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  1. Apr 10, 2018
    • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
      Start the process of locking down proc/net · 08731895
      Jeff Vander Stoep authored
      Files in /proc/net leak information. This change is the first step in
      determining which files apps may use, whitelisting benign access, and
      otherwise removing access while providing safe alternative APIs.
      
      To that end, this change:
      * Introduces the proc_net_type attribute which will assigned to any
      new SELinux types in /proc/net to avoid removing access to privileged
      processes. These processes may be evaluated later, but are lower
      priority than apps.
      * Labels /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} as proc_net_vpn due to existing
      use by VPN apps. This may be replaced by an alternative API.
      * Audits all other proc/net access for apps.
      * Audits proc/net access for other processes which are currently
      granted broad read access to /proc/net but should not be including
      storaged, zygote, clatd, logd, preopt2cachename and vold.
      
      Bug: 9496886
      Bug: 68016944
      Test: Boot Taimen-userdebug. On both wifi and cellular: stream youtube
          navigate maps, send text message, make voice call, make video call.
          Verify no avc "granted" messages in the logs.
      Test: A few VPN apps including "VPN Monster", "Turbo VPN", and
      "Freighter". Verify no logspam with the current setup.
      Test: atest CtsNativeNetTestCases
      Test: atest netd_integration_test
      Test: atest QtaguidPermissionTest
      Test: atest FileSystemPermissionTest
      
      Change-Id: I7e49f796a25cf68bc698c6c9206e24af3ae11457
      08731895
  2. Apr 05, 2018
  3. Apr 04, 2018
  4. Apr 03, 2018
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