Add new untrusted_v2_app domain

untrusted_v2_app is basically a refinement of untrusted_app with legacy
capabilities removed and potentially backwards incompatible changes.

This is not currently hooked up to anything.

Bug: 33350220
Test: builds
Change-Id: Ic9fad57476bc2b6022b1eaca8667bf6d844753c2

private/app.te

@@ -86,9 +86,9 @@ allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;
 
 # Execute the shell or other system executables.
-allow appdomain shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
-allow appdomain system_file:file rx_file_perms;
-allow appdomain toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -untrusted_v2_app } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 
 # Renderscript needs the ability to read directories on /system
 r_dir_file(appdomain, system_file)
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
 # logd access
 read_logd(appdomain)
-control_logd(appdomain)
+control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app untrusted_v2_app })
 # application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
 allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
 

private/app_neverallows.te

@@ -5,30 +5,27 @@
 # Only allow domains in AOSP to use the untrusted_app_all attribute.
 neverallow { untrusted_app_all -untrusted_app -untrusted_app_25 } domain:process fork;
 
+define(`all_untrusted_apps',`{ untrusted_app_all untrusted_app_25 untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app }')
 # Receive or send uevent messages.
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
 
 # Receive or send generic netlink messages
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } domain:netlink_socket *;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_socket *;
 
 # Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
 # best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } debugfs_type:file read;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps debugfs_type:file read;
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to register services.
 # Only trusted components of Android should be registering
 # services.
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } service_manager_type:service_manager add;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps service_manager_type:service_manager add;
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to connect to the property service
 # or set properties. b/10243159
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } property_socket:sock_file write;
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } property_type:property_service set;
-
-# b/34115651 - net.dns* properties read
-# This will go away in a future Android release
-neverallow { appdomain -untrusted_app_25 } net_dns_prop:file r_file_perms;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps property_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps property_type:property_service set;
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
 # This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
@@ -38,7 +35,7 @@ neverallow { appdomain -untrusted_app_25 } net_dns_prop:file r_file_perms;
 # permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
 # never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
 # and an untrusted app is allowed fork permission to itself.
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps mlstrustedsubject:process fork;
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to hard link to any files.
 # In particular, if an untrusted app links to other app data
@@ -46,16 +43,16 @@ neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } mlstrustedsubject:pr
 # of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
 # bugs, so we want to ensure untrusted apps never have this
 # capability.
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } file_type:file link;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps file_type:file link;
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to access network MAC address file
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } sysfs_mac_address:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps sysfs_mac_address:file no_rw_file_perms;
 
 # Restrict socket ioctls. Either 1. disallow privileged ioctls, 2. disallow the
 # ioctl permission, or 3. disallow the socket class.
-neverallowxperm { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } *:{ netlink_route_socket netlink_selinux_socket } ioctl;
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } *:{
+neverallowxperm all_untrusted_apps domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:{ netlink_route_socket netlink_selinux_socket } ioctl;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:{
   socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket appletalk_socket
   netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket
   netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket
@@ -66,15 +63,15 @@ neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } *:{
 } *;
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps access to /cache
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to create/unlink files outside of its sandbox,
 # internal storage or sdcard.
 # World accessible data locations allow application to fill the device
 # with unaccounted for data. This data will not get removed during
 # application un-installation.
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } {
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
   fs_type
   -fuse                     # sdcard
   -sdcardfs                 # sdcard
@@ -92,12 +89,12 @@ neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } {
 }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to directly open tun_device
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } tun_device:chr_file open;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps tun_device:chr_file open;
 
 # Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } anr_data_file:dir ~search;
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps anr_data_file:dir ~search;
 
 # Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
 # Create a more specific label if needed
-neverallow { untrusted_app_all ephemeral_app isolated_app } proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };

private/seapp_contexts

 # Input selectors:
 #       isSystemServer (boolean)
 #       isEphemeralApp (boolean)
+#       isV2App (boolean)
 #       isOwner (boolean)
 #       user (string)
 #       seinfo (string)
@@ -11,6 +12,7 @@
 # isSystemServer=true can only be used once.
 # An unspecified isSystemServer defaults to false.
 # isEphemeralApp=true will match apps marked by PackageManager as Ephemeral
+# isV2App=true will match apps in the v2 app sandbox.
 # isOwner=true will only match for the owner/primary user.
 # isOwner=false will only match for secondary users.
 # If unspecified, the entry can match either case.
@@ -29,16 +31,17 @@
 # Precedence rules (see external/selinux/libselinux/src/android/android.c seapp_context_cmp()):
 #       (1) isSystemServer=true before isSystemServer=false.
 #       (2) Specified isEphemeralApp= before unspecified isEphemeralApp= boolean.
-#       (3) Specified isOwner= before unspecified isOwner= boolean.
-#       (4) Specified user= string before unspecified user= string.
-#       (5) Fixed user= string before user= prefix (i.e. ending in *).
-#       (6) Longer user= prefix before shorter user= prefix.
-#       (7) Specified seinfo= string before unspecified seinfo= string.
+#       (3) Specified isV2App= before unspecified isV2App= boolean.
+#       (4) Specified isOwner= before unspecified isOwner= boolean.
+#       (5) Specified user= string before unspecified user= string.
+#       (6) Fixed user= string before user= prefix (i.e. ending in *).
+#       (7) Longer user= prefix before shorter user= prefix.
+#       (8) Specified seinfo= string before unspecified seinfo= string.
 #           ':' character is reserved and may not be used.
-#       (8) Specified name= string before unspecified name= string.
-#       (9) Specified path= string before unspecified path= string.
-#       (10) Specified isPrivApp= before unspecified isPrivApp= boolean.
-#       (11) Higher value of minTargetSdkVersion= before lower value of minTargetSdkVersion=
+#       (9) Specified name= string before unspecified name= string.
+#       (10) Specified path= string before unspecified path= string.
+#       (11) Specified isPrivApp= before unspecified isPrivApp= boolean.
+#       (12) Higher value of minTargetSdkVersion= before lower value of minTargetSdkVersion=
 #              integer. Note that minTargetSdkVersion= defaults to 0 if unspecified.
 #
 # Outputs:
@@ -100,7 +103,8 @@ user=shared_relro domain=shared_relro
 user=shell seinfo=platform domain=shell type=shell_data_file
 user=_isolated domain=isolated_app levelFrom=user
 user=_app seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
-user=_app isEphemeralApp=true domain=ephemeral_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app isV2App=true isEphemeralApp=true domain=ephemeral_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app isV2App=true domain=untrusted_v2_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=26 domain=untrusted_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app domain=untrusted_app_25 type=app_data_file levelFrom=user

private/untrusted_v2_app.te

+###
+### Untrusted v2 sandbox apps.
+###
+app_domain(untrusted_v2_app)
+net_domain(untrusted_v2_app)
+bluetooth_domain(untrusted_v2_app)
+
+# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
+# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
+# cropping or taking user photos.
+allow untrusted_v2_app system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };
+
+# Access to /data/media.
+allow untrusted_v2_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow untrusted_v2_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
+# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
+allow untrusted_v2_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
+
+# allow cts to query all services
+allow untrusted_v2_app servicemanager:service_manager list;
+
+allow untrusted_v2_app audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_v2_app cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_v2_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_v2_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_v2_app mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_v2_app mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_v2_app mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_v2_app mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_v2_app nfc_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_v2_app radio_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_v2_app surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+# TODO: potentially provide a tighter list of services here
+allow untrusted_v2_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
+
+# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
+allow untrusted_v2_app self:process ptrace;

public/untrusted_v2_app.te

+###
+### Untrusted v2 sandbox apps.
+###
+
+type untrusted_v2_app, domain;

tools/check_seapp.c

@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ key_map rules[] = {
                 /*Inputs*/
                 { .name = "isSystemServer", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
                 { .name = "isEphemeralApp",  .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
+                { .name = "isV2App",        .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
                 { .name = "isOwner",        .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
                 { .name = "user",           .dir = dir_in,                              },
                 { .name = "seinfo",         .dir = dir_in,                              },