Adds per-app categories to untrusted app domains and their
app data types. Per-app categories are in addition to the
existing per-user categories.

Apps targeting sdk version 28+ will now have the following
characteristics:
Domain: u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c[0-9]+,c[0-9]+,c[0-9],c[0-9]
Data context: u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c[0-9]+,c[0-9]+,c[0-9],c[0-9]

Whereas apps targeting 27- will look like:
Domain: u:r:untrusted_app_27:s0:c[0-9]+,c[0-9]+
Data context: u:object_r:app_data_file:s0:c[0-9]+,c[0-9]+

To ensure backwards compatibility with previous SDK versions,
the levelFrom=all now enforces categories by dominance instead of
equality. Apps with per-app and per-user categories will continue
to have selinux permissions (but not necessarily unix permissions)
to access app data with only per-user categories, but apps with only
per-user categories will not be able to access the data of apps with
both per-app and per-user categories.

Bug: 63897054
Test: Boot sailfish, run apps, verify no new selinux denials.
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSelinuxTargetSdkCurrentTestCases
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSelinuxTargetSdk27TestCases
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsSelinuxTargetSdk25TestCases
Test: adb sideload an OTA and verify that files are correctly labeled.
Change-Id: I64b013874fe87b55f47e817a1279e76ecf86b7c0

This leaves only the existence of untrusted_app domain as public API.
All other rules are implementation details of this domain's policy and
are thus now private.

Test: No change to policy according to sesearch, except for
      disappearance of all allow rules from untrusted_domain_current
      attribute (as expected).
Bug: 31364497

Change-Id: Ief71fa16cfc38437cbe5c58100bba48b9a497c92

/proc/tty/drivers is read by applications to figure out if they are
running in an emulated environment. Specifically, they look for the
string "goldfish" within that file.

Arguably this is not an Android API, and really shouldn't be exposed to
applications, but:

1) A largish number of applications break if they can't read this file;
2) The information here isn't particularly sensitive

While we could spend a bunch of time trying to get applications fixed,
there are bigger fish to fry. It's not worth the battle.

Test: "ls -laZ /proc/tty/drivers" is labeled properly.
Bug: 33214085
Bug: 33814662
Bug: 33791054
Bug: 33211769
Bug: 26813932
Change-Id: Icc05bdc1c917547a6dca7d76636a1009369bde49

app_domain was split up in commit: 2e00e637 to
enable compilation by hiding type_transition rules from public policy.  These
rules need to be hidden from public policy because they describe how objects are
labeled, of which non-platform should be unaware.  Instead of cutting apart the
app_domain macro, which non-platform policy may rely on for implementing new app
types, move all app_domain calls to private policy.

(cherry-pick of commit: 76035ea0)

Bug: 33428593
Test: bullhead and sailfish both boot. sediff shows no policy change.
Change-Id: I4beead8ccc9b6e13c6348da98bb575756f539665

app_domain was split up in commit: 2e00e637 to
enable compilation by hiding type_transition rules from public policy.  These
rules need to be hidden from public policy because they describe how objects are
labeled, of which non-platform should be unaware.  Instead of cutting apart the
app_domain macro, which non-platform policy may rely on for implementing new app
types, move all app_domain calls to private policy.

Bug: 33428593
Test: bullhead and sailfish both boot. sediff shows no policy change.
Change-Id: I4beead8ccc9b6e13c6348da98bb575756f539665

In order to support platform changes without simultaneous updates from
non-platform components, the platform and non-platform policies must be
split.  In order to provide a guarantee that policy written for
non-platform objects continues to provide the same access, all types
exposed to non-platform policy are versioned by converting them and the
policy using them into attributes.

This change performs that split, the subsequent versioning and also
generates a mapping file to glue the different policy components
together.

Test: Device boots and runs.
Bug: 31369363
Change-Id: Ibfd3eb077bd9b8e2ff3b2e6a0ca87e44d78b1317

Lock in the gains we've made so far in restricting access to generically
labeled /proc files. There's more we can do here, but let's avoid
inadvertent regressions.

Test: policy compiles. Only compile time assertions added.
Bug: 26813932
Change-Id: If354c2ddc1c59beed7f0eb4bcbd3f0d9971c3b8a

The other domains either don't have the same backwards compatibility
issues (isolated_app) or are privileged components that are pretty much
part of the platform and can be expected to meet a higher standard.

It would be possible to expose a build option for disabling the ART JIT,
allowing conditional removal of execmem from some of these domains too
(ones not ever using the WebView, until that's always in isolated_app).

Bug: 20013628
Change-Id: Ic22513157fc8b958b2a3d60381be0c07b5252fa5

Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c

Change-Id: Ia938d73b1a49b9ba4acf906df37095d21edee22e

(cherry picked from commit e01654f9)

For Retail Demo mode, we need to preload photos in
/data/preloads and allow regular apps to access the
photos returned by the media provider from the preloads
directory.

Bug: 29940807
Change-Id: Ic1061dac55ace1b125ae04b5b0c70aae9aa0c732

Grant permissions observed.

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ie63cda709319bbf635ef7bffbba3477c2cccc11b

This reverts commit 9c820a11.

Bug: 31364540
Change-Id: I98a34bd32dd835e6795d31a90f16f4ccd691e6e5

Grant permissions observed.

(cherry picked from commit 9c820a11)

Merged-in: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303
Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303

Change-Id: Ia938d73b1a49b9ba4acf906df37095d21edee22e

Change-Id: I4c318efba76e61b6ab0be9491c352f281b1c2bff
Bug: 19160983

Change-Id: Ia938d73b1a49b9ba4acf906df37095d21edee22e

untrusted_app lost all of the domain_deprecated permissions in N,
including the ability to read asec_apk_file dirs.  This is used for
forward locked apps.

Addresses the following denials:
avc: denied { search } for name="asec" dev="tmpfs" ino=9298 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/asec" dev="tmpfs" ino=9298 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

(cherry-pick of internal commit: addd3c9f)

Bug: 30082229
Change-Id: I87758f1daee19197d9299bca261f0324e01af5e0

For Retail Demo mode, we need to preload photos in
/data/preloads and allow regular apps to access the
photos returned by the media provider from the preloads
directory.

Bug: 29940807
Change-Id: Ic1061dac55ace1b125ae04b5b0c70aae9aa0c732

untrusted_app lost all of the domain_deprecated permissions in N,
including the ability to read asec_apk_file dirs.  This is used for
forward locked apps.

Addresses the following denials:
avc: denied { search } for name="asec" dev="tmpfs" ino=9298 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
avc: denied { getattr } for path="/mnt/asec" dev="tmpfs" ino=9298 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

Bug: 30082229
Change-Id: I44119f218433b9009cf8d09d0ee5f8a13cc15dd9

Grant permissions observed.

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303

Address denials:
avc: denied { read } for name="meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026544360 scontext=u:r:isolated_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 28722489
Change-Id: I3c55bd95bb82ec54e88e9e9bc42d6392a216a936

These neverallow rules are exact duplicates of neverallow
rules which occur earlier in the file.

Change-Id: I75e3d84109f26374257741425f8de638a15f2741

SafetyNet is in the priv_app domain. Suppressing this
isn't necessary anymore.

Change-Id: Icbcb75d3b2ebde657bd16b336b252aaec4d0d252

(cherry picked from commit 6ba383c5)

Restrict unix_dgram_socket and unix_stream_socket to a whitelist.
Disallow all ioctls for netlink_selinux_socket and netlink_route_socket.

Neverallow third party app use of all ioctls other than
unix_dgram_socket, unix_stream_socket, netlink_selinux_socket,
netlink_route_socket, tcp_socket, udp_socket and rawip_socket.

Bug: 28171804
Change-Id: Icfe3486a62fc2fc2d2abd8d4030a5fbdd0ab30ab

Restrict unix_dgram_socket and unix_stream_socket to a whitelist.
Disallow all ioctls for netlink_selinux_socket and netlink_route_socket.

Neverallow third party app use of all ioctls other than
unix_dgram_socket, unix_stream_socket, netlink_selinux_socket,
netlink_route_socket, tcp_socket, udp_socket and rawip_socket.

Bug: 28171804
Change-Id: Icfe3486a62fc2fc2d2abd8d4030a5fbdd0ab30ab

Add a neverallow rule (compile time assertion + CTS test) that
isolated_apps and untrusted_apps can't do anything else but append
to /data/anr/traces.txt. In particular, assert that they can't
read from the file, or overwrite other data which may already be
in the file.

Bug: 18340553
Bug: 27853304

(cherry picked from commit 369cf8cd)

Change-Id: Ib33e7ea0342ad28e5a89dfffdd9bc16fe54d8b3d

Add a neverallow rule (compile time assertion + CTS test) that
isolated_apps and untrusted_apps can't do anything else but append
to /data/anr/traces.txt. In particular, assert that they can't
read from the file, or overwrite other data which may already be
in the file.

Bug: 18340553
Bug: 27853304
Change-Id: I249fe2a46401b660efaa3f1102924a448ed750d5

Applications do not explicitly request handles to the batteryproperties
service, but the BatteryManager obtains a reference to it and uses it
for its underlying property queries.  Mark it as an app_api_service so
that all applications may use this API.  Also remove the batterypropreg
service label, as this does not appear to be used and may have been a
duplication of batteryproperties.  As a result, remove the
healthd_service type and replace it with a more specific
batteryproperties_service type.

(cherry-picked from commit: 9ed71eff)

Bug: 27442760
Change-Id: I537c17c09145b302728377bf856c1147e4cc37e9

Applications do not explicitly request handles to the batteryproperties
service, but the BatteryManager obtains a reference to it and uses it
for its underlying property queries.  Mark it as an app_api_service so
that all applications may use this API.  Also remove the batterypropreg
service label, as this does not appear to be used and may have been a
duplication of batteryproperties.  As a result, remove the
healthd_service type and replace it with a more specific
batteryproperties_service type.

Bug: 27442760
Change-Id: I5c0f9d7992ff2ec64adaeef22356e88fd0e8169c

HwRngTest needs access to the hwrandom sysfs files, but untrused_app
does not have access to sysfs.  Give these files their own label and
allow the needed read access.

(cherry-pick from internal commit: 85c0f8af)

Bug: 27263241
Change-Id: If572ad0931a534d76e148b688b76687460e99af9

HwRngTest needs access to the hwrandom sysfs files, but untrused_app
does not have access to sysfs.  Give these files their own label and
allow the needed read access.

Bug: 27263241
Change-Id: I718ba485e9e6627bac6e579f746658d85134b24b

Change-Id: I4c318efba76e61b6ab0be9491c352f281b1c2bff
Bug: 19160983

Bug: 26813932
Change-Id: I155087d28d9284d8c96554cc6739bb676272a00f

It's unlikely we'll get /proc locked down for the N release, so
delete the auditallow to avoid spamming the logs. Mark this
commit as DO NOT MERGE so we can continue to make progress on this
for future Android releases.

Change-Id: Ibf27bc5cb1b23c21e123aae8a4f190560d0ac2dc

This is a special profile folder where apps will leave profile markers
for the dex files they load and don't own. System server will read the
markers and decide which apk should be fully compiled instead of
profile guide compiled.

Apps need only to be able to create (touch) files in this directory.
System server needs only to be able to check wheter or not a file with a
given name exists.

Bug: 27334750
Bug: 26080105

Change-Id: I2256e4aba1ec0e5117de6497123223b9a74f404e

Bluetooth uses the tun device for tethering. Allow access.

  STEPS TO REPRODUCE:
  0. Have two devices to test on, say Device A and Device B
  1. On Device A, Go to settings ->Bluetooth .
  2. Turn on the Bluetooth .
  3. Pair it with device B
  4. Tap on the paired device

  OBSERVED RESULTS:
  -Bluetooth share crash is observed with "Bluetooth share has stopped"
  error message
  -Unable to use Bluetooth tethering due to this issue

  EXPECTED RESULTS:
  No crash and Bluetooth devices should be able to connect for tethering

Addresses the following denial:

com.android.bluetooth: type=1400 audit(0.0:131): avc: denied { open }
for comm=425420536572766963652043616C6C path="/dev/tun" dev="tmpfs"
ino=12340 scontext=u:r:bluetooth:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0
tclass=chr_file permissive=0

Bug: 27372573

(cherry picked from commit 9a1347ee)

Change-Id: Ibd16e48c09fe80ebb4f3779214de3b4806c12497

Bluetooth uses the tun device for tethering. Allow access.

  STEPS TO REPRODUCE:
  0. Have two devices to test on, say Device A and Device B
  1. On Device A, Go to settings ->Bluetooth .
  2. Turn on the Bluetooth .
  3. Pair it with device B
  4. Tap on the paired device

  OBSERVED RESULTS:
  -Bluetooth share crash is observed with "Bluetooth share has stopped"
  error message
  -Unable to use Bluetooth tethering due to this issue

  EXPECTED RESULTS:
  No crash and Bluetooth devices should be able to connect for tethering

Addresses the following denial:

com.android.bluetooth: type=1400 audit(0.0:131): avc: denied { open }
for comm=425420536572766963652043616C6C path="/dev/tun" dev="tmpfs"
ino=12340 scontext=u:r:bluetooth:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:tun_device:s0
tclass=chr_file permissive=0

Bug: 27372573
Change-Id: I07724d8d68ffcdda691f1179787a4f40a0ab1c73

Address the following denial:
m.chrome.canary: type=1400 audit(0.0:15): avc: granted { read open } for path="/proc/meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026544360 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

(cherry-pick of internal commit: 971aeeda)

Bug: 22032619
Chromium Bug: 586021

Change-Id: I2dcb2d4800bbc92ea47c37d4fd7a10f827a0114c

Address the following denial:
m.chrome.canary: type=1400 audit(0.0:15): avc: granted { read open } for path="/proc/meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026544360 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 22032619
Chromium Bug: 586021

Change-Id: I584345c84d870c313da69ec97a0b1e54c0eb9ee1