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  • Jeff Vander Stoep's avatar
    untrusted_app: policy versioning based on targetSdkVersion · bacb6d79
    Jeff Vander Stoep authored 
    Motivation:
Provide the ability to phase in new security policies by
applying them to apps with a minimum targetSdkVersion.

Place untrusted apps with targetSdkVersion<=25 into the
untrustd_app_25 domain. Apps with targetSdkVersion>=26 are placed
into the untrusted_app domain. Common rules are included in the
untrusted_app_all attribute. Apps with a more recent targetSdkVersion
are granted fewer permissions.

Test: Marlin builds and boots. Apps targeting targetSdkVersion<=25
run in untrusted_app_25 domain. Apps targeting the current development
build >=26 run in the untrusted_app domain with fewer permissions. No
new denials observed during testing.
Bug: 34115651
Bug: 35323421
Change-Id: Ie6a015566fac07c44ea06c963c40793fcdc9a083
    bacb6d79
untrusted_app_all.te 4.51 KiB 
###
### Untrusted_app_all.
###
### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains.
### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
### directory).  The untrusted_app_all attribute is assigned to all default
### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
### attribute is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
### seapp_contexts.
###

# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
create_pty(untrusted_app)

# Legacy text relocations
allow untrusted_app_all apk_data_file:file execmod;

# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out
# to their sandbox directory and then execute.
allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };

# ASEC
allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms;
# Execute libs in asec containers.
allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute execmod };

# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when
# running "adb install foo.apk".
# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files.
# Figure out a way to remove these rules.
allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;

# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
# cropping or taking user photos.
allow untrusted_app_all system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };

#
# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app.
# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app.
#

# Access to /data/media.
allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
allow untrusted_app_all mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;

# allow cts to query all services
allow untrusted_app_all servicemanager:service_manager list;

allow untrusted_app_all audioserver_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all drmserver_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all mediacodec_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all nfc_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all radio_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all app_api_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all vr_manager_service:service_manager find;

# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
# data stored in that directory to process them one by one.
userdebug_or_eng(`
  allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:file r_file_perms;
  allow untrusted_app_all perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
')

# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
allow untrusted_app_all self:process ptrace;

# Cts: HwRngTest
allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:dir search;
allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms;

# Allow apps to view preloaded content
allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;

# Access to /proc/tty/drivers, to allow apps to determine if they
# are running in an emulated environment.
# b/33214085 b/33814662 b/33791054 b/33211769
# https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator/blob/master/AntiEmulator/src/diff/strazzere/anti/emulator/FindEmulator.java
allow untrusted_app_all proc_tty_drivers:file r_file_perms;