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Stephen Smalley authored
Addresses denials such as: avc: denied { mount } for pid=5 comm="kworker/u:0" name="/" dev=usbfs ino=3234 scontext=u:r:kernel:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:usbfs:s0 tclass=filesystem Change-Id: I1db52193e6a2548c37a7809ef44cf7fd3357326d Signed-off-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
718bf84b
kernel.te 1.03 KiB
# Life begins with the kernel.
type kernel, domain;
# setcon to init domain.
allow kernel self:process setcurrent;
allow kernel init:process dyntransition;
# The kernel is unconfined.
unconfined_domain(kernel)
# cgroup filesystem initialization prior to setting the cgroup root directory label.
allow kernel unlabeled:dir search;
# Mount usbfs.
allow kernel usbfs:filesystem mount;
# init direct restorecon calls prior to switching to init domain
# /dev and /dev/socket
allow kernel { device socket_device }:dir relabelto;
# /dev/__properties__
allow kernel properties_device:file relabelto;
# /sys
allow kernel sysfs:{ dir file lnk_file } relabelfrom;
allow kernel sysfs_type:{ dir file lnk_file } relabelto;
# Initial setenforce by init prior to switching to init domain.
# We use dontaudit instead of allow to prevent a kernel spawned userspace
# process from turning off SELinux once enabled.
dontaudit kernel self:security setenforce;
# Set checkreqprot by init.rc prior to switching to init domain.
allow kernel self:security setcheckreqprot;