Note: The existing rules allowing socket communication will be removed
once we  migrate over to HIDL completely.

Bug: 34603782
Test: Able to connect to wifi networks.
Test: Will be sending for full wifi integration tests
(go/wifi-test-request)
Change-Id: I9ee238fd0017ec330f6eb67ef9049211f7bd4615

Make the policy smaller and less noisy on user builds by suppressing
auditallow rules.

Bug: 28760354
Test: policy compiles and device boots. No obvious problems.
Change-Id: Iddf6f12f8ce8838e84b09b2f9f3f0c8b700543f5

auditallows have been in place for a while, and no obvious denials.
Remove domain_deprecated from init.te

While I'm here, clean up the formatting of the lines in
domain_deprecated.te.

Bug: 28760354
Test: policy compiles and device boots. No obvious problems.
Change-Id: Ia12e77c3e25990957abf15744e083eed9ffbb056

Grant observed uses of permissions being audited in domain_deprecated.

fsck
avc: granted { getattr } for path="/" dev="dm-0" ino=2 scontext=u:r:fsck:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir

keystore
avc: granted { read open } for path="/vendor/lib64/hw" dev="dm-1" ino=168 scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

sdcardd
avc: granted { read open } for path="/proc/filesystems" dev="proc" ino=4026532412 scontext=u:r:sdcardd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

update_engine
avc: granted { getattr } for path="/proc/misc" dev="proc" ino=4026532139 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for path="/proc/misc" dev="proc" ino=4026532139 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for name="hw" dev="dm-1" ino=168 scontext=u:r:update_engine:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

vold
avc: granted { read open } for path="/vendor/lib64/hw" dev="dm-1" ino=168 scontext=u:r:vold:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

Test: Marlin builds and boots, avc granted messages no longer observed.
Bug: 35197529
Change-Id: Iae34ae3b9e22ba7550cf7d45dc011ab043e63424

Addresses the following auditallow spam:

avc: granted { getattr } for comm="init"
path="/data/app/com.sling-1/lib/x86/libavcodec-56.so" dev="mmcblk0p11"
ino=32607 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
tclass=file

Test: policy compiles.
Change-Id: I81775f8de93f0b4334279e9f5e19d27e6171616f

Replace the global debuggerd with a per-process debugging helper that
gets exec'ed by the process that crashed.

Bug: http://b/30705528
Test: crasher/crasher64, `debuggerd <pid>`, `kill -ABRT <pid>`
Change-Id: Iad1b7478f7a4e2690720db4b066417d8b66834ed

No denials collected.

Bug: 28760354
Test: no denials collected.
Test: device boots and no obvious problems
Change-Id: I7fc053ecae2db3bb2ca7c298634453e930713bec

Remove /proc/net access to domain_deprecated. Add it to domains where it
was missing before.

Other than these domains, SELinux denial monitoring hasn't picked up any
denials related to /proc/net

Bug: 28760354
Test: Device boots
Test: No unexpected denials in denial collection logs.
Change-Id: Ie5bfa4bc0070793c1e8bf3b00676fd31c08d426a

Addresses the following denials and auditallows:

avc: denied { read } for pid=561 comm="hwservicemanage" name="hw"
dev="dm-0" ino=1883 scontext=u:r:hwservicemanager:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

avc: denied { read } for pid=748 comm="gatekeeperd" name="hw" dev="dm-0"
ino=1883 scontext=u:r:gatekeeperd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0
tclass=dir permissive=0

avc: granted { read open } for pid=735 comm="fingerprintd"
path="/system/lib64/hw" dev="dm-0" ino=1883 scontext=u:r:fingerprintd:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

Test: no denials on boot
Change-Id: Ic363497e3ae5078e564d7195f3739a654860a32f

No unexpected usages.

Bug: 28760354
Test: Device boots
Test: No unexpected denials in denial collection logs.
Change-Id: I43226fd0b8103afb1b25b1eb21445c04bc79954e

auditallows have been in place for quite a while now, and nothing has
triggered. Let's do some cleanup!

Bug: 28760354
Test: device boots and no new denials
Test: SELinux denials collection has seen no instances of these
      permissions
Change-Id: I9293f8d8756c9db6307e344c32cd11b9e0183e7f

Allow installd to read through files, directories, and symlinks
on /system. This is needed to support installd using files in
/system/app and /system/priv-app

Addresses the following auditallow spam:

avc: granted { getattr } for comm="installd"
path="/system/app/Bluetooth/lib/arm/libbluetooth_jni.so"
dev="mmcblk0p41" ino=19 scontext=u:r:installd:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file

avc: granted { getattr } for comm="installd"
path="/system/priv-app/MtpDocumentsProvider/lib/arm64/libappfuse_jni.so"
dev="dm-0" ino=2305 scontext=u:r:installd:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=lnk_file

avc: granted { read open } for comm="installd"
path="/system/priv-app/TelephonyProvider" dev="mmcblk0p43" ino=1839
scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

avc: granted { read } for comm="installd" name="Velvet" dev="mmcblk0p43"
ino=1841 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { read open } for comm="installd"
path="/system/priv-app/GoogleOneTimeInitializer" dev="mmcblk0p43"
ino=1778 scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { read open } for comm="installd"
path="/system/app/PlayAutoInstallConfig" dev="mmcblk0p43" ino=112
scontext=u:r:installd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_file:s0 tclass=dir

Test: policy compiles
Change-Id: I5d14ea2cd7d281f949d0651b9723d5b7fae2e1f2

Addresses the following audit messages:

[    7.984957] type=1400 audit(33873666.610:40): avc: granted { getattr
} for pid=1 comm="init" name="system@framework@boot-ext.art" dev="dm-2"
ino=106324 scontext=u:r:init:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file

[   65.528068] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:96): avc: granted { search
} for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir

[   65.530425] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:97): avc: granted { search
} for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir

[   65.530487] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:98): avc: granted { open }
for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/tasks" dev="cgroup" ino=12429
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file

[   65.530800] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:98): avc: granted { open }
for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/tasks" dev="cgroup" ino=12429
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file

[   65.530842] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:99): avc: granted { search
} for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir

[   65.531138] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:99): avc: granted { search
} for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12428
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir

[   65.531176] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:100): avc: granted {
search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="bg_non_interactive" dev="cgroup"
ino=12444 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0
tclass=dir

[   65.531465] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:100): avc: granted {
search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="bg_non_interactive" dev="cgroup"
ino=12444 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0
tclass=dir

[   65.531502] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:101): avc: granted { open
} for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/bg_non_interactive/tasks"
dev="cgroup" ino=12445 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file

[   65.531789] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:101): avc: granted { open
} for pid=6330 comm="main" path="/dev/cpuctl/bg_non_interactive/tasks"
dev="cgroup" ino=12445 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=file

[   65.531827] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:102): avc: granted {
search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12459
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir

[   65.713056] type=1400 audit(1477751916.508:102): avc: granted {
search } for pid=6330 comm="main" name="/" dev="cgroup" ino=12459
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cgroup:s0 tclass=dir

Bug: 32246161
Test: policy compiles
Test: dumpstate no longer generates the audit messages above.
Change-Id: Id5afe2ebeb24f8a7407aac1a0a09806b1521b0e4

Fixes the following SELinux messages when running adb bugreport:

avc: granted { read } for name="libart.so" dev="dm-0" ino=1886
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read open } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { getattr } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { read execute } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so"
dev="dm-0" ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { read } for path="/system/lib64/libart.so" dev="dm-0"
ino=1886 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:libart_file:s0
tclass=file

avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { getattr } for path="/data/dalvik-cache/arm64" dev="dm-2"
ino=106290 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=dir

avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { search } for name="arm64" dev="dm-2" ino=106290
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { getattr } for
path="/data/dalvik-cache/arm64/system@framework@boot.art" dev="dm-2"
ino=106318 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { search } for name="arm64" dev="dm-2" ino=106290
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
tclass=dir

avc: granted { read } for name="system@framework@boot.art" dev="dm-2"
ino=106318 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { read open } for
path="/data/dalvik-cache/arm64/system@framework@boot.art" dev="dm-2"
ino=106318 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0 tclass=file

avc: granted { search } for name="dalvik-cache" dev="dm-2" ino=106289
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
tclass=dir

[  169.349480] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:129): avc: granted { read
} for pid=6413 comm="main" name="ipv6_route" dev="proc" ino=4026535947
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.350030] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:130): avc: granted { read
open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route"
dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.350361] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:130): avc: granted { read
open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route"
dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.350399] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:131): avc: granted {
getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route"
dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.350963] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:131): avc: granted {
getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/ipv6_route"
dev="proc" ino=4026535947 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.351002] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:132): avc: granted { read
} for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.351330] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:132): avc: granted { read
} for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.351366] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:133): avc: granted { read
open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.351861] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:133): avc: granted { read
open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.351910] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:134): avc: granted {
getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.353105] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:134): avc: granted {
getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.353186] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:135): avc: granted { read
} for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.353594] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:135): avc: granted { read
} for pid=6413 comm="main" name="if_inet6" dev="proc" ino=4026535946
scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.353636] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:136): avc: granted { read
open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.354230] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:136): avc: granted { read
open } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.354437] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:137): avc: granted {
getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

[  169.395359] type=1400 audit(1477679159.734:137): avc: granted {
getattr } for pid=6413 comm="main" path="/proc/6413/net/if_inet6"
dev="proc" ino=4026535946 scontext=u:r:dumpstate:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:proc_net:s0 tclass=file

Test: policy compiles
Test: adb bugreport runs without auditallow messages above.
Bug: 32246161
Change-Id: Ie0ab2ed3c6babc1f93d3b8ae47c92dd905ebc93a

Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
version.

Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
avrules are left in public.

Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.

Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c

Test: builds/boots on Angler. No "granted" messages for the removed
permissions observed in three months of log audits.

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: I0a6363f094c41392469f438c4399c93ed53fb5ac

avc: granted { use } for pid=3067 comm="SoundPoolThread"
scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tclass=fd

Test: builds/boots on Angler. Adds permissions for all "granted" avc
messages observed in three months of log auditing.

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: I51f13d7c7d40f479b1241dfcd5d925d28f74926b

Test: builds/boots on Angler. No "granted" messages for the removed
permissions observed in three months of log audits.

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: I76c2752f806b83a6c21fcb17b6f445368936f61b

Isolated_app no longer has the domain_deprecated attribute.

Bug: 31364540
Change-Id: I37e39becf24f98d6ee427bc8d039852e6a322ca6

No "granted" messages for the removed permissions observed in three
months of log audits.

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: I46b6b79b3a13108020114f3c3555adeac021b0a9

No "granted" messages for the removed permissions observed in three
months of log audits.

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: I6bd9525b663a2bdad4f5b2d4a85d3dd46d5fd106

Grant permissions observed.

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ie63cda709319bbf635ef7bffbba3477c2cccc11b

This reverts commit 9c820a11.

Bug: 31364540
Change-Id: I98a34bd32dd835e6795d31a90f16f4ccd691e6e5

This reverts commit 8486f4e6.

Bug: 31364540
Change-Id: I7dee039540864a3244ee6d9fbb200ef177c42465

This reverts commit 48d68a64.

Bug: 31364540
Change-Id: I2a83b661e06c84f42c0a7aa566f02d2c135b96c3

(cherry picked from commit 48d68a64)

Remove audit messaged.

Addresses:
avc:  granted  { read } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="cmdline" dev="proc" ino=4026535448 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc:  granted  { read open } for  pid=1 comm="init" path="/proc/cmdline" dev="proc" ino=4026535448 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: I48ea01b35c6d1b255995484984ec92203b6083be

(cherry picked from commit 8486f4e6)

Grant observed permissions

Addresses:
init
avc:  granted  { use } for  pid=1 comm="init" path="/sys/fs/selinux/null" dev="selinuxfs" ino=22 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tclass=fd

mediaextractor
avc: granted { getattr } for pid=582 comm="mediaextractor" path="/proc/meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026535447 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for pid=582 comm="mediaextractor" name="meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026535447 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for pid=582 comm="mediaextractor" path="/proc/meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026535447 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file

uncrypt
avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6750 comm="uncrypt" path="/fstab.angler" dev="rootfs" ino=9809 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for pid=6750 comm="uncrypt" name="fstab.angler" dev="rootfs" ino=9809 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for pid=6750 comm="uncrypt" path="/fstab.angler" dev="rootfs" ino=9809 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ibd51473c55d957aa7375de60da67cdc6504802f9

Grant permissions observed.

(cherry picked from commit 9c820a11)

Merged-in: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303
Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303

Remove audit messaged.

Addresses:
avc:  granted  { read } for  pid=1 comm="init" name="cmdline" dev="proc" ino=4026535448 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file
avc:  granted  { read open } for  pid=1 comm="init" path="/proc/cmdline" dev="proc" ino=4026535448 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: I48ea01b35c6d1b255995484984ec92203b6083be

Grant observed permissions

Addresses:
init
avc:  granted  { use } for  pid=1 comm="init" path="/sys/fs/selinux/null" dev="selinuxfs" ino=22 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tclass=fd

mediaextractor
avc: granted { getattr } for pid=582 comm="mediaextractor" path="/proc/meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026535447 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for pid=582 comm="mediaextractor" name="meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026535447 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for pid=582 comm="mediaextractor" path="/proc/meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026535447 scontext=u:r:mediaextractor:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file

uncrypt
avc: granted { getattr } for pid=6750 comm="uncrypt" path="/fstab.angler" dev="rootfs" ino=9809 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read } for pid=6750 comm="uncrypt" name="fstab.angler" dev="rootfs" ino=9809 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file
avc: granted { read open } for pid=6750 comm="uncrypt" path="/fstab.angler" dev="rootfs" ino=9809 scontext=u:r:uncrypt:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ibd51473c55d957aa7375de60da67cdc6504802f9

Grant permissions observed.

Bug: 28760354
Change-Id: Ifdead51f873eb587556309c48fb84ff1542ae303

untrusted_app lost the ability to read files labeled as sysfs to prevent
information leakage, but this is trivially bypassable by spawning an
isolated app, since this was not taken away from isolated app.
Privileges should not be gained by launching an isolated app, and this
one directly defeats that hardeneing. Remove this access.

Bug: 28722489
Change-Id: I61d3678eca515351c9dbe4444ee39d0c89db7a3e

This rule is a duplicate of a rule already in domain.te.

Change-Id: I729e6d9ca9c99466f8c0fd1ab2f8449f889c71fa

Allow /proc/meminfo to be read by bootanim. Not sure why
it's needed, but harmless enough.

Modify domain_deprecated so it doesn't use r_dir_file().
/proc/meminfo is neither a symlink nor a directory, so it doesn't
make sense to create allow rules for those classes of objects.

Addresses the following denial:

  avc: denied { read } for comm="BootAnimation" name="meminfo" dev="proc"
  ino=4026536593 scontext=u:r:bootanim:s0
  tcontext=u:object_r:proc_meminfo:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

This denial is only showing up on flounder, flounder_lte, or
dragon devices. I'm not sure why.

Change-Id: I0f808bcae47fc2fda512cd147c3b44593835cac5

Remove references to /data/security and the corresponding
type securitly_file.

Bug: 26544104
Change-Id: Iac00c293daa6b781a24c2bd4c12168dfb1cceac6

Address the following denial:
m.chrome.canary: type=1400 audit(0.0:15): avc: granted { read open } for path="/proc/meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026544360 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

(cherry-pick of internal commit: 971aeeda)

Bug: 22032619
Chromium Bug: 586021

Change-Id: I2dcb2d4800bbc92ea47c37d4fd7a10f827a0114c

Address the following denial:
m.chrome.canary: type=1400 audit(0.0:15): avc: granted { read open } for path="/proc/meminfo" dev="proc" ino=4026544360 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:proc:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 22032619
Chromium Bug: 586021

Change-Id: I584345c84d870c313da69ec97a0b1e54c0eb9ee1

Was moved to domain_deprecated. Move back to domain.

Files in /acct/uid/*/tasks are well protected by unix permissions.
No information is leaked with write perms.

Change-Id: I8017e906950cba41ce350bc0892a36269ade8d53

Address the following denials:
01-21 12:44:53.704  4595  4595 W ndroid.calendar: type=1400 audit(0.0:21): avc: denied { getattr } for name="/" dev="dm-0" ino=2 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:labeledfs:s0 tclass=filesystem permissive=0
01-21 12:45:23.177  5544  5544 W roid.music:main: type=1400 audit(0.0:46): avc: denied { getattr } for name="/" dev="rootfs" ino=1 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=filesystem permissive=0
7618 W .android.chrome: type=1400 audit(0.0:413): avc: denied { getattr } for path="/" dev="rootfs" ino=1 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:rootfs:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0

01-21 12:44:53.709  4595  4595 D AndroidRuntime: Shutting down VM
01-21 12:44:53.727  4595  4595 E AndroidRuntime: FATAL EXCEPTION: main
01-21 12:44:53.727  4595  4595 E AndroidRuntime: Process: com.google.android.calendar, PID: 4595
01-21 12:44:53.727  4595  4595 E AndroidRuntime: java.lang.RuntimeException: Unable to get provider com.google.android.syncadapters.calendar.timely.TimelyProvider: java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Invalid path: /data
01-21 12:44:53.727  4595  4595 E AndroidRuntime: 	at android.app.ActivityThread.installProvider(ActivityThread.java:5550)
...

Change-Id: I0e9d65438d031e19c9abc5dca8969ed4356437a0

auditallow says not needed.

Change-Id: If44f64aeb5d0be78fd166d1b3eee298c5f7c860d