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  • Jeff Sharkey's avatar
    Different blkid and fsck execution domains. · 84e1c611
    Jeff Sharkey authored
    vold works with two broad classes of block devices: untrusted devices
    that come in from the wild, and trusted devices.
    
    When running blkid and fsck, we pick which SELinux execution domain
    to use based on which class the device belongs to.
    
    Bug: 19993667
    Change-Id: I44f5bac5dd94f0f76f3e4ef50ddbde5a32bd17a5
    84e1c611
fsck.te 1.19 KiB
# Any fsck program run by init
type fsck, domain;
type fsck_exec, exec_type, file_type;

init_daemon_domain(fsck)

# /dev/__null__ created by init prior to policy load,
# open fd inherited by fsck.
allow fsck tmpfs:chr_file { read write ioctl };

# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
allow fsck devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };

# Allow stdin/out back to vold
allow fsck vold:fd use;
allow fsck vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };

# Run fsck on certain block devices
allow fsck block_device:dir search;
allow fsck userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow fsck cache_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow fsck dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;

###
### neverallow rules
###

# fsck should never be run on these block devices
neverallow fsck {
  boot_block_device
  frp_block_device
  metadata_block_device
  recovery_block_device
  root_block_device
  swap_block_device
  system_block_device
  vold_device
}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;

# Only allow entry from init or vold via fsck binaries
neverallow { domain -init -vold } fsck:process transition;
neverallow domain fsck:process dyntransition;
neverallow fsck { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;