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  • Jeff Sharkey's avatar
    Different blkid and fsck execution domains. · 84e1c611
    Jeff Sharkey authored
    vold works with two broad classes of block devices: untrusted devices
    that come in from the wild, and trusted devices.
    
    When running blkid and fsck, we pick which SELinux execution domain
    to use based on which class the device belongs to.
    
    Bug: 19993667
    Change-Id: I44f5bac5dd94f0f76f3e4ef50ddbde5a32bd17a5
    84e1c611
fsck_untrusted.te 1.06 KiB
# Any fsck program run on untrusted block devices
type fsck_untrusted, domain;

# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
allow fsck_untrusted devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };

# Allow stdin/out back to vold
allow fsck_untrusted vold:fd use;
allow fsck_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };

# Run fsck on vold block devices
allow fsck_untrusted block_device:dir search;
allow fsck_untrusted vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;

###
### neverallow rules
###

# Untrusted fsck should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
neverallow fsck_untrusted {
  boot_block_device
  frp_block_device
  metadata_block_device
  recovery_block_device
  root_block_device
  swap_block_device
  system_block_device
  userdata_block_device
  cache_block_device
  dm_device
}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;

# Only allow entry from vold via fsck binaries
neverallow { domain -vold } fsck_untrusted:process transition;
neverallow domain fsck_untrusted:process dyntransition;
neverallow fsck_untrusted { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;