Test: Builds

Bug: 64121714
Bug: 31973802
Change-Id: Id37be8726a8bb297e35bca494964fdbcc48c6a73
(cherry picked from commit 4be28894)

Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.

To that end, this change:
* Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
priority than apps.
* Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
* Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
* Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.

Bug: 9496886
Bug: 68016944
Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
    navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
    Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
"Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: atest netd_integration_test
Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest

Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
Merged-In: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
(cherry picked from commit 08731895)

Vendor public libs are exposed to apps (not system), and their ABI
stability is guaranteed by vendor. Introducing new selinux type so that
we don't conflate concepts of same-process HAL and vendor public lib.
The former is exposed to all domains, while the latter should only be
acessible by apps.

Bug: 76413554
Test: build-only change, policy builds
Change-Id: I89dad351374f46c7fe2726991eb4c05064c37ed5

The /dev/ion driver's file operations structure does not specify a
write operation. Granting write is meaningless. This audit statement
has been around since Android Oreo and logs collected from dogfooders
shows that no apps are attempting to open the file with write
permissions.

Bug: 28760354
Test: build
Test: verify no "granted" messages from dogfood devices.
Change-Id: Id4f3540bba8c9f30f9d912f7a7473933be779cbb

We're adding support for OEMs to ship exFAT, which behaves identical
to vfat.  Some rules have been manually enumerating labels related
to these "public" volumes, so unify them all behind "sdcard_type".

Test: atest
Bug: 67822822
Change-Id: I09157fd1fc666ec5d98082c6e2cefce7c8d3ae56

Values of the following properties are set by SoC vendors on some
devices including Pixels.
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap
- persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- persist.vendor.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.enable
- ro.bt.bdaddr_path
- wlan.driver.status

So they should be whitelisted for compatibility.

Bug: 77633703
Test: succeeded building and tested with Pixels
Change-Id: Ib2b81bcc1fd70ddd571dc7fb2b923b576d62b7d5

System components should use the public tagSocket() API, not direct
file access to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/* and /dev/xt_qtaguid.

Test: build/boot taimen-userdebug. Use youtube, browse chrome,
    navigate maps on both cellular and wifi.
Bug: 68774956

Change-Id: Id895395de100d8f9a09886aceb0d6061fef832ef

Remove unecessary access to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl and
/dev/xt_qtaguid.

Bug: 68774956
Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: adb root; atest tagSocket
Change-Id: If3a1e823be0e342faefff28ecd878189c68a8e92

Bug: 72177715
Test: flash device and check incident output
Change-Id: I16c172caec235d985a6767642134fbd5e5c23912

Test: build
Bug: 68774956
Change-Id: I0f9fd87eb41e67e14f35e49eba13e3d1de745250

The file under /proc/net/xt_qtaguid is going away in future release.
Apps should use the provided public api instead of directly reading the
proc file. This change will block apps that based on SDK 28 or above to
directly read that file and we will delete that file after apps move
away from it.

Test: Flashed with master branch on marlin, verified phone boot, can
      browse web, watch youtube video, make phone call and use google
      map for navigation with wifi on and off.
      run cts -m CtsNetTestCases -t android.net.cts.TrafficStatsTest
      run cts -m CtsAppSecurityHostTestCases -t \
      		android.appsecurity.cts.AppSecurityTests

Change-Id: I4c4d6c9ab28b426acef23db53f171de8f20be1dc
(cherry picked from commit 5ec8f843)

This reverts commit fad0b04d.

Reason for revert: This change crashed facebook App on dogfood build.

Bug: 72977484
Change-Id: I4f35b00c11afbd4914f572d3cc0378d740403ed2

Remove the untrusted apps and priviledged apps from the group that can
directly access xt_qtaguid module related file. All apps that need to
access app network usage data need to use the public API provided in
framework.

Test: Flashed with master branch on marlin, verified phone boot, can
      browse web, watch youtube video, make phone call and use google
      map for navigation with either wifi is on or off.
      run cts -m CtsNetTestCases -t android.net.cts.TrafficStatsTest
      run cts -m CtsNativeNetTestCases
Bug: 68774956 30950746

Change-Id: I9b3db819d6622611d5b512ef821abb4c28d6c9eb

Do not let apps read /proc/uid_cpupower/time_in_state,
/proc/uid_cpupower/concurrent_active_time,
/proc/uid_cpupower/concurrent_policy_time.

b/71718257

Test: Check that they can't be read from the shell
    without root permissions and system_server was able
    to read them

Change-Id: I812694adfbb4630f7b56aa7096dc2e6dfb148b15

/proc/net/xt_qtaguid is used by apps to track their network data
use. Limit access to just zygote spawned processes - apps and
system_server, omitting access to isolated_app which is not allowed
to create network sockets.
As Android moves to eBPF for app's network data stats, access to
/proc/net/xt_qtaguid will be removed entirely. Segmenting access off
is the first step.
Bug: 68774956

This change also helps further segment and whitelist access to
files in /proc/net and is a step in the lockdown of /proc/net.
Bug: 9496886

Test: boot Taimen. Walk through setup-wizard. Make phone call and
    video call. Browse web. Watch youtube. Navigate in maps.
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsAppSecurityHostTestCases -t \
    android.appsecurity.cts.AppSecurityTests
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsNativeNetTestCases
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsIncidentHostTestCases -t \
    com.android.server.cts.NetstatsIncidentTest
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsOsTestCases -t \
    android.os.cts.StrictModeTest
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsNetTestCases -t \
    android.net.cts.TrafficStatsTest
Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsUsageStatsTestCases -t \
    android.app.usage.cts.NetworkUsageStatsTest
Test: vts-tradefed run vts -m VtsQtaguidTest
Change-Id: Idddd318c56b84564142d37b11dcc225a2f2800ea

Vendor-specific app domains depend on the rules in app.te so they
must reside in public policy.

Bug: 70517907
Test: build
Change-Id: If45557a5732a06f78c752779a8182e053beb25a2
Merged-In: If45557a5732a06f78c752779a8182e053beb25a2
(cherry picked from commit 1f4cab8b)

Do not let apps read uid_concurrent_active_time and
uid_concurrent_policy_time.

b/68399339

Test: Check that they can't be read from the shell
    without root permissions and system_server was able
    to read them

Change-Id: I6f09ef608607cb9f4084ba403a1e7254b8c49a06

In kernel 4.7, the capability and capability2 classes were split apart
from cap_userns and cap2_userns (see kernel commit
8e4ff6f228e4722cac74db716e308d1da33d744f). Since then, Android cannot be
run in a container with SELinux in enforcing mode.

This change applies the existing capability rules to user namespaces as
well as the root namespace so that Android running in a container
behaves the same on pre- and post-4.7 kernels.

This is essentially:
  1. New global_capability_class_set and global_capability2_class_set
     that match capability+cap_userns and capability2+cap2_userns,
     respectively.
  2. s/self:capability/self:global_capability_class_set/g
  3. s/self:capability2/self:global_capability2_class_set/g
  4. Add cap_userns and cap2_userns to the existing capability_class_set
     so that it covers all capabilities.  This set was used by several
     neverallow and dontaudit rules, and I confirmed that the new
     classes are still appropriate.

Test: diff new policy against old and confirm that all new rules add
      only cap_userns or cap2_userns;
      Boot ARC++ on a device with the 4.12 kernel.
Bug: crbug.com/754831

Change-Id: I4007eb3a2ecd01b062c4c78d9afee71c530df95f

Bug: 37916906
Test: Builds 'n' boots.
Change-Id: Ia1d86264446ebecc1ca79f32f11354921bc77668
Merged-In: I208ec6a864127a059fb389417a9c6b259d7474cb

This reverts commit 9216a6ad.

Bug: 65206688

Merged-In: I8e61b77a1abe9543e4fba77defb8062407676fcf
Change-Id: I8e61b77a1abe9543e4fba77defb8062407676fcf

This reverts commit f27bba93.

Bug: 65206688

Change-Id: I8e61b77a1abe9543e4fba77defb8062407676fcf

Only seeing this denial in permissive:
allow shell screencap_exec:file getattr;

Bug: 37565047
Test: adb shell screencap w/o root
Test: cts-tradefed run cts-dev --module CtsAadbHostTestCases
Merged-In: I9f31d2067e002e7042646ee38dbfc06687481ac7
Change-Id: I9f31d2067e002e7042646ee38dbfc06687481ac7

Only seeing this denial in permissive:
allow shell screencap_exec:file getattr;

Bug: 37565047
Test: adb shell screencap w/o root
Test: cts-tradefed run cts-dev --module CtsAadbHostTestCases
Merged-In: I9f31d2067e002e7042646ee38dbfc06687481ac7
Change-Id: I9f31d2067e002e7042646ee38dbfc06687481ac7

Android uses hidepid=2 to restrict visibility to other /proc entries on
the system. This helps preserve user, application, and system
confidentiality by preventing unauthorized access to application metadata,
and addresses attacks such as
http://www.cs.ucr.edu/~zhiyunq/pub/sec14_android_activity_inference.pdf

Ensure the SELinux (weaker) equivalent is being enforced by adding
neverallow compile time assertions.

TODO: The "shell" user runs as both an Android application, as well as
spawned via adb shell. This was a mistake. We should separate out the
"shell" Android app into it's own SELinux domain. For now, exclude the
shell from this assertion. (The shell Android app is covered by
hidepid=2, so there's no leaking of data, but still, it's over
privileged today and should be cleaned up.

Bug: 23310674
Test: policy compiles. Compile time assertion only.
Change-Id: I0e1a6506b2719aabf7eb8127f046c4ada947ba90

Only seeing this denial in permissive:
allow shell screencap_exec:file getattr;

Bug: 37565047
Test: adb shell screencap w/o root
Test: cts-tradefed run cts-dev --module CtsAadbHostTestCases
Change-Id: I9f31d2067e002e7042646ee38dbfc06687481ac7

Bug: 37281396
Test: cts-tradefed run cts-dev -m CtsContentTestCases --test=android.content.pm.cts.InstallSessionTransferTest
Change-Id: If2094057d1acfbbf007ae108225decd9ad70e459

Allow wrapped app to send pid back to zygote.

(cherry picked from commit ee694980)

Bug: 63566721
Bug: 63635227
Test: lunch angler-userdebug && m
Test: lunch angler-user && m
Test: lunch angler-user && m && fastboot flashall && m cts && cts-tradefed run commandAndExit cts-dev -m CtsWrapWrapDebugTestCases
Change-Id: Ie1b41c3eb124aa5ee321c124d0121a0e965f0f0e

Allow wrapped app to send pid back to zygote.

Bug: 63566721
Bug: 63635227
Test: lunch angler-userdebug && m
Test: lunch angler-user && m
Test: lunch angler-user && m && fastboot flashall && m cts && cts-tradefed run commandAndExit cts-dev -m CtsWrapWrapDebugTestCases
Change-Id: Ie1b41c3eb124aa5ee321c124d0121a0e965f0f0e

avc:  denied  { find } for
interface=android.hardware.configstore::ISurfaceFlingerConfigs
scontext=u:r:system_server:s0
tcontext=u:object_r:hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:s0
tclass=hwservice_manager permissive=0

Bug: 35197529
Test: Device boots without this denial
Change-Id: Ia43bc5879e03a1f2056e373b17cc6533636f98b1

NOTE: This change is marked dnma because we don't want it on
oc-dr1-dev-plus-aosp or any other downstream branch. Moreover,
oc-dr1-dev-plus-aosp is the only outgoing merger from oc-dr1-dev for
this project.

This reverts commit 11bfcc1e.

Bug: 62908344
Test: make
Change-Id: Ide61829cf99f15777c46f657a0e140d594f88243

This adds parellel rules to the ones added for media_rw_data_file
to allow apps to access vfat under sdcardfs. This should be reverted
if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext it used for access to
the lower filesystem

Change-Id: Idb123206ed2fac3ead88b0c1ed0b66952597ac65
Bug: 62584229
Test: Run android.appsecurity.cts.ExternalStorageHostTest with
      an external card formated as vfat
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>

This adds parellel rules to the ones added for media_rw_data_file
to allow apps to access vfat under sdcardfs. This should be reverted
if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext it used for access to
the lower filesystem

Change-Id: Idb123206ed2fac3ead88b0c1ed0b66952597ac65
Bug: 62584229
Test: Run android.appsecurity.cts.ExternalStorageHostTest with
      an external card formated as vfat
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>

tombstoned allows dumpstate to install "intercepts" to java trace
requests for a given process. When an "intercept" is installed, all
trace output is redirected to a pipe provided by dumpstate instead
of the default location (usually in /data/anr or /data/tombstone).

Note that these processes are already granted "write" and "getattr"
on dumpstate:fifo_file in order to communicate with dumpstate; this
change adds "append" to the existing set of permissions.

Bug: 32064548
Test: manual
Change-Id: Iccbd78c59071252fef318589f3e55ece51a3c64c

Applications connect to tombstoned via a unix domain socket and request
an open FD to which they can write their traces. This socket has a new
label (tombstoned_java_trace_socket) and appdomain and system_server are
given permissions to connect and write to it.

Apps no longer need permissions to open files under /data/anr/ and
these permissions will be withdrawn in a future change.

Bug: 32064548
Test: Manual

(cherry picked from commit a8832dabc7f3b7b2381760d2b95f81abf78db709)

(cherry picked from commit 11bfcc1e)

Change-Id: Icc60d227331c8eee70a9389ff1e7e78772f37e6f

Applications connect to tombstoned via a unix domain socket and request
an open FD to which they can write their traces. This socket has a new
label (tombstoned_java_trace_socket) and appdomain and system_server are
given permissions to connect and write to it.

Apps no longer need permissions to open files under /data/anr/ and
these permissions will be withdrawn in a future change.

Bug: 32064548
Test: Manual

Merged-In: I70a3e6e230268d12b454e849fa88418082269c4f
Change-Id: Ib4b73fc130f4993c44d96c8d68f61b6d9bb2c7d5

Applications connect to tombstoned via a unix domain socket and request
an open FD to which they can write their traces. This socket has a new
label (tombstoned_java_trace_socket) and appdomain and system_server are
given permissions to connect and write to it.

Apps no longer need permissions to open files under /data/anr/ and
these permissions will be withdrawn in a future change.

Bug: 32064548
Test: Manual

(cherry picked from commit a8832dabc7f3b7b2381760d2b95f81abf78db709)

Change-Id: I70a3e6e230268d12b454e849fa88418082269c4f

Test: pass
Bug: 62073522
Change-Id: I3d53d0d5ec701c87fb3d45080799f424f7ba3792

Currently, some jni libs in /vendor/lib are allowed to be executed
in java process by labelling them as same_process_hal_file. This is
wrong because those jni libs are not in fact same process HALs.

After b/37481404, those jni libs for vendor apks are embedded inside the
apk just like downloaded apks.

In order to make this possible, appdomain is allowed to execute
vendor_app_file. Note that allowing this is not a Treble violation because
vendor_app_file is Java and JNI code only. Native libraries in
/vendor/lib are still prevented from being loaded in apps except for
those are labeled as same_process_hal_file AND are loaded via the
'sphal' namespace.

Bug: 37481404
Test: Phone application does not crash.
Change-Id: Ifaece2f05d0b20e28c4b1c0847f5ea0bb28ade02

Specify per-service rules for PDX transport. Now being able to
grant permissions to individual services provided by processes,
not all services of a process.

Also tighter control over which permissions are required for
client and server for individual components of IPC (endpoints,
channels, etc).

Bug: 37646189
Change-Id: I78eb8ae8b6e08105666445a66bfcbd2f1d69d0ea
Merged-Id: I78eb8ae8b6e08105666445a66bfcbd2f1d69d0ea

Sensord move in ag/2106763 should be accompanied by corresponding
sepolicy move of sensord-related files/declarations.

Bug: 36996994
Test: Sailfish build shows no related permission errors
Change-Id: Ibe41b363f7ca2752b5d3e0961298985cf784663d