Change-Id: Id344f2937062bfb9f045e262c57f88d4f2c54920

Change-Id: Ifa0811b5445cf9d2c47f2e9246fe023031bf538f

Bug: 138545724
Test: n/a

(cherry picked from commit 3d58603623dd67b181fb965f437c552428c979bc)

Change-Id: I03c2430778f1112679090bb7aad234c907384ea1
CRs-Fixed: 2491659

Change-Id: I229ac404f28108e876215c0220c4db38bd893b20

Change-Id: I2178bd416cd6f24592145147b65ffee09052c3a9

Change-Id: I4f12153d858aba3d281ab5cb546bdb44ac17892b

This is used to address a CTS testcase failure. This CTS
testcase need to access the content of Contact, some data
from ContactProvider is transfered through ashmem.

Currently ashmem is backed by the tmpfs filesystem, ContactProvider
in android run as a priv_app, so the file context of the ashmem
created by ContactProvider is priv_app_tmpfs. CTS runs as an
untrusted_app, need to be granted the read permission to the
priv_app_tmpfs files.

RESTRICT AUTOMERGE

Bug: 117961216

[Android Version]:
android_p_mr0_r0

[Kernel Version]:
4.19.0-rc8

[CTS Version]:
cts-9.0_r1

[Failed Testcase]:
com.android.cts.devicepolicy.ManagedProfileTest#testManagedContactsPolicies

[Error Log]:
11-11 11:15:50.479 12611 12611 W AndroidTestSuit: type=1400 audit(0.0:811):
avc: denied { read } for path=2F6465762F6173686D656D202864656C6574656429
dev="tmpfs" ino=174636 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c113,c256,c522,c768
tcontext=u:object_r:priv_app_tmpfs:s0:c522,c768 tclass=file permissive=0

[Test Result With This Patch]:
PASS

(cherry picked from fdfa42bf)

(cherry picked from commit e4ccef0f35a86d5f7ee9732a296bc1864105308c)
CRs-Fixed:2491460
Change-Id: I45efacabe64af36912a53df60ac059889fde1629

Kernel commit 8a2af06415ef0fc922162503dd18da0d9be7771f (ashmem: switch
to ->read_iter) switched ashmem from using __vfs_read to vfs_iter_read
to read the backing shmem file.  Prior to this, reading from an ashmem
fd that was passed between processes didn't hit any permission checks;
now SELinux checks that the receiver can read from the creator's file
context.

Some apps receive buffers through ashmem from system_server, e.g., the
settings app reads battery stats from system_server through ashmem when
an app details page is opened.  Restore this ability by giving apps read
access to system_server_tmpfs.  system_server is still responsible for
creating and passing across the ashmem buffers, so this doesn't give
apps the ability to read anything system_server isn't willing to give
them.

Bug: 112987536
Bug: 111381531
Test: atest android.appsecurity.cts.PermissionsHostTest on kernel 4.14
(cherry picked from 360559e7)

(cherry picked from commit 7e799f995abfb2dd2cb8708db3b0042b73476ef3)

CRs-Fixed:2491460

Change-Id: Ice5e25f55bc409e91ad7e8c7ea8b28ae213191a3

Change-Id: If8d87b56a556b231997d22e4ca8bbabb03abc623

Change-Id: I6d6332d7c3da1b958672fbcd4369ba67cf74ebc5

Change-Id: I612a285a367ed2ced9a2128954c3e2f5688d867a

Change-Id: Iaa7dedecd2170651b1fcdd65bd91c4be10c09b22

Merge cherrypicks of [8662136, 8662137, 8660337, 8660601, 8660073, 8660074, 8660602, 8662138, 8660127] into qt-release

Change-Id: I37d65a3b4f59c46ec86b742b39f3582f411fcf82

Required to check if migration is necessary and migrate obb contents

Bug: 136199978
Test: make
Change-Id: I23890e4eeea1da7791e25ce5c9584b1abe94f440
(cherry picked from commit 793dc8f8)

Change-Id: Iab2c3ae54bc404f3f01de407a0cf44c6b9c2710d

Change-Id: Ifb39a037b8bc350da37e9047dfcbd3227f23c905

Change-Id: I40ba2508d7412b0923dc5978e8993c7e8926b217

Change-Id: Ic8ac05fbe017795e71aa40b0552b5100f1db6692

Change-Id: I97220dc2de02a50cdeddbdf2fc100c637921cac4

Change-Id: Id95b0fccc4252fbac9e72dabca96410b92edcc37

This will allow Perfetto to capture GPU frequency changes
on the target, which is useful to graphics developers
using Perfetto to profile graphics HW usage.

This change also updates the private prebuilt at version
29.0 to match the update.

Bug: 136062452
Merged-In: Idb7870b2f674f1359ef3b4487dbeff190b394248
Change-Id: Ib98ba10d96caa199d7030be3a17148045576a80c

In order to show licensing information, we need to read it from
an asset stored in the .apex file.

Bug: 135183006
Test: Manual; settings can access apex files stored on /data
Change-Id: I71fbde6e295d9c890c9b9b0449e5150834a6680e
Merged-In: I71fbde6e295d9c890c9b9b0449e5150834a6680e

Change-Id: Idbc8bd55c78c640ff7d075329db98485657e7722

Change-Id: I5de1194abb6d87fa1fb19edc1b6ed28624a0113c

Change-Id: Ic45261b454c8365128fa8ccc8397526db088328f

Change-Id: Ib137a973f3fdcda6adff9a27622ee6901e255e88

Change-Id: I56ede22e4d07629cba83a033553d53b83b9afcb4

Change-Id: I1f58f49654397975f3d2765304a33269115feaeb

Bug: http://b/135139675

Coverage files are written to /data/misc/trace (governed by the
method_trace_data_file selinux type).  Allow all domains to access
(create directories, access files) this directory when native coverage
is enabled (by setting NATIVE_COVERAGE to true) in an userdebug or eng
build.

Also relax neverallow constraints to allow access to
method_trace_data_file for native coverage builds.

Test: Build 32-bit cuttlefish with coverage:
          m NATIVE_COVERAGE=true COVERAGE_PATHS="*"
      and verify that there are no selinux denials in kernel log and
      logcat.

Change-Id: I3fe7c77612854b9de7de7a0ddd5cbf44a2f5c21e
(cherry picked from commit ce9c0c5a5fbd3fda8e1fd102d2bf1ca6afebbdf9)

Test: manual
Bug: 126802513

Change-Id: If037483f305e161a158e30f6322d5e25b7770952

Change-Id: I72ee7a6e132f0f59f73b4c1ffdbb31a4087bff82

This CL fixes the following denials during libdm_test
that is part of VTS.

avc: denied { read } for comm="loop1" path=2F6D656D66643A66696C655F32202864656C6574656429
dev="tmpfs" ino=97742 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:appdomain_tmpfs:s0
tclass=file permissive=0
W loop1   : type=1400 audit(0.0:371): avc: denied { read } for
path=2F6D656D66643A66696C655F32202864656C6574656429 dev="tmpfs" ino=97742 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:appdomain_tmpfs:s0 tclass=file permissive=0

Bug: 135004816
Test: adb shell libdm_test
Change-Id: Ifb6d58ee6f032cdf3952a05667aa8696d6e2a2fa

This property will be set by system_server (to indicate the currently
selected theme for device), and can be accessed by vendor init.rc.

avc:  denied  { read } for property=persist.sys.theme pid=0 uid=0 gid=0 scontext=u:r:vendor_init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:theme_prop:s0 tclass=file

Bug: 113028175
Test: Set a vendor init trigger that waits on `persist.sys.theme`. Check
      that the trigger fires without denial.
Change-Id: Ibb4e392d5059b76059f36f7d11ba82cd65cbe970

Change-Id: I78f21b36c99cc0cd00506793f23ce6e2cddf9b93

Change-Id: I6ffe12e29c5b22c1e992804020e4e3407b2ff7c7

avc: denied { sigchld } for comm="main"
scontext=u:r:system_server_startup:s0 tcontext=u:r:zygote:s0
tclass=process permissive=0

Test: build
Bug: 134496658
Change-Id: I98c106b17ba1740f953c3108bd0fc927c150096f
(cherry picked from commit 67dc274f87b25b80d507f8ad8263648f5f9a1dd1)

Change-Id: Ie2ae9e3668d8efea628469cc83de7769d3d93404