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    Split general policy into public and private components. · cc39f637
    dcashman authored
    Divide policy into public and private components.  This is the first
    step in splitting the policy creation for platform and non-platform
    policies.  The policy in the public directory will be exported for use
    in non-platform policy creation.  Backwards compatibility with it will
    be achieved by converting the exported policy into attribute-based
    policy when included as part of the non-platform policy and a mapping
    file will be maintained to be included with the platform policy that
    maps exported attributes of previous versions to the current platform
    version.
    
    Eventually we would like to create a clear interface between the
    platform and non-platform device components so that the exported policy,
    and the need for attributes is minimal.  For now, almost all types and
    avrules are left in public.
    
    Test: Tested by building policy and running on device.
    
    Change-Id: Idef796c9ec169259787c3f9d8f423edf4ce27f8c
    cc39f637
fsck_untrusted.te 1.11 KiB
# Any fsck program run on untrusted block devices
type fsck_untrusted, domain, domain_deprecated;

# Inherit and use pty created by android_fork_execvp_ext().
allow fsck_untrusted devpts:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };

# Allow stdin/out back to vold
allow fsck_untrusted vold:fd use;
allow fsck_untrusted vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };

# Run fsck on vold block devices
allow fsck_untrusted block_device:dir search;
allow fsck_untrusted vold_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;

r_dir_file(fsck_untrusted, proc)

###
### neverallow rules
###

# Untrusted fsck should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data
neverallow fsck_untrusted {
  boot_block_device
  frp_block_device
  metadata_block_device
  recovery_block_device
  root_block_device
  swap_block_device
  system_block_device
  userdata_block_device
  cache_block_device
  dm_device
}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;

# Only allow entry from vold via fsck binaries
neverallow { domain -vold } fsck_untrusted:process transition;
neverallow * fsck_untrusted:process dyntransition;
neverallow fsck_untrusted { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;