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CodeLinaro
public-release-test
platform
system
sepolicy
Commits
7826a787
Commit
7826a787
authored
6 years ago
by
Treehugger Robot
Committed by
Gerrit Code Review
6 years ago
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Merge "add links to docs explaining motivations behind neverallow assertions."
parents
9ec48cef
6cf9160e
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private/system_server.te
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4 additions, 1 deletion
private/system_server.te
private/zygote.te
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private/zygote.te
public/domain.te
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public/domain.te
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private/system_server.te
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7826a787
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@@ -880,7 +880,8 @@ neverallow { domain -init -system_server -crash_dump } system_ndebug_socket:sock
neverallow system_server dex2oat_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
# system_server should never execute or load executable shared libraries
# in /data
# in /data. Executable files in /data are a persistence vector.
# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=955 for example.
neverallow system_server data_file_type:file no_x_file_perms;
# The only block device system_server should be accessing is
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@@ -889,6 +890,8 @@ neverallow system_server data_file_type:file no_x_file_perms;
neverallow system_server { dev_type -frp_block_device }:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
# system_server should never use JIT functionality
# See https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/12/bitunmap-attacking-android-ashmem.html
# in the section titled "A Short ROP Chain" for why.
neverallow system_server self:process execmem;
neverallow system_server ashmem_device:chr_file execute;
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private/zygote.te
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7826a787
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@@ -43,7 +43,9 @@ allow zygote resourcecache_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow zygote resourcecache_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# When WITH_DEXPREOPT is true, the zygote does not load executable content from
# /data/dalvik-cache.
# /data/dalvik-cache. Executable files loaded from /data is a persistence vector
# we want to avoid. See
# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=955 for example.
allow { zygote with_dexpreopt(`-zygote') } dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
# Execute idmap and dex2oat within zygote's own domain.
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public/domain.te
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@@ -425,6 +425,9 @@ neverallow { domain -kernel -init -recovery -vold -zygote -update_engine -otapre
#
# Assert that, to the extent possible, we're not loading executable content from
# outside the rootfs or /system partition except for a few whitelisted domains.
# Executable files loaded from /data is a persistence vector
# we want to avoid. See
# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=955 for example.
#
neverallow {
domain
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