/data/media/0/Qtc88.mp4" dev="dm-0" ino=678654 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Test: Photos, Play Music, Play Movies, Youtube
Bug: 29125703
Change-Id: If84ab43b934944abf4c416db751ab6694835df83

*mac_permissions.xml files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
cross system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' or 'rootfs' label.

Bug: 36003167
Test: no new 'mac_perms_file' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
      OTA update.
Test: Launch 'chrome' and succesfully load a website.
Test: Launch Camera and take a picture.
Test: Launch Camera and record a video, succesfully playback recorded
      video

Change-Id: I1c882872bb78d1242ba273756ef0dc27487f58fc
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

sepolicy files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
cross system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' or 'rootfs' label.

Bug: 36527360
Test: no new 'sepolicy_file' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
      OTA update.
Test: Launch 'chrome' and succesfully load a website.
Test: Launch Camera and take a picture.
Test: Launch Camera and record a video, succesfully playback recorded
      video

Change-Id: I6fe8ba31588c2d75521c6e2b0bf7e6d6eaf80a19
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

seapp_context files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
cross system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' label.

Bug: 36002414
Test: no new 'seapp_context' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
      OTA update.
Test: ./cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
      --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi \
      arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
      android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospSeappContexts
Test: Launch 'chrome' and succesfully load a website.
Test: Launch Camera and take a picture.
Test: Launch Camera and record a video, succesfully playback recorded
      video

Change-Id: I19b3e50c6a7c292713d3e56ef0448acf6e4270f7
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

file_context files need to be explicitly labeled as they are now split
across system and vendor and won't have the generic world readable
'system_file' label.

Bug: 36002414
Test: no new 'file_context' denials at boot complete on sailfish
Test: successfully booted into recovery without denials and sideloaded
OTA update.
Test: ./cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
       --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check --abi \
       arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases -t \
       android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospFileContexts

Change-Id: I603157e9fa7d1de3679d41e343de397631666273
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>

The label applies to all service_contexts regardless of their location.
This also lets us track the service_contexts usage and limit access to
the files for the corresponding object manager alone.

Bug: 36002427
Test: Boot sailfish and observe no denials for 'serice_contexts'
Test: cts-tradefed run singleCommand cts --skip-device-info \
          --skip-preconditions --skip-connectivity-check \
          --abi arm64-v8a --module CtsSecurityHostTestCases \
          -t android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testAospServiceContexts

Change-Id: I97fc8b24bc99ca5c00d010fb522cd39a35572858
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>