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  1. Nov 06, 2018
  2. Nov 05, 2018
    • Tri Vo's avatar
      Neverallow vendor access to system_file. · 9410105c
      Tri Vo authored
      Bug: 111243627
      Test: m selinux_policy
      Change-Id: I37d03906b93c8810f1d33af736f19fd6ab241c35
      9410105c
    • Felipe Leme's avatar
      New service: intelligence_service · 5bf0c636
      Felipe Leme authored
      Bug: 111276913
      Test: manual verification
      
      Change-Id: Icb309bb07e4e4b39cdc912b1d3dc1ece9cb55f5f
      5bf0c636
    • Kenny Root's avatar
      Allow SystemUI to talk to ADB service · 41ab29ee
      Kenny Root authored
      Mark the ADB service as a system_api_service so that SystemUI can tell
      it that the device is accepted. Refactoring split the AdbService out of
      the UsbService. UsbService is marked as an app_api_service which SystemUI
      is allowed to connect to; AdbService must be marked similarly as either
      system_api_service or app_api_service. However, only system apps should
      talk to AdbService currently.
      
      SELinux : avc:  denied  { find } for service=adb pid=1737 uid=10041 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:adb_service:s0 tclass=service_manager permissive=0
      
      Introduced in Change-Id Ibf23964665a115a5bc835820dcff98aaf7ba610f
      
      Test: Flash userdebug, accept ADB key, and replug USB
      Bug: 118999282
      Change-Id: I47b5090908ed84d0ba7a9fca100b299011bf8796
      41ab29ee
  3. Nov 02, 2018
  4. Nov 01, 2018
  5. Oct 31, 2018
  6. Oct 30, 2018
  7. Oct 29, 2018
    • Treehugger Robot's avatar
    • Treehugger Robot's avatar
      a94e6e51
    • Nick Kralevich's avatar
      Enforce execve() restrictions for API > 28 · 0dd738d8
      Nick Kralevich authored
      untrusted_app: Remove the ability to run execve() on files within an
      application's home directory. Executing code from a writable /home
      directory is a W^X violation (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W%5EX).
      Additionally, loading code from application home directories violates a
      security requirement that all executable code mapped into memory must
      come from signed sources, or be derived from signed sources.
      
      Note: this change does *not* remove the ability to load executable code
      through other mechanisms, such as mmap(PROT_EXEC) of a file descriptor
      from the app's home directory. In particular, functionality like
      dlopen() on files in an app's home directory continues to work even
      after this change.
      
      untrusted_app_25 and untrusted_app_27: For backwards compatibility,
      continue to allow these domains to execve() files from the
      application's home directory.
      
      seapp_contexts: Bump the minimum API level required to enter the
      untrusted_app domain. This will run API level 27-28 processes in
      the API level 27 sandbox. API level 28 will continue to run with
      levelFrom=all, and API level 27 will continue to run with
      levelFrom=user.
      
      Bug: 112357170
      Test: Device boots and no obvious problems.
      Test: See CTS test at https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/cts/+/804228
      Change-Id: Ief9ae3a227d16ab5792f43bacbb577c1e70185a0
      0dd738d8
  8. Oct 27, 2018
    • Jeff Sharkey's avatar
      vold does more than LOOP_GET_STATUS64. · f2cad2d9
      Jeff Sharkey authored
      Update the "allowxperm" to reflect the various ioctl() performed in
      the vold source code.
      
      Bug: 118437832
      Test: atest android.os.storage.cts.StorageManagerTest
      Change-Id: Ide3a09104d8b4ce7fa2b7e23e9b215139186f595
      f2cad2d9
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